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Abstract 
 
The precautionary principle is increasingly being adopted as a legal risk management 
tool in international environmental law and regulation, especially in the marine context. In 
fact, over the last 35 years it has been included, often as a central feature, in the vast 
majority of international law instruments relating to protection and management of the 
environment. This rise to prominence is largely driven by widespread recognition that the 
ability of environmental law to successfully avert long term and significant harm is very 
much contingent on the successful implementation and application of the precautionary 
principle (specifically, the decision-making and planning measures it advocates). 
 
Owing to the above, it is unsurprising that like many other countries New Zealand has 
incorporated the precautionary principle expressly and implicitly into domestic law and 
policy over the last 25 years. The most recent and arguably most notable instance of the 
incorporation of the precautionary principle in New Zealand law is in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 (“EEZ Act”). 
Indeed, for reasons explained in this paper, the success of the EEZ Act will in large part 
depend on the successful application of the precautionary principle contained in the Act. 
  
Unfortunately, New Zealand’s incorporation and application of the precautionary 
principle to date has been problematic, with confusion and a variety of approaches taken 
to its core concepts, and arguably outright misapplication of it. For this reason, this paper 
seeks to take comprehensive stock of the precautionary principle, first to identify what is 
the likely cause of such confusion and misapplication, and second, to provide a 
foundational understanding to assist policy makers and the courts with the task of 
operationalising and applying it during legislative consenting processes. In doing so, this 
paper focuses on its operation in the marine setting, with a view to assisting with its 
interpretation and application under the EEZ Act. It argues that in order to secure consistent 
and proper application of the precautionary principle, significant work needs to be done to 
clarify definitional ambiguities embedded within the principle. It then argues that further 
work needs to be done to properly operationalise the New Zealand formulations of the 
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precautionary principle (i.e. unpack the substantive content of the principle and pin down 
what such content requires of decision-makers in practice) so they can be consistently and 
correctly applied under New Zealand’s environmental risk management regimes.  
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I Introduction 
 
“Few things are certain in life – except, of course, death and taxes. If certainty were 
a requirement for action, we would never do anything. How well we do in life 
depends in large measure on how successfully we cope with uncertainties” – 
Benjamin Franklin1     
 
That care and foresight are required in the face of an uncertain future is an abiding and 
universal notion:2 “[w]e check our driving mirrors before overtaking; we use condoms to 
avoid HIV infections; we fasten seatbelts to avoid injury in [motor] accidents”.3 This 
practice, better known as erring on the side of caution,4 is represented in numerous maxims 
such as; “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure”, “a stich in time saves nine”, 
and “better be safe than sorry”.5 Common to each of these exemplars is the combination of 
a threat, and uncertainty (i.e. as to the nature of the threat and likelihood of it materialising) 
which, if present, operate as conditions that trigger a need to exercise caution when 
conducting an activity.6 As Trouwborst notes: 
 
Although the degree of likelihood of the feared danger materialising in the absence 
of preventative measures varies with each instance, this materialisation remains 
  
1 Daniel Bodansky “The Precautionary Principle in US Environmental Law” in T O’Riordan, and J Cameron 
(eds) Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Cameron May, London, 1994) 203 at 203. 
2 James Cameron and Juli Abouchar “The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law” in 
David Freestone and Ellen Hey (eds) The Precautionary Principle and International Law: The Challenge of 
Implementation (Kluwer International, Hague, 1996) 29 at 29. David Vanderzwaag “The Precautionary 
Principle and Marine Environmental Protection: Slippery Shores, Rough Seas, and Rising Normative Tides” 
(2002) 33 Ocean Development & International Law 165 at 166. Arie Trouwborst Evolution and Status of the 
Precautionary Principle in International Law (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2002) at 7. Tim 
O’Riordan “The Politics of the Precautionary Principle” in Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher Perspectives 
on the Precautionary Principle (The Federation Press, Sydney, 1999) 283 at 283. 
3 Earl RC “Common-Sense and the Precautionary Principle: an Environmentalist’s Perspective” (1992) 24 
MPB182 at 182. 
4 Bodansky, above n 1, at 203.  
5 David VanderZwaag “The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Law and Policy: Elusive Rhetoric and 
First Embraces” (1999) 8 JELP 355 at 358. David Vanderzwaag, above n 2, at 167. Arie Trouwborst, above 
n 2, at 7. 
6 Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 7. 
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uncertain in all three [examples] – there may or may not be a car passing at the 
moment of an overtaking manoeuvre, a bed partner may or may not carry the HIV-
virus, and an accident may or may not occur. Still in all these cases precautionary 
measures are widely considered appropriate.          
A The precautionary principle  
Over the last 35 plus years, this common-sense notion has crystallised into a legal 
principle, and arguably a legal norm, known as the precautionary principle.7 In the most 
general sense, it operates as a legal risk management tool initially developed at 
international law primarily in the marine context.8  
 
The core definition of the precautionary principle reflects it common sense origins. In 
particular it provides:9 where there is a threat of environmental harm, in order adequately 
to protect the environment, decision-makers must take protective measures in advance of 
the establishment of scientific certainty as to, or, indeed, proof of causation between, the 
relevant activity and the potential environmental harm.10  
 
The precautionary principle has been incorporated into “an overwhelming majority” 
of modern international instruments and domestic law legislative regimes relating to the 
  
7 Gary E Marchant “From General Policy to Legal Rule: Aspirations and Limitations of the Precautionary 
Principle” (2003) 111(14) Environmental Health Perspectives 1799 at 1799. See also James Cameron and 
Juli Abouchar, above n 2; Arie Trouwborst, above n 2. 
8 Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher “Introducing the Precautionary Principle” in Ronnie Harding and 
Elizabeth Fisher, above n 2, at 2; and David Vanderzwaag, above n 2, at 165–188, as cited in Catherine J 
Iorns Magallanes “The Precautionary Principle in the New Zealand Fisheries Act: Challenges in the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal” (paper presented to Australasian Law Teachers Association, Melbourne, July 
2006) at 7, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2079837.  
9 Philippe Sands Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2003) at 268-279; Arie Trouwborst , above n 2, at 245. David Freestone and Ellen Hey “Origins and 
Development of the Precautionary Principle” in David Freestone and Ellen Hey (eds), above n 2, at 13.  John 
S Applegate “The Taming of the Precautionary Principle” (2002) 27 Wm & Mary Envtl L & Pol’y Rev 13 
at 14. 
10 David Freestone and Ellen Hey, above n 9, at 13. Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 245. 
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environment since its introduction.11 In doing so, it has become a fundamental norm of 
international environmental law – so much so it is now widely believe that it occupies a 
central place in any realistic strategy for sustainable development and in ensuring that the 
environment is adequately protected from the effects of human activities.12  
 
New Zealand has been a vocal advocate for the precautionary principle’s inclusion as 
a central, if not fundamental feature, in a multitude of pivotal international law instruments. 
In doing so, New Zealand has played a significant and active role in facilitating the 
principle attaining its prominent status at international law.13 For this reason, it is 
unsurprising that, to date, New Zealand’s legislature has elected to import the precautionary 
principle into domestic law by either expressly or implicitly incorporating versions of it 
into several pieces of environmental legislation.14 Furthermore, the Executive has also 
incorporated the precautionary principle into certain legally binding tertiary instruments 
and domestic environmental policy documents, which inform the exercise of statutory 
decision-making powers under domestic environmental legislation.15  
  
11 Alan Boyle and David Freestone, International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and 
Future Challenges (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) at 138. Simon Marr The Precautionary Principle 
in the Law of the Sea: Modern Decision Making in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, New 
York, 2003) at 13. 
12 David Freestone “International Fisheries Law Since Rio: The Continued Rise of the Precautionary 
Principle” in Alan Boyle and David Freestone (eds) International Law and Sustainable Development: Past 
Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) 134 at 134. 
13 Iorns, above n 8. See also Linda Cameron “Environmental Risk Management in New Zealand – Is There 
Scope to Apply A More Generic Framework?” (New Zealand Treasury Policy Perspectives Paper 06/06, July 
2006) at 15.    
14 See Chapter VI which discusses its incorporation into domestic law. 
15 Iorns, above n 8. Alexander Gillespie “Precautionary New Zealand” (2011) 24 NZULR 3 364. Greg 
Severinsen “Letting our Standards Slip? Precaution and the Standard of Proof under the Resource 
Management Act 1991” (2014) 18 NZJEL 173. Joan Forret “Scientific Evidence and Environmental 
Litigation in New Zealand” (1998) 2 NZJEL 39 at 51; McIntyre v Christchurch City Council [1996] 2 ELRNZ 
84 at 99. Derek Nolan “The Legal Standards of Proof to be Applied to Coastal Projects and Predictions of 
Coastal Behaviour, and the role of the Precautionary Principle” in Pacific Coasts and Ports '97: Proceedings 
of the 13th Australasian Coastal and Ocean Engineering Conference and the 6th Australasian Port and 
Harbour Conference; Volume 1. Christchurch, NZ: Centre for Advanced Engineering, University of 
Canterbury, 1997 
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B Significant new role for precaution in New Zealand environmental regulation  
The most recent and arguably most notable instance of the New Zealand legislature 
incorporating the precautionary principle into domestic legislation is the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 (“EEZ Act”). 
This Act came into force on 28 June 2013. In doing so, it put in place New Zealand’s first 
legislative framework for regulating and managing the environmental effects of certain 
activities conducted in New Zealand’s exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”) and continental 
shelf areas.16 Putting into perspective the monumental size of the EEZ Act’s environmental 
management responsibilities, the geographical area that the Act presides over (e.g. is 
responsible for protecting and ensuring is used or managed in a sustainable fashion), is 20 
times the size of New Zealand’s land area. Specifically, it includes 400 million hectares of 
exclusive economic zone marine space and 170 million hectares of extended continental 
shelf area, which spans from the subtropics to the Sub-Antarctic.     
1 Rationale behind the EEZ Act  
The primary reason behind Parliament’s move to regulate use of this marine space was 
the expected rise in opportunities (brought about by advances in technology), for people to 
undertake a variety of novel industrial activities such as “seabed mining, petroleum 
activities, energy generation, carbon capture and storage, and marine farming”.17 
Specifically, the prospect of having to field an increasing number of applications to perform 
such complex, technological and often large-scale activities, turned the Government’s 
mind to the absence of a coordinated statutory process for assessing and managing the 
associated environmental effects, to ensure they do not “cause environmental harm, affect 
  
16 Ministry for the Environment “Managing our Oceans: A Discussion Document on the Regulations 
Proposed under the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Bill” (May 
2012) ME 1090 at vii and ix; Cabinet Paper “Proposal for Exclusive Economic Zone Environmental Effects 
Legislation” (May 2011) Cab 07-C-0751http://www.mfe.govt.nz/more/cabinet-papers-and-related-material-
search/cabinet-papers/proposal-exclusive-economic-zone; Donald Anton and Rakhyun Kim “The 
Application of the Precautionary and Adaptive Management Approaches in the Seabed Mining Context: 
Trans-Tasman Resources Ltd Marine Consent Decision under New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012” (2015) 30(1) IJRL 175 at 175. 
17 Ministry for the Environment above n 16, at vii and ix. Cabinet Paper 2011 above n 16 at 2.  
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marine life, habitats and biodiversity”.18 As such, Parliament enacted the EEZ Act to plug 
certain regulatory gaps, which:19 
 
…were acknowledged to include the lack of comprehensive and consistent 
environmental assessment for: activities affecting seafloor habitats and 
biodiversity; effects associated with new and existing offshore installations and 
structures; managing cumulative effects of such activities; and activities/proposals 
which extend across both territorial waters and the EEZ 
Drawing heavily on the Resource Management Act 1991, the EEZ Act seeks to create 
an analogous but distinct framework for managing the EEZ space. In doing so, it classifies 
activities as either permitted, discretionary or prohibited,20 and a marine consent is required 
before one can perform discretionary activities.  
 
As will be discussed in Chapters II and VI, the purpose of the EEZ Act is to promote 
sustainable management, and through doing so, “[c]ontinue or enable the implementation 
of New Zealand’s obligations under various international conventions relating to the 
marine environment”.21 In addressing the purpose section of the Act (then Bill) the then 
Minister for the Environment Amy Adams noted:22 
 
The proposed purpose clause will use the concept of sustainable management and 
include the same environmental foundation as the purpose of the RMA...Because 
the proposed wording is similar to the purpose of the RMA, it should benefit from 
more than 20 years of the RMA case law that clarifies the meaning and 
implementation of sustainable management.  
As will be demonstrated below, reliance on the 20 years of case law, so far as it relates to 
application of the precautionary principle, is arguably problematic and likely to result in a 
  
18 Ministry for the Environment above n 16. Chris Simmons “The RMA at Sea?” (2012) NZLJ 385 at 385. 
19 Simmons, above n 18, at 385; (8 August 2012) 683 NZPD 4779. 
20 EEZ Act, ss 20 and 35-37. 
21 Sections 10 and 11.  
22 (8 August 2012) 683 NZPD 4779, at 4780.  
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flawed approach to applying the principle being carried over to the EEZ Act.    
2 The central role of the precautionary principle  
The EEZ Act likely represents Parliament’s most incisive effort to embed the 
precautionary principle into environmental decision-making.23 As is discussed later, this is 
demonstrated through:  
 
(1) the inclusion of the precautionary principle twice in the operative decision-making 
provisions of the Act; first at s 31, where it is to be applied when considering whether 
to permit, make discretionary or prohibit an activity; and second, at s 61 where it is to 
be applied by decision-makers when considering whether to grant a marine consent;  
(2) the fact that the formulations of the precautionary principle found in ss 31 and 61 likely 
represent the strongest versions of the precautionary principle, in terms of 
environmental protection, which Parliament has incorporated into New Zealand 
legislation to date; and 
(3) the fact that compared to other environmental legislation, the EEZ Act treats proper 
application of the precautionary principle as being especially vital to whether or not 
the Act’s decision-making process is capable of producing decisions that will achieve 
sustainable management objectives in the Act’s purpose.24     
 
As Chapters IV and V will explain, because “uncertainty” and “harm” come together 
in considerable abundance when conducting industrial activities in the marine space, the 
strong emphasis that the EEZ Act places on the precautionary principle is warranted and is 
in line with common practice at international law.  
 
  
23 See discussion of the EEZ Act’s incorporation of the precautionary principle in Chapter VI.  
24 See s 10 of the EEZ Act which, in the most explicit terms found in legislation to date, expressly states: 
“[i]n order to achieve the purpose, decision-makers must—apply the information principles” (that is, the Act's 
version of the precautionary principle), “…to the development of regulations and the consideration of 
applications for marine consent. Also refer to further discussion on this point at Chapter VI. 
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In addressing such inherent uncertainty, Cabined noted in its “Proposal for Exclusive 
Economic Zone environmental effects legislation” that:25       
 
[t]he EEZ is an environment about which relatively little is known, and the 
decision-making framework for the legislation needs to acknowledge those 
uncertainties.  The Fisheries Act deals with this issue by using information 
principles to guide decision-makers.  
 
Regarding harm in this context, the EEZ Act swiftly followed the Gulf of Mexico 
Deepwater Horizon and Rena disasters. These incidents put in sharp relief the potential 
magnitude of harm, which activities the EEZ Act seeks to regulate can render on receiving 
ecosystems. The above therefore likely explains:  
 
(1) Parliament’s indication in s 10(3)(b) of the Act26 that the Act’s success or failure 
hinges on the successful operation of the precautionary principle; and  
(2) the decision to incorporate into the EEZ Act what the latter chapters will demonstrate 
is the strongest precautionary principle formulation, and which also is arguably the 
first to possess true normative character. 
 
Based on the above, when managing potentially invasive activities in the marine space 
under the EEZ Act, proper application of the precautionary principle is arguably more 
critical to achieving the requisite environmental protection goals of the EEZ Act, than is 
the case under terrestrial environmental management regimes.27    
  
25 Cabinet Paper, above n 16, at 5. 
26 Specifically, ss 10(3)(b) provides that “in order to achieve the purpose [of the Act], decision makers 
must…apply the information principles to the development of regulations and the consideration of 
applications for marine consent”.   
27 Marguerite Quin “The Fisheries Act 1996: Context, Purpose, and Principles” (1999) 8 AULR 503. Also 
see Chapter II discussion on the unique nature of the marine space.  
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C Fundamental lack of guidance on how to apply the precautionary principle  
With the above in mind, it is worth emphasising that policy makers modelled the EEZ 
Act on the RMA. Furthermore, as will be discussed in chapter IV, the drafting of its 
formulation of precautionary principle in ss 31 and 61 is based on the equivalent provisions 
in the Fisheries Act. Thus, in the course of determining how to apply the principle under 
the EEZ Act, decision-makers and the courts will inevitably resort to the body of case law 
regarding the precautionary principle’s application under such pre-existing legislation for 
guidance.28 The majority of such case law relates to the precautionary principle’s 
application under the Resource Management Act 1991. However, the courts have also 
considered its application on numerous occasions under the Fisheries Act 1996 and the 
Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996. Furthermore, since its recent 
enactment decision-makers have applied the precautionary principle under the EEZ Act 
when considering marine consent applications.29  
 
In spite of its considerable exposure to judicial scrutiny, the precautionary principle, 
and in particular how it ought to operate in practice, appears to have remained an elusive 
concept for New Zealand’s Courts, and decision-makers of first instance alike. As 
Severinsen notes:30  
 
…the courts have been prepared to read in precaution in a variety of ways in the 
consenting context. This has been done largely on a case-by-case basis, and has 
resulted in a range of inconsistent judicial approaches. (emphasis added) 
Rive echoes the above sentiment. In discussing the circumstances in which the 
precautionary principle might appropriately be applied he observes the matter is far from 
settled “with different divisions of the Environment Court adopting various views as to the 
  
28 See discussion in Chapter VI, which discusses how two of the first decision under the EEZ Act (in particular 
the Trans-Tasman Resources Ltd Marine Consent Decision, and Chatham Rock Phosphate Limited Decision) 
have taken this approach. 
29 Gillespie, above n 15.   
30 Severinsen above n 15, at 173. This view is supported by Cameron, above n 13, at 15. 
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relevance of the precautionary principle”.31 In addition to such confusion, Iorns identifies 
what is likely outright misapplication of the precautionary principle, by arguing that in 
applying the precautionary principle under the Fisheries Act 1996, “precaution is 
effectively being used contrary to its intended purpose”.32  
 
As explained above, the success of the EEZ Act will in large part turn on the successful 
application of the ss31 and 61 versions of the precautionary principle. As such, the apparent 
inability to consistently and correctly apply the precautionary principle in the various 
consent decisions and case law that will likely guide its application under the EEZ Act 
going forward is alarming. As chapter VI of this paper discusses, even more alarming is 
the fact that this inconsistent and incorrect application is arguably the product of a flawed 
approach to incorporating the principle into New Zealand law. In particular, chapter VI 
asserts that the root cause of this flawed approach is a failure to recognise and confront the 
fact that the international law versions of the precautionary principle that New Zealand’s 
formulations are modelled on are:  
 
(1) intentionally vague high-level definitions, which house various unresolved legal issues 
that the negotiating states could not agree on; and 
(2) do not represent or capture the full substantive legal content of the precautionary 
principle, but rather represent short-hand summaries of what the precautionary 
principle entails.  
 
As such, like their international equivalents, New Zealand formulations are “situated at a 
meta-level”, and for this reason, “require explication and operationalisation” in order to be 
suitable for application by decision-makers and the courts as a legal decision-making tool.33 
In examining this, Chapter VI explains how New Zealand has not “operationalised” the 
precautionary principle. As a result, decision-makers and courts appear to have never taken 
  
31 Vernon Rive “Environmental Assessment” in Derek Nolan (ed) Environmental and Resource Management 
Law (4th ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2011) chapter 18 at 1186-1188.  
32 Iorns, above n 8, at 5. 
33 See discussion in Chapter VI and footnote 392.  
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pause to consider what the full substantive content of the precautionary principle entails 
and in turn how this content shapes how the principle should be applied.   
D Purpose of this paper  
In order to demonstrate how New Zealand decision-makers and courts have likely 
misunderstood and misapplied the precautionary principle, and in turn address this and the 
subsequent problems that this gives rise to, this paper seeks to take comprehensive stock 
of the precautionary principle. Specifically, it does so with a view to building a 
foundational understanding of the precautionary principle, which is capable of assisting 
policy makers and the courts with the task of operationalising the precautionary principle 
in New Zealand.  
 
While this exercise is of importance to the precautionary principles application under 
all of the legislative regimes that it features in, due to its significance under the EEZ Act, 
this paper will focus this exercise on its operation in the marine setting. Given the 
likelihood that New Zealand decision-makers and courts are not properly acquainted with 
what the precautionary principle entails, in “taking stock” this paper goes back to first 
principles, and from this foundational level, seeks to build a practical understanding of the 
concept with those who must apply it in practice as the audience in mind.  
 
On the above basis, Chapter II starts by examining the core contextual elements that 
assist one with attaining the level of understanding required for the proper application of 
the precautionary principle when exercising administrative decision-making power. Given 
that confusion over the precautionary principle often arises from a failure to distinguish it 
from the predecessor “traditional approach” that it replaces, Chapter III conducts an in-
depth analysis of this predecessor approach. Specifically, this exercise is useful because it:  
 
(1) provides context that is essential to properly appreciating the mischief the 
precautionary principle seeks to address; 
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(2) operates as a useful litmus test for ascertaining when decision-makers or the courts 
have, despite their best efforts to apply the precautionary principle, reverted back to a 
traditional approach; and 
(3) informs the task of operationalizing the precautionary principle.   
 
Chapter IV subsequently considers in detail the various scientific insights which: (a) 
led to the realisation that the traditional legal approach to environmental regulation is 
unable to adequately protect the environmental and prevent harm; and (b) provided the 
impetus for the emergence and adoption of the precautionary principle. This chapter does 
this on the basis that:  
 
(1) such a detailed working knowledge of these issues helps with understanding the 
specific task given to the precautionary principle, something that decision-makers 
surely need to be cognisant of when wielding the principle as a tool for overcoming 
such issues; and 
(2) due to the lack of certainty as to the precautionary principle’s normative content and 
parameters, and the absence of proper guidance as to how it ought to be 
operationalised, a detailed appreciation of the mischief that underpins the principle’s 
existence arguably serves as a useful compass that can guide decision-makers.   
 
In response to the failure to go beyond the meta-level definitions of the precautionary 
principle when applying it in New Zealand, Chapter V discusses the emergence and 
development of the precautionary principle in depth in order to:  
 
(1) identify its conceptual core, common purpose, structure, and key components on the 
basis that these are matters decision-makers must have a settled understanding of in 
order to properly apply the precautionary principle and do so in a consistent manner;  
(2) identify the fact that the precautionary principle is a much broader concept than what 
is currently understood, and in fact entails a “territory” of substantive meaning; 
(3) elucidate what the substantive content found within the “territory” of substantive 
meaning identified at (2) above includes; and 
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(4) demonstrate that there are multiple formulations of the precautionary principle that 
vary in terms of the strength of environmental protection they afford. 
 
Finally, in drawing upon the above analysis, chapter VI explains in detail the fundamental 
issues associated with the way in which various versions of the precautionary principle are 
incorporated into New Zealand legislation, and how this has likely given rise to the 
application difficulties experienced to date. Finally, in response to such difficulties, 
drawing on the preceding analysis, this chapter attempts to elucidate the broader legal 
content of the New Zealand precautionary principle formulations and identify issues that 
will need to be resolved in the course of operationalising them.   
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II Key Contextual Matters  
 
There are three core contextual elements that greatly assist one with attaining the level 
of informed understanding required to apply the precautionary principle properly in the 
course of exercising administrative decision-making power. These include:   
 
(1) the fundamental role of environmental law; 
(2) what the environment and ecosystems are and what they entail; and   
(3) the relationship between science and environmental law. 
 
Logic dictates that awareness of these three elements leads to a better appreciation of the 
precautionary principle’s proper place within the wider environmental law landscape. On 
this basis, consideration of these matters is an essential prerequisite to understanding how 
the precautionary principle should operate in practice.  
A Fundamental role of environmental law 
It has long been acknowledged that the human activities we conduct often carry a risk 
of having adverse impacts on the ecosystems that make up the receiving environment. 
Environmental law emerged in response to this acknowledgement and thus is aimed at 
addressing and managing adverse anthropogenic impacts.34  
 
At its most basic, environmental law is a “body of law concerned with protecting the 
environment and human health from the risks arising from [human] industrial activity”.35 
Palmer’s summary below aptly captures the essence of environmental law:36  
 
…the purposes and objectives of legislation and the subject-matter of litigation 
  
34 Hon Justice Cooke “The Concept of Environmental Law – The New Zealand Law – An Overview” [1975] 
NZLJ 631. Hanling Wang, “Ecosystem Management and its Application to Large Marine Ecosystems: 
Science, Law, and Politics” (2004) 35 Ocean Dev & Int'l L 41 at 43.  
35 Elizabeth Fisher “Is the Precautionary Principle Justiciable?” (2001) 13(3) Journal of Environmental Law 
315 at 317. 
36 Kenneth Palmer “Introduction to Environmental Law” in Derek Nolan, above n 31, at 8.  
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generally classified as “environmental” have as their central focus the interaction 
of human societies, individuals within those societies, with both the physical 
(abiotic) and organic (biotic) surroundings. Environmental law…[concerns] the 
use, management and protection of the physical and biological elements of the 
biosphere and the effects of human interactions within and between these physical 
and biological elements.     
 
Throughout its crystallisation into a distinct legal discipline, environmental law has 
become states’ primary means of safeguarding the environment from deleterious man-
made impacts.  Such protection remains the integral purpose of environmental law.  
 
At a national level, the environmental law framework comprises national policies and 
strategies, legislation, and administrative structures, which seek to coordinate and regulate 
human activities with a view to achieving internationally agreed fundamental norms, such 
as sustainable development, intergenerational equity and “integrated resource practice” 
(otherwise known as the ecosystem approach).37 In general terms sustainable development 
means “development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.38 In line with international practice, 
New Zealand environmental legislation has adopted the overarching goal of “sustainable 
management”, which embraces the above core essence of sustainable development, as the 
overarching goal it seeks to achieve.39  
 
The recently enacted EEZ Act is illustrative of the above. Parliament enacted this Act 
to “set up a legislative framework to regulate and manage the environmental effects of 
activities in the EEZ and on the continental shelf, which were not previously managed”.40 
  
37 At 8. 
38 World Commission on Environment and Development Our Common Future: From One Earth to One 
World (The Bruntland Report) 1987.  
39 Klaus Bosselmann “The Concept of Sustainable Development” in Klaus Bosselmann, David Grinlinton 
and Prue Taylor (eds) Environmental Law for a Sustainable Society (2nd ed, NZCEL, Auckland, 2002) at 95.   
40 Rakhyun Kim
 
& Donald Anton “The Application of the Precautionary and Adaptive Management 
Approaches in the Seabed Mining Context: Trans-Tasman Resources Ltd Marine Consent Decision under 
New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012” (2015) 
30 IJRL 175 at 176.    
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In terms of the EEZ Act’s objectives, section 10 provides (emphasis added):41  
 
(1) The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable management of the 
natural resources of the exclusive economic zone and the continental 
shelf.    
(2) In this Act, sustainable management means managing the use, 
development, and protection of natural resources in a way, or at a rate, 
that enables people to provide for their economic well-being while— 
(a) sustaining the potential of natural resources (excluding minerals) to 
meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
(b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of the environment; and 
(c) avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities 
on the environment. 
(3) In order to achieve the purpose, decision-makers must— 
(a) take into account decision-making criteria specified in relation to 
particular decisions; and 
(b) apply the information principles to the development of regulations 
and the consideration of applications for marine consent. 
 
Although subject to slight variances, this purpose is modelled on the Resource 
Management Act 1991 section 5 purpose, which provides (emphasis added): 
 
(1) The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable management of natural 
and physical resources. 
(2) In this Act, sustainable management means managing the use, 
development, and protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or 
at a rate, which enables people and communities to provide for their social, 
economic, and cultural well-being and for their health and safety while— 
(a) sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding 
minerals) to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future 
generations; and 
  
41 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 (hereafter referred to 
as the “EEZ Act”), s 10.  
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(b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and 
ecosystems; and 
(c) avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on 
the environment.  
 
Each of the above Acts lead with an overriding purpose of promoting sustainable 
management flanked by a series of sub-purposes that are either a natural corollary of, or 
prerequisite to, achieving sustainable management.42 For example: the principle of 
intergenerational equity is reflected in s 10(2)(a) of the EEZ Act and 5(2)(a) of the RMA; 
the ecosystem approach is reflected in s 10(2)(b) of the EEZ Act and s 5(2)(b) of the RMA, 
and the precautionary principle is reflected in s 10(3)(b) of the EEZ Act.  
      
B The environment and ecosystems  
Understanding the parameters of environmental law logically flows from the definition 
of “environment” and “ecosystems”. While the term “environment” does not enjoy a 
generally accepted legal definition or usage as a term of art, the following definition is 
representative of most (emphasis added):43  
 
“Environment” means “…the circumstance, objects, or conditions by which one is 
surrounded…the complex of physical, chemical, and biotic factors (such as 
climate, soil and living things) that act upon an organism or an ecological 
community and ultimately determine its form and survival…the aggregate of social 
and cultural conditions that influence life of an individual or community”   
 
The term ‘environment' is also typically defined in relevant international agreements.  
In spite of this however, it is readily accepted that as a legal term, ‘environment’ includes 
all life forms, habitats, areas of the earth, ecosystems and organisms, as well as all land, 
marine and atmospheric resources.44   
  
42 Bosselmann, above n 39, at 107. Palmer above n 36, at 14-15 and 26-30. 
43 Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton International Environmental Law (3rd ed, Transnational Publishers, 
New York, 2004) at 2. Philippe Sands, above n  9, at 16.  
44 Bruce Pardy Environmental Law: A Guide to Concepts (Butterworths, Toronto, 1996) at 99.  
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New Zealand environmental legislative regimes however, often provide a definition of 
‘environment’. For example, section 4 of the EEZ Act provides (emphasis added):   
 
environment means the natural environment, including ecosystems and their 
constituent parts and all natural resources, of— 
(a) New Zealand: 
(b) the exclusive economic zone: 
(c) the continental shelf: 
(d) the waters beyond the exclusive economic zone and above and beyond the 
continental shelf 
 
Similarly, section 2 of the RMA provides (emphasis added): 
 
environment includes— 
(a) ecosystems and their constituent parts, including people and communities; 
and 
(b) all natural and physical resources; and 
(c) amenity values; and 
(d) the social, economic, aesthetic, and cultural conditions which affect the 
matters stated in paragraphs (a) to (c) or which are affected by those matters 
 
Based on the different articulations of the term ‘environment’ found in common literature 
and innumerable legal instruments, it is clear that this term is intended to cover the totality 
of the different forms of life within a particular delimited region. 
 
The term ‘ecosystem’ often appears in the various legal definitions of ‘environment’. 
In a non-legal sense, scientists, policy and lawmakers alike often treat ecosystems as being 
synonymous with environment. Legal instruments however, often do not treat the term 
‘ecosystem’ as being synonymous with ‘environment’. Rather, the ecosystem concept 
regularly appears at the core of the definition of environment. For example, the EEZ Act 
and RMA definitions of ‘environment’ both record ‘ecosystems’ (and their constituent 
parts) as a central element to the overall concept.  
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International and domestic legal instruments typically do not fully define the term 
‘Ecosystem’. While, the term ‘ecosystem’ is sometimes loosely identified within the 
definition of environment,45 its full substantive definition typically lies beyond that 
included in legislation and other legal instruments. The Oxford dictionary for example, 
defines ecosystem as: “a unit of ecology…which includes the plants and animals occurring 
together plus that part of their environment over which they have influence”.46 Although 
articulated in a multitude of ways, the basic connotations around ‘ecosystems’ remain 
unchanged.47 Multiple institutions and commentators have agreed that the key features of 
ecosystems can be summarised in the following five points:48 
 
(1) An ecosystem exists in a space with boundaries that may or may not be 
explicitly delineated. Ecosystems are distinguishable from each other based on 
their biophysical attributes and their locations. (2) An ecosystem includes both 
living organisms and their abiotic environment, including pools of organic and 
inorganic materials. (3) The organisms interact with each other, and interact with 
the physical environment through fluxes of energy, organic and inorganic materials 
amongst the pools. These fluxes are mediated and functionally controlled by 
species’ behaviour and environmental forces. (4) An ecosystem is dynamic. Its 
structure and function change with time. (5) An ecosystem exhibits emergent 
properties that are characteristic of its type and that are invariant within the domain 
of existence. 
  
45 Specifically the “environment” definitions in both the EEZ Act and RMA refer to “ecosystems and their 
constituent parts” although the RMA does further elaborate on the definition by subsequently noting 
ecosystems also “[include] people and communities". 
46 Sands, above n 9, at 15. Pardy, above n 44, at 87 (footnotes omitted). R Schlaepfer Ecosystem-Based 
Management of Natural Resources: A Step towards Sustainable Development (IUFRO, Occasional Paper No. 
6, 1997) at [2.3]. Bruce Hatcher and Roger Bradbury Marine Ecosystem Management: Is the whole greater 
than the sum of the parts?” in Donald Rothwell and David VanderZwaag (eds) Towards Principled Oceans 
Governance: Australian and Canadian approaches and challenges (Routledge, New York, 2006) 205 at 206 
to 209.  
47 Hatcher and Bradbury above n 46, at 207. 
48 G Likens An Ecosystem Approach: Its Use and Abuse (Ecology Institute, Oldendorf, 1992) at 10; RV 
O’Neill and others A Hierarchical Concept of Ecosystems (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1986) at 
68-69. Wang, above n 34, at 43. Pardy above n 44, at 87 (footnotes omitted).   
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Maintenance of ecosystem health and integrity refers to an ecosystem that retains its 
structure, activity (also referred to as ‘function’), and resilience over time; in other words, 
whether it is sustainable.49  
 
As is discussed in chapter IV, the complex nature and function of the ecosystem is at 
the heart of the precautionary principle, and the bulk of issues faced when applying it. Thus, 
a basic appreciation of what ecosystems entail informs one’s understanding of the 
precautionary principle and how it ought to be applied. As will become apparent, 
understanding the meaning and relevance of ecosystems is also integral to appreciating the 
proper place of the precautionary principle in environmental law. More importantly, as 
chapter IV demonstrates, the a priori assumptions underpinning the precautionary principle 
stem from the complex and interconnected nature of ecosystems captured in the definition 
set out below.  
 
In order to provide context to later discussion regarding the precautionary principle’s 
prominence in the marine setting, it is worth noting that two key attributes distinguish 
marine ecosystems from other categories of ecological organisation (e.g. such as terrestrial 
ecosystems):50  
 
First marine ecosystems explicitly include the interactions among organisms and 
the viscous, energetic environment they inhabit (i.e. the processes at the bio-
physical interface). The fluid medium of the ocean connects marine populations, 
communities, habitats and pools of biochemical far more intimately that their 
terrestrial counterparts. Second, marine ecosystems implicitly exhibit some form 
of integrity reflected in emergent properties (i.e. the whole is greater than the sum 
of the parts…) and organisational or thermodynamic closure (i.e. internal 
transformations exceed trans boundary fluxes).    
  
49 Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General GA Res 69(a) A/61/63, (2006) at [135]. 
50 J Steele “The Ocean Landscape” (1989) 3 Landscape Ecology 185 at 185 to 192. S Woodley, J Kay and G 
Francis (eds) Ecological Integrity and the Management of Ecosystems (University of Waterloo Press, 
Waterloo, 1993). Hatcher and Bradbury above n 46, at 207. Oceans and the Law of the Sea, above n 49, 
preamble. 
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As chapter IV demonstrates, such interconnectivity and interdependency makes the marine 
space (relative to terrestrial ecosystems) considerably more vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of human activities. As Chapters IV and V demonstrate, it is these characteristics, 
which are responsible for the precautionary principle’s particularly swift emergence in 
international law (especially in the ocean management setting). 
1 Ecosystems: Their life sustaining capacity  
Simply put, ecosystems are life-supporting systems. They are essential to the survival 
and welfare of human beings and all other life forms.51 In particular, “marine ecosystems, 
which cover more than 70 per cent of the globe and support an abundant and diverse web 
of life, are extremely valuable for the health and development of our planet”.52 At 
international law it is almost universally accepted that “[e]cosystems should be managed 
for their intrinsic values and for the tangible or intangible benefits for humans…”.53 As 
Kiss notes: 54   
 
Environmental law springs form the understanding that the environment 
determines the form and survival of each organism and community thus national, 
regional and international efforts must be taken to ensure the continued viability of 
the planet and the sustainability of its myriad of species… 
 
In terms of anthropogenic benefits, humankind derives benefit from ecosystems by way of 
  
51 Alan Boyle and David Freestone “Introduction” and David Freestone “International Fisheries Law Since 
Rio: The Continued Rise of the precautionary Principle” in Alan Boyle and David Freestone (eds), above n 
12, at 1. David Farrier “Factoring Biodiversity Conservation into Decision-Making Processes: The Role of 
the Precautionary Principle” and David James “Economic Concepts and the Precautionary Principle and 
Implementation of Safe Minimum Standards” in Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher Perspectives on the 
Precautionary Principle, above n 2, at 155. Klaus Bosselmann “Environmental Law for Sustainability” in 
Benjamin J Richardson and Stepan Wood (eds) Environmental Law for Sustainability (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2006) 129 at 145 and 146. 
52 Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General, above n 49, at [115]. 
53 Decision V/6 by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its fifth meeting 
(COP), Nairobi, 15-26 May 2000, UNEP/COP/5/23.   
54 Kiss and Shelton above n 43, at 2. 
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their:55  
 
(1) provision of life-sustaining and life-enhancing resources (for example, through the 
harvesting of living marine resources);  
(2) provision of ecological processes which regulate and sustain biospheric processes 
(such as the ozone layer, climate systems, carbon cycle and water cycle) within the 
“relatively narrow range of parameters [required] to sustain life”;56 and 
(3) inputs into culture, aesthetics and spiritual practices.  
 
Ecosystems are life-support systems for all organisms regardless of their worth to human 
society.57 Today it is generally recognised that all life-forms have intrinsic value and should 
be “recognised, protected and conserved simply because they exist”.58 It is this very 
dedication to protecting all life forms on the basis of their mere existence, which signifies 
the necessity to protect ecosystems – they are a sine qua non for the sustainability of life. 
 
2 Ecosystems: sustainability 
In spite of the numerous international and domestic definitions, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity aptly captures the main thrust of sustainable use. It provides:59 
  
55 Boyle and Freestone, above n 12, at 1; Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General, 
above n 49, at [135]; Rusong Wang and others “Understanding Eco-Complexity: Social-Economic-Natural 
Complex Ecosystem approach” (2011) 8 Ecological Complexity 15 at 17.  
56 Boyle and Freestone, above n 12, at 1. 
57 Rosie Cooney “From Promise to Practicalities: The Precautionary Principle in Biodiversity Conservation 
and Sustainable Use” in Rosie Cooney & Barney Dickson Biodiversity and the Precautionary Principle: 
Risks and Uncertainty in Conservation and Sustainable Use (Earthscan, London. 2005) 3 at 3. Convention 
on Biological Diversity 1760 UNTS 79, 142 (opened for signature 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 
December 1993), preamble. Decision V/6 by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity at its fifth meeting, above n 53. Decision VII/11 of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity at its seventh meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 20 February 2004 UNEP/COP. Kenneth 
Palmer above n 31, at 6 (references omitted).   
58 Decision V/6 by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its fifth meeting, 
above n 53. Decision VII/11 COP above n 57. Palmer, above n 36, at 6 (references omitted).  
59 Convention on Biological Diversity 1760 UNTS 79, 142 (opened for signature 5 June 1992, entered into 
force 29 December 1993), art 2. 
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"Sustainable use" means the use of components of biological diversity in a way 
and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, 
thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and 
future generations.  
 
Essentially, sustainability entails ensuring “the proper functioning of natural systems”60 
and that “essential processes shall not be impaired”, while contemporaneously facilitating 
efficient utilisation of ecosystems; “but not in such a way as to endanger the integrity of 
those other ecosystems or species with which they coexist”.61 Thus, as a matter of logic, 
understanding the multitude of ecological linkages, interactions, and their implications 
(e.g. manner, gravity and extent to which human-induced harm communicates through an 
ecosystems), is an essential prerequisite to ascertaining whether an activity will 
compromise the “proper functioning”, “essential processes” and overall integrity of a 
receiving ecosystem. In this regard, without such knowledge, decision-makers are:  
 
(1) blind to an ecosystem’s capacity to accommodate human demands (that is, whether a 
proposed activity will unduly compromise ecosystem structure or function);  and 
(2) in turn are unable to ascertain the conservation / use balance capable of achieving 
sustainable use.62  
 
As will become apparent in Chapter IV and V, it is the virtual impossibility of fully 
appreciating and understanding the ecosystem functions and processes that are in play 
within a given receiving environment, is ultimately responsible for the emergence of the 
precautionary principle and its close ties with sustainable development (or in the case of 
New Zealand, ‘sustainable management’).  
  
60 World Charter for Nature 1982 General Assembly Resolution 37/7, Report of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992 (United Nations publication, 
Sales No. E.93.I.8 and corrigenda) at [1]. 
61 At [4]. Decision VII/11 COP above n 57, at [6(a)].  
62 Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General, above n 49, at [115]. 
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3 The relationship between science and environmental law  
 As noted earlier in this Chapter, environmental law exists to regulate human activities 
and respond to environmental problems they may generate, particularly those that threaten 
quality of life for human society.63  
 
 Fundamental to legal decision-making, the appropriate outcome that should be reached 
upon the application of the relevant legal principles turns on the facts of any particular case. 
In the environmental law setting, science is largely the means employed to identify and 
explain the relevant facts. As one author notes, environmental law “is perhaps uniquely 
dependant on science for the determination of the existence and scope of problems and 
appropriate…responses to them”.64 As such, it goes without question that science is the 
only discipline capable of studying environmental issues. This is why science is referred to 
as “…the linchpin around which environmental law is organised”.65 As von Moltke 
observes:66  
 
Without science we know little or nothing about the threats to the environment 
which require our attention…Science makes the environment speak. Without 
science, trees have no standing...  
 
…toxics go unknown, ecosystems degrade unrecognized and species are lost 
without our knowing. Scientists are deeply implicated in the process of 
environmental policy formation. 
 
In particular, science is the only discipline with the means to identify, analyse, understand 
and predict:  
  
63 Dinah Shelton “The Impact of Scientific Uncertainty on Environmental Law and Policy in the United 
States” in David Freestone and Ellen Hey (eds), above n 9, at 210. 
64 At 210. 
65 Nicolas de Saadeleer “The Principles of Prevention and Precaution in International Law: Two Heads of 
the Same Coin?” in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David Ong and Panos Mekouris (eds) Research Handbook on 
International Environmental Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2010) at 185. 
66 Konrad Von Moltke “The Relationship Between Policy, Science, Technology, Economics and Law in the 
Implementation of the Precautionary Principle” in David Freestone and Ellen Hey (eds), above n 2, at 98. 
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(1) ecosystem structures, processes and the plethora of complex and inextricable, but often 
unseen, connections between ecosystems;67 and 
(2) the environmental impact of often technological human activities on an ecosystem’s 
structures, processes, and interactions with other ecosystems.  
 
As an illustration of this, Shelton’s comment is noteworthy:68 
 
New technologies and the consequences of them pose complex technical issues that 
require scientific “translations” for lay persons charged with fact finding or 
[decision-]making.  
 
Further, de Saadler states that science is “…much more in evidence in environment law 
than in other branches of the law…” because:69  
 
First, scientists detect, identify and set out the ecological problems to which the 
law must respond. Second, environmental crises are increasingly perceived through 
scientific descriptions of our physical world. Last but not least, science is often 
called upon to play a decisive role in judicial procedures. 
 
Thus, environmental decision-makers rely on science for the basic information regarding:  
 
(1) a “particular factual claim” that a harm or threat which is caused by or relates to a 
given human activity exists (for example, whether dust plumes generated by seafloor 
mining interfere with marine life);70 and  
(2) what environmental measures that are capable of mitigating the alleged threat, exist 
and should be implemented. 
  
67 Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnee and Ellen Hey “Mapping the Field” in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnee 
and Ellen Hey (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2007) at 7. 
68 Dinah Shelton, above n 63.   
69 Nicolas de Saadeleer, above n 65, at 185-186. 
70 Dinah Shelton, above n 63.   
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As de Saadler goes on to note:71  
 
Scientists thus play a decisive role in the conception and implementation of 
environmental law; all the regulations adopted in this field, without exception, are 
based on their calculations, computations or affirmations. In fact, no area of public 
policy is comparably dependent on science. 
 
Scientists are deeply implicated in the processes of environmental [decision-
making]. Without them it cannot occur. No other area of [decision-making], not 
even public health…is comparatively dependant on science.72 
 
Environmental decision-makers are therefore uniquely dependent on science to furnish 
them with knowledge, and in particular the relevant facts, critical to making informed and 
effective decisions, be it at the policy level, or at operational level (e.g. when deciding 
whether to grant a consent, and if so what conditions ought to be imposed). In explaining 
the relationship between environmental law and science, Shelton notes:73  
 
…law thus comes into contact with science when scientific experts present 
conclusions based on reasoning and analysis concerning the extent to which there 
are environmental problems and the appropriate means of remedying them… 
 
Therefore, in light of the above we can say that unlike most other legal areas, 
environmental law necessarily rests on, is informed by, and depends on good science.  In 
order to achieve its fundamental purpose of protecting human, animal and plant life by 
curbing the effects human activities can have on ecosystems, it must be directed by 
comprehensive and accurate scientific findings.  This applies at a macro-level, where 
policies are transformed into legal principles, as well as at a micro-level, where, for 
example, an ecosystem is assessed in the context of a given resource consent. One could 
  
71 Nicolas de Saadeleer, above n 65, at 185. 
72 Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 98. 
73 Dinah Shelton, above n 63.   
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even go as far as saying there cannot be environmental law, in any meaningful and practical 
sense, without the effective and proper application of science. 
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III The traditional approach: predecessor to precaution  
 
As Chapter IV will discuss in detail, the precautionary principle arose in response to 
the failure of its predecessor, typically referred to as the ‘preventative principle’ or 
‘traditional approach’. As outlined in the Chapter I, a detailed examination of the traditional 
approach forms an integral part of this papers’ approach of going back to first principles in 
order to rebuild from scratch an understanding of where the precautionary principle comes 
from, what it is meant to achieve, and in turn how it operates. Specifically, examination of 
the traditional approach in detail is useful because:  
 
(1) it is essential to appreciating the mischief the precautionary principle seeks to address 
and thus operates as a useful high level guide for decision-makers when applying the 
precautionary principle 
(2) it operates as a useful litmus test for ascertaining when decision-makers or the courts 
have, despite the best of intentions to apply the precautionary principle, reverted back 
to a traditional approach; and 
(3) as will become apparent in Chapter VI, the insights it provides help inform how one 
should go about operationalising the precautionary principle.   
A Causation: the core of the traditional approach  
Causation, which is an essential ingredient in law, entails proving a cause-and-effect 
relationship between a person’s conduct and a resulting harm.74 As Iorns illustrates in tort, 
for example, a person is not liable for the loss or damage unless the plaintiff has proven a 
causal link between that person's actions and the loss the plaintiff suffered. It is a basic rule, 
therefore, that the law does not intervene and impose liability for harm, loss or damage 
until causation has been proved. 
 
  
74 Catherine J Iorns Magallanes, above n 8, at 5. James E Hickey and Vern R Walker “Refining the 
Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law” (1995) 14 Va Envtl LJ 423 at 426-429. Philippe 
Sands, above n 9, at 268. 
  35 
Causation is also an established constituent of environmental law. In the consenting 
context for example, prior to the introduction of the precautionary principle opponents to a 
proposed activity carried the burden of presenting sufficient proof of causation between a 
proposed activity and an asserted environment effect, before a decision maker was able to 
take action to prevent such harm occurring (e.g. by restricting or refusing the activity).75 In 
this regard, as two lead authors note:76   
 
The public has typically carried the burden of proving that a particular activity or 
substance is dangerous, while those undertaking potentially dangerous activities 
and the products of those activities are considered innocent until proven guilty. 
Chemicals, dangerous practices, and companies often seem to have more rights 
than citizens and the environment. 
  
Under this traditional approach, the need to prove causation also restrained the ability 
of regulators' to validly exercise any discretionary powers that authorised them to restrict 
or prohibit human activities in order to protect the environment. The imposition of this 
burden stemed from the entrenched legal position that administrative decision-making is:77  
 
…based on the precept that the only valid action is that based on facts. This concept 
has its source in the Rule of Law…The Rule of law dictates that governments are 
non-arbitrary and principled in their decision-making...[consequently]…unless 
  
75 James Cameron and Will Wade-Gery Addressing Uncertainty: Law, Policy and the Development of the 
Precautionary Principle (CSERG, Working Paper GEC 92-43, 1992) at 18. Elizabeth Fisher “The 
Precautionary Principle as a Legal Standard for Public Decision-making: The Role of Judicial and Merits 
Review in Ensuring Reasoned Deliberation” in Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 2, at 90. 
Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2002) at 211-213. James E Hickey and Vern R Walker, above n 74, at 426. Charmian Barton 
“The Status of the Precautionary Principle in Australia: Its Emergence in Legislation and as a Common Law 
Doctrine” (1998) 22 Harv Envtl L Rev 509 at 510. Richard Hildreth, Casey Jarman and Margaret Langlas 
“Roles for a Precautionary Approach in Marine Management” (2005) 19 Ocean YB 33 at 34. Ronnie Harding 
and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, at 2-3. Arie Trouwborst Precautionary Rights and Duties of States (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2006) at 193.  
76 Joe Tickner and Carolyn Raffensperger The Precautionary Principle in Action: A Handbook (1st ed, 
Science and Environmental Health Network, Massachusetts, 1999) at 1. 
77 Elizabeth Fisher, above n 75, at 90. 
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there is a substratum of objective evidence for the reasons and policies acted upon, 
discretionary powers are liable to a charge of arbitrariness”. These “principles of 
fundamental justice” are to be observed where government action entails potential 
interference with “life, liberty and security of the person”.  
 
The need to prove causation thus, led to “[t]he requirement that proof of harm must be 
shown before regulatory action occurs”. As one author notes:78     
 
the main feature of this model…is that action to protect the environment is solely 
justified when conclusive evidence shows that an activity will cause (substantial) 
damage in the absence of preventative and abatement measure.  
 
In sum, the rule of law mandates that regulatory intervention is legal if, and only if, a 
causative link can be demonstrated between an action that has environmental effects and 
the relevant environmental harm.  
B The principled basis of the traditional approach  
Essentially the basis of the traditional approach is the view that in order to afford 
ecosystems and human interests in them sufficient protection, only predictable harm needs 
to be regulated.  This flawed view rested on the following broad presumptions:  
 
(1) science can accurately foretell and determine the nature, extent and likelihood of harm 
an activity may cause (namely, “threats”); and  
(2) once this is determined, there is sufficient time to take preventative action before 
significant harm occurs.79  
  
78 Arie Trouwborst , above n 2, at 11. Geoffrey Palmer Environment: The International Challenge (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 1995) at 70. Dinah Shelton, above n 63, at 218. 
79 Ellen Hey “The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution” 
(1992) 4 Geo Int'l Envtl L Rev 303. Charmian Barton, above n 75, at 510 to 511. Arie Trouwborst , above n 
2, at 11. Geoffrey Palmer, above n 78, at 70. Owen McIntyre and Thomas Mosedale “The Precautionary 
Principle as a Norm of Customary International Law” (1997) 9 JEL 221 at 221. Stephen Dovers and John 
Handmer “Ignorance, Sustainability, and the Precautionary Principle: Towards an Analytical Framework” in 
Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 2, at 168. Michael M’Gonigle and others “Taking Uncertainty 
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Most cite the above presumptions as being the principal rationale or basis underpinning 
the traditional approach. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, these presumptions are 
in fact the product of a more detailed suite of assumptions, which taken together, represent 
a more comprehensive and accurate explanation of the logic behind this approach. As this 
chapter will also demonstrate, the fundamentally flawed nature of these assumptions are 
what is responsible for: (a) the failure of the traditional approach; and (b) the subsequent 
emergence and adoption of the precautionary principle.  
 
While not typically described as such, collectively, more specific flawed assumptions 
that underpin the traditional approach essentially comprise the mischief that the 
precautionary principle seeks to address. On this basis, this paper asserts that in order to 
appreciate the precautionary principle, both in principle, and at an operational level, one 
must first understand the specific reasons behind the failure of the traditional approach.  
 
In terms of policy background, the traditional approach is based on a “permissive 
regulation” paradigm, whereby environmental laws operate from the starting point that an 
activity should permitted unless proven otherwise.80 Belief in the validity of this 
overarching approach to environmental management was itself is based on the theory 
known as “assimilative capacity”.81 In short, assimilative capacity is a theory which 
provides that certain levels of “discharges into, or activities in, a receiving environment are 
permitted” on the basis of the central assumption “that the environment has an enduring 
capacity to assimilate” a prescribed level of such pollutants, or impacts from activities, 
without suffering any harm as a result. In other words, up to a “specified limit which 
purportedly reflects "safe" levels”, the impact of such activities will not harm the receiving 
  
Seriously: From Permissive Regulation to Preventative Design in Environmental Decision Making” (1994) 
32(1) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 99 at 129. 
80 RC Earll “Common Sense and the Precautionary Principle - An Environmentalists Perspective” (1992) 
24(4) Marine Pollution Bulletin 182. 
81 Note that for simplicity however, most literature provides that the traditional approach is based on 
assimilative capacity. Michael M’Gonigle and others, above n 79. Owen McIntyre and Thomas Mosedale, 
above n 79, at 221. Arie Trouwborst , above n 2, at 18. 
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environment.82 In sum, assimilative capacity assumes science will, primarily through 
predictive modelling:83  
 
(1) provide decision-makers with the information and means necessary to prevent humans 
from encroaching upon the carrying or assimilative capacity of ecosystems and 
environmental media;84 and 
(2)  allow regulators to permit activities (such as the release of substances) “…within and 
up to the limits of that capacity”.  
 
As most institutions and academics agree, however, this is a paradigm in crisis. 
Specifically, as M'Gonigle et al note:85  
 
…the problems associated with the paradigm are evident in the common but ill-
considered and incorrect assumptions about how the environment assimilates 
waste, how scientific research is done, how reliable the results of such research are, 
and how regulatory agencies operate. 
Assimilated capacity, and in turn the traditional approach to environmental 
regulations, is rooted in “strict observance of the scientific method”,86 and is premised on 
the a priori assumptions, set out below which Chapter IV will demonstrate, are 
unequivocally flawed.87  
  
82 K Stairs and P Taylor “Non-Governmental Organisation and the Legal Protection of Oceans: A Case 
Study” in A Hurrell and B Kingsbury (eds) The International Politics of Environment (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1992) at 132. JF Whitehouse “Will the Precautionary Principle Environmental Decision Making and 
Impact-Assessment” in Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 2, at 59. Owen McIntyre and Thomas 
Mosedale, above n 79, at 222; Charmain Barton, above n 75, at 512.    
83 Arie Trouwborst , above n 2, at 18. 
84 Ellen Hey, above n 79, at 307 and 308. Owen McIntyre and Thomas Mosedale, above n 79, at 229-133. 
Charmian Barton, above n 75, at 511.   
85 M'Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 129. 
86 Laurence David Mee “Scientific Methods and the Precautionary Principle” in David Freestone and Ellen 
Hey (eds), above n 2, at 109.  
87 Ellen Hey, above n 79, at 307 and 308. Arie Trouwborst , above n 2, at 18. Owen McIntyre and Thomas 
Mosedale, above n 79, at 221. Charmian Barton, above n 75, at 510-511. Nicolas de Saadeleer, above n 65, 
at 184. M’Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 129-130. 
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(a) Assumption that ecosystems readily assimilate human impacts  
 
As indicated above, the core assumption underpinning the traditional approach is the 
view that each ecosystem possesses an enduring but finite capacity to accommodate a 
certain level of a given kind of human impact, without that impact giving rise to significant 
or long-term adverse effects on the receiving ecosystem. Commentators typically refer to 
such tolerance to human impacts as an ecosystem's ‘carrying’ or ‘assimilative’ capacity, 
which, as noted above, determines the allowable limits on human interference. Its 
proponents also assumed that if the assimilative capacity is overwhelmed, ecosystems 
could handle some measure of harm.88 
 
(b) Assumption of scientific knowledge   
 
The second-most important assumption behind the traditional approach is the 
assumption that carrying capacity “…can be quantified, apportioned for a certain activity, 
and utilised”,89 and that science is equipped with the tools and ability to achieve this. From 
a regulator's perspective:90  
 
…underlying the assumption of assimilative capacity is a corresponding 
assumption that we are, in some way, basing our regulations and allowable limits 
on firm scientific knowledge. 
 
Specifically, this is the assumption that science is capable of resolving any uncertainty as 
to the effects an activity will have on the environment, by accurately determining:  
 
(1) the likely ecological impact of an activity (that is, the ecological threat it presents);91  
  
88 Raffensberger and Tickner “Introduction: to Foresee and Forestall” in Carolyn Raffensberger and Joel 
Tickner (eds) Protecting Public Health and the Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle 
(Island Press, Washington DC, 1999) at 2. 
89 V Pravdic “Environmental Capacity - Is a New Scientific Concept Acceptable as a Strategy to Combat 
Marine Pollution?” (1985) 16 Marine Pollution Bull 295 as cited in Charmian Barton, above n 75, at 511.  
90 M’Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 129. Charmian Barton, above n 75, at 511.    
91 Raffensberger and Tickner, above n 88, at 1-2. Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher , above n 8, at 3. 
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(2) an ecosystem's carrying capacity for a given impact or confluence of impacts;92 and  
(3) the measures needed to prevent or mitigate it.  
 
In this respect one author aptly notes that assimilative capacity is based on the belief that 
humans can fully understand the ecological impacts “of their activities and establish levels 
of insult at which the environment…[can] rebound from harm…”.93  
 
(c) Operational assumptions   
 
Assimilative capacity is premised on operational assumption, which can be categorised 
as both technological and regulatory. It is assumed from a technological or science 
perspective that science is capable of providing the requisite technological solutions to 
mitigate those threats, once it has identified or predicted them.  
 
(d) Temporal assumption  
 
The temporal assumption essentially provides that, by the point in time at which 
science has identified:94  
 
(1) a given threat (that is, an instance where an ecosystem's carrying capacity will likely 
be overwhelmed by a given activity resulting in significant detrimental effects); and  
(2) the corresponding means of addressing such a threat,  
 
there will be sufficient time to act (e.g. take steps to limit or prevent the harm generated by 
the offending activity), before an ecosystem’s carrying capacity is overwhelmed and in turn 
given rise to significant and/or long-term detrimental effects. 
 
  
92 M’Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 129.   
93 Raffensperger and Tickner, above n 88, at 1. 
94 Charmian Barton, above n 75, at 511. Malcolm MacGarvin “Precaution, Science and the Sins of Hubris” 
in T O’Riordan and J Cameron (eds), above n 1, at 74. 
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(e) Economic assumption  
 
It is subsequently assumed that, in light of the above, acting after science identifies an 
ecological harm and solution, rather than before, will ensure that financial resources are 
not wasted (i.e. expended on avoiding or mitigating human impacts that can in any case be 
assimilated), but rather are efficiently allocated. This is because, in such circumstances (for 
example, where human impacts are likely to be assimilated, or the harm identified prior to 
its occurring) “…it is difficult to justify high initial expenditures for uncertain future 
environmental gains”.  As Hey further notes:95  
 
the assimilative capacity concept emphasises…reliance on short-term economic 
considerations, while emphasising the unreliability of long-term economic 
considerations and the uncertainties involved in determining the present value of 
future economic degradation. 
C The hallmarks of the traditional approach  
In light of the above, once can say that the traditional approach is characterised by the 
following three concepts that stem from the requirement to prove causation:  
 
(1) Until proven harmful a human activity may continue or proceed;96 in other words, 
environmental action necessarily follows scientific proof.97   
(2) The approach to be favoured is the one that is only concerned with preventing, and 
therefore only capable of implementing measures that prevent foreseeable and 
predictable harm.98  
  
95 Ellen Hey, above n 79, at 308. See also Charmian Barton, above n 75, at 511.  
96 James Cameron and Will Wade-Gery, above n 75, at 18. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 196. 
97 Nicolas de Sadeleer, above n 75, at 53. 
98 Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 18. Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, at 2 
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(3) Because it relies on science to determine the existence, nature and scope of the harm 
caused by human activities, the approach must fundamentally be “science-based”, and 
as such, factual inquiries into causation are also intrinsically questions of science.99  
D Risk assessment 
Operating under the assumptions detailed above, environmental management 
frameworks have evolved into decision-making structures based around risk assessment 
tools such as environmental impact assessments (“EIAs”).100 These risk assessment tools 
have:   
 
(1) become the principal method of resolving scientific uncertainties regarding the effects 
an activity may have on the receiving environment;101 and 
(2) because of that, become embedded into environmental decision-making frameworks 
(such as legislative environmental frameworks), as the vehicles by which causation is 
established and, in turn, regulatory action is justified and legitimised legally.102  
 
1     Purpose and function of risk assessment 
Such risk assessment based frameworks seek to reduce the scientific uncertainty 
associated with a given decision (e.g. to allow or not allow an activity). In this regard, they 
attempt to bridge the gap between science and environmental law in a procedural manner 
that is transparent to (i.e. can be assessed by) all parties including the public in the case of 
notified consent applications.103 These processes respond to the need to ensure accountable 
  
99 As one author notes; “the search for causes is the essence of science” L King Medical Thinking: A 
Historical Preface (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1982) at 191 as cited in Dinah Shelton, above n 
63, at 219. 
100 Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, at 2. Raffensberger and Tickner, above n 88, at 2. 
Charmian Barton, above n 75, at 511.   
101 Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 99. 
102 Joe Tickner and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 76, at 13-14. 
103 Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 100-101. 
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administrative decision-making, and in doing so provide for independent review of 
decisions, which:104 
 
…in turn creates a burdensome requirement to document each step of a decision-
making process and to find a specific justification for each critical decision. Absent 
such documentation and justification, the expectation is that some interested party 
will be able to successfully challenge the outcome, either in a court of law [and/]or 
through a legislative process.    
 
Depending on the particular decision-making framework involved, the EIA process 
can involve decision-makers, applicants and the public relying on science accurately to 
discharge the task of:105 
(1) hazard identification, whereby experts seek to determine whether an activity may 
cause a given ecological harm (this is often referred to as “risk”); 
(2) risk characterisation, whereby experts also attempt to ascertain the magnitude and 
distribution of the ecological risk;  
(3) identifying and comparing alternatives, whereby “costs, technical and administrative 
feasibility, and distributive consequences of alternative” strategies to control risk are 
evaluated;  
(4) chosing an appropriate management strategy, whereby, based on the information 
obtained at assessments (1) to (3) above, an acceptable level of risk (generated by the 
activity) is identified, and the appropriate means of maintaining the level of risk below 
accepted levels is chosen; and 
(5) (if part of the chosen management strategy) implementation, review and adjustment of 
control strategy, whereby implementation of the strategy is monitored to assess its 
effectiveness, and change is made if performance is not satisfactory.    
 
  
104 Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 100. 
105 Gavan McDonell “Risk Management, Reality and the Precautionary Principle: Coping with Decisions” in 
Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 2, at 190. Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 101.  
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Each aspect of the EIA process depends entirely on that which science can accurately 
observe measure and quantify.106  The traditional approach thus places virtually all of the 
decision-making emphasis on the role of science in modelling and predicting harm.  
 
It is important to note that, as such, assessments are premised on, and operate within, 
the assimilative capacity model, their primary focus is not on the prevention of harm. As 
Tickner and Raffensperger provide:107  
 
Risk assessment is used to manage and reduce risks, not prevent them...It asks how 
much pollution is safe or acceptable; which problems are we willing to live with; 
how should limited resources be directed? 
 
Again, the premise of this approach is the assumption that receiving ecosystems can 
tolerate certain levels of detrimental impact, and, as such, it is legitimate to allow such 
harm to occur. 
 
2     Origins of risk assessment  
As McDonell notes, understanding the origins of these tools aids one’s appreciation of 
the shortcomings if the EIA and similar assessments that have become the mainstream form 
of risk assessment in the environmental context. Risk assessment was “…originally 
developed for mechanical problems such as bridge construction …”,108 or, as one author 
notes: 
 
Risk assessment, as a scientifically disciplined way of analysing risk and safety 
problems was originally developed for relatively well-structured mechanical 
problems, such as chemical and nuclear plants, aircraft and aerospace technologies. 
In such systems, the technical processes and parameters are well defined, and the 
  
106 Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 101. 
107 Joe Tickner and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 76, at 13-14. 
108 Raffensberger and Tickner, above n 88, at 2. See also Gavan McDonell, above n 105, at 190-192.  
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reliability of separate components is testable or amenable to actuarial in-service 
analysis. Indeed, so controlled are the parameters    
 
The application of that which came to be known as 'scientific risk assessment' has been 
significantly expanded to fields as scientifically and technologically varied as 
epidemiology, biology and general environmental studies.109 Academics attribute this shift 
to the increased demand on science to model and predict harm in extremely complex 
ecological and human systems.110  Essentially, the belief that risk assessment methods 
(such as EIAs) were fit for purpose in environmental law appears to be, at the operational 
level, an extension of the belief in the pre-eminence of scientific knowledge, which itself 
underpins the assumption of assimilative capacity. As such, it was initially though such 
risk assessment approaches were capable of effectively predicting environmental 
outcomes. However, this paper asserts that in reality the substantial complexity of 
ecosystems makes this task too substantial, complex and onerous for risk assessment to  
handle.         
 
  
109 Gavan McDonell, above n 105, at 190-192. 
110 Joe Tickner and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 76, at 13-14. 
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IV Failure of the traditional approach  
 
By the early 1980s it was clear that “there were substantial adverse impacts associated 
with unlimited [industrial] growth”.111 In spite of widespread global efforts to implement 
traditional-approach-based environmental management regimes (i.e. via risk management 
frameworks that employ impact assessments as the primary means of assessing risk), 
ecosystems were increasingly subject to significant anthropological harm.112 Significantly, 
over time this harm continued to become progressively more pervasive, destructive and 
global in nature. 
 
Due to the above realisation, it became apparent that environmental regulation efforts 
that employed the traditional approach lacked the ability to manage the impacts of 
increasingly technological human activities effectively, so much so they often failed to 
prevent many instances environmental harm113 and forestall ever-increasing instances of 
mass environmental degradation.114 In response to this failure, the scientific community 
began to call into question the assumptions underpinning the traditional approach, 
including, most prominently, the assumption of assimilative capacity.115 By the mid-1980s 
this culminated in a series of scientific insights, which:  
 
(1) established that the assumptions underpinning the traditional approach are either 
fundamentally flawed or largely incorrect; and  
(2) in turn, provided the impetus for the precautionary principle and its widespread 
adoption by states, as a replacement for the traditional approach.   
 
In describing these scientific insights, Trouwborst provides the following useful 
  
111 Raffensberger and Tickner, above n 88, at 2. 
112 Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, at 2.  
113 Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, at 2. Carolyn Raffensperger and Ted Schettler 
“Precaution: Belief, Regulatory System, and Overarching Principle” (2000) 6 Int J Occup Environ Health 
266 at 266.  
114 Malcolm MacGarvin, above n 94, at 69; Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, at 2.  
115 Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, at 2. Carolyn Raffensperger and Ted Schettler, above n 
113, at 266.  
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summary:116      
 
…the rationale of the precautionary principle – or precautionary approach, as it is 
often referred to – is a dual one. That is to say, two scientific insights account for 
the adoption by States of the precautionary principle. Plainly stated, the first is the 
realisation that in many cases the environmental harm caused by human activities 
is graver than previously thought and can be difficult, if not impossible, to undo. 
Due to the vulnerability of the environment, anthropogenic impacts are often of a 
long-term and sometimes irreversible nature. The second insight making up the 
rationale of the precautionary principle concerns the uncertainty about, and limited 
predictability of, the gravity and probability of environmental impacts, which is 
due in a significant measure to the complexity and variability of natural systems 
and processes. 
A The seminal realisation  
These scientific insights grew into the realisation that contrary to what assimilative 
capacity asserts, by the time that clear scientific proof of a causal link between an activity 
and ecological harm is available to decision-makers (i.e. policy and consenting decision-
makers), it is often too late to remedy or reverse the adverse effects associated with the 
activity in question.117 As von Moltke further explains, this is because:118 
 
…often [environmental] threats are the result of complex processes with origins 
not identifiable by the human senses, more often than not the result of science and 
technological change themselves. By the time these changes become palpable to 
the human senses significant sometimes irreversible changes have taken place. 
Keystone species disappear from an eco-system long after micro-organisms have 
suffered the effects of human interventions unseen…Persistent chemicals enter the 
food chain long before contamination causes visible changes in the behaviour of 
  
116 Arie Trouwborst “Prevention, Precaution, Logic and Law: The Relationship between the Precautionary 
Principle and the Preventative Principle in International Law and Associated Questions” (2009) 2 Erasmus 
Law Review 105 at 107. 
117 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 195. Dinah Shelton, above n 63, at 226. 
118 Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 97-98., 
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and reproductive performance of birds and mammals. Large-scale environmental 
change may escape direct human observation entirely. Stratospheric ozone 
depletion is not something that can be smelled, felt, heard or seen. Global warming 
is so difficult to prove conclusively because of its very complexity. Even acid rain 
is not an intuitively obvious phenomenon.” 
 
The same realisation happened at an operational level, in that the scientific insights also 
led to the realisation amongst states, and subsequently domestic regulators, that under a 
traditional approach, significant or irreversible ecological changes will have already taken 
place119 by the time:120  
 
(1) the anthropogenic ecological harm associated with a given activity becomes “palpable 
to the human senses”;  
(2) science is afforded sufficient opportunity to investigate, isolate and establish a causal 
relationship between the activity and subsequent ecological harm to the extent required 
by rigorous standards of proof;121 and  
(3) proof of causation marshals policy and regulatory decision-makers to implement the 
requisite protective, preventative or mitigation measures needed to abate or curb the 
effects of the identified resulting harm.  
 
This is because until a causal link is proven the offending activity is typically left to 
continue, absent any preventative or mitigating measures being put in place to prevent the 
resulting harm, thereby allowing otherwise avoidable ecological damage to occur.122   
 
  
119 Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 97-98. Charmian Barton, above n 75, at 510-511. Sumudu Arapattu, 
Emerging Principles of International Law (Transnational Publishers, New York, 2006) at 206, Philippe 
Sands, above n 9, at 203-204. 
120 Dinah Shelton, above n 63, at 226. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 195. Catherine J Iorns Magallanes, 
above n 8, at 5. 
121 As Tickner and Raffensperger note: “traditional research science attempts to gather nearly complete and 
perfectly supportive information before claiming a cause-and-effect relationship”: Joe Tickner and Carolyn 
Raffensperger, above n 76, at 5. 
122 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 195. Dinah Shelton, above n 63, at 226. David Freestone and Ellen Hey, 
above n 9, at 12. 
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The above explanation is sufficient to acquaint one with a high level understanding as 
to why the traditional approach failed and subsequently the precautionary principle 
subsequently emerged (i.e. as an overlay to existing risk assessment regimes). However, 
this high-level summary fails to account for and explain the specific mechanics that sit 
behind its emergence. This paper asserts that there are two key reasons why a detailed 
working knowledge of such mechanics is critical to the application of the precautionary 
principle in New Zealand. First, it asserts that such detail is instructive to appreciating the 
specific task given to the precautionary principle. Therefore, this is something that 
decision-makers need to be cognisant of when wielding the principle as a tool for 
overcoming such issues (e.g. without a proper understanding of the uncertainty a decision-
maker faces, they will be unable to ascertain for example, whether such uncertainty can be 
overcome by adaptive management, or whether it is incurable).  
 
Second, as is discussed in detail in Chapter VI, this paper also asserts that the following 
factors plague the application of the precautionary principle. First, a lack of certainty as to 
the principle’s normative content and boundaries undermines its application. Second, a 
dearth of proper guidance as to how the precautionary principle should be operationalised 
(i.e. further elucidated to the extent necessary to equip decision-makers with the requisite 
guidance and normative character and certainty required to enable proper and consistent 
application in practice) also hinders this. As such, this paper asserts that a detailed 
examination of the specific mischiefs that gave rise to and underpin the precautionary 
principle, arguably serve as a useful compass for navigating the ambiguity that surrounds 
the principle, and in turn, will assist with resolving such issues.   
B Significant and irreversible harm 
The principal insight to arise at this time was the realisation that ecosystems are 
considerably more vulnerable than initially thought. In turn, the global community 
subsequently acknowledged that human-induced harm is:123  
  
123 Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 97-98. Arie Trouwborst, above n 116, at 107. Timothy O’Riordan and 
James Cameron “The History and Contemporary Significance of the Precautionary Principle” in Timothy 
O’Riordan and James Cameron (eds), above n 1, at 12. Philippe Sands, above n 9, at 3. Ronnie Harding and 
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(1) often much graver than previously thought;  
(2) often difficult, if not impossible, to undo; and  
(3) above all else, often long-term and sometimes irreversible in nature.  
 
This overarching ecosystem vulnerability insight was the product of (i.e. premised on) a 
suite of realisations, which, although often glanced over by most academic discussion on 
the precautionary principle, are central to its rationale, and thus are particularly informative 
to understanding the mischief the principle seeks to address.  
1 Gravity of anthropogenic harm 
Such acknowledgements and insights led scientists to become aware of the true gravity 
and pervasiveness of damage that is actually inflicted on species and ecosystems because 
of human activities. Significantly, it became apparent that human society had acquired the 
capacity to alter the environment in unprecedented ways on an unprecedented scale, and 
that this capacity would likely continue to increase over time.124  
 
In particular, science was now being used to establish that, over time; the ecological 
effects generated by increasingly large-scale technological industrial activities had and 
were continuing to become progressively more invasive, pervasive and severe in nature. 125 
In addition, rapid and exponential population growth, coupled with globalisation, had 
operated to increase the frequency and prevalence of those activities that generate such 
increased harms. As two leading commentators note:126 
  
Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, at 2. Alan Boyle and David Freestone (eds), above n 12, at 1. Durwood Zaelke, 
Donald Kaniaru and Eva Kruzikova (eds) Making Law Work: Environmental Compliance and Sustainable 
Development Volume 1 (Cameron May, London, 2005) at 32. 
124 Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger “Why is a Precautionary Approach Needed” in Marco Martuzzi 
and Joel Tickner (eds) The Precautionary Principle: Protecting Public Health, the Environment and the 
Future of our Children (World Health Organisation Europe, ISBN 92 890 1098 3, 2004) at 63. 
125 Alan Boyle and David Freestone (eds), above n 12, at 1. International Encyclopaedia of Laws (reissue, 
1998) Volume 1 Environmental Law at [International 10]. Philippe Sands, above n 9, at 3. Dinah Shelton, 
above n 63, at 228.  
126 Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 63. 
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…humans have increasingly dominated the earth’s ecosystems in unprecedented 
ways…the scale of change has expanded rapidly and dramatically…population 
growth and human activities such as resource extraction, manufacturing, transport, 
agriculture and fishing have escalated these changes and contributed to serious, 
widespread and often avoidable harm to humans, wildlife, and ecosystems…    
 
As author de Saadler further notes, such technological activities have created “post-
industrial risks”, that the traditional approach of environmental management now has to 
mitigate. Specifically:127 
 
…the twentieth century has taken us fully into a risk civilisation. Scientific 
development gives rise to so many new risks…The globalisation of the economy 
and the rise of new technologies characteristic of post-industrialised society have 
caused a new generation of risks to emerge (CFCs, POPs, BSE, greenhouse gases, 
hormone-disrupting chemicals, electromagnetic fields etc). 
 
It is important to note that this scientific realisation arose concurrently with the 
political-economic acknowledgement that attempts to repair ecosystems after harm has 
already occurred will typically be substantially more expensive than the cost of prevention 
in the first place.128  
 
The above realisations countered the view under assimilative capacity that 
anthropogenic harm is usually readily assimilated and where it was not, the receiving 
ecosystems would accommodate the resulting harm without resulting in severe and 
permanent adverse outcomes.  
 
 
  
127 Nicolas de Sadeleer, above n 75, at 150-153. 
128 Nicolas de Sadeleer, above n 75, at 16. Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, above n 43, at 204. 
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2 Vulnerability of ecosystems  
As discussed above, contrary to the traditional contention that ecosystems are robust 
entities with a substantial capacity to assimilate anthropogenic impacts (particularly the 
more severe technological industrial activities described above), science established that 
ecosystems are typically much more vulnerable than first anticipated. This section seeks to 
discuss this vulnerability in more depth. 
 
Flowing from the scientific community’s acknowledgement of how vulnerable 
ecosystems in fact are, it is now recognised that anthropogenic impacts often inflict harm 
more readily and more acutely than first thought.129 In fact, the more science uncovered 
the complexities of ecosystems, the more apparent it became that ecosystems are 
particularly sensitive to seemingly modest insults,130 and that such vulnerability likely 
stems from several key ecosystem characteristics.  
 
The first characteristic is that ecosystem health and integrity overall is contingent on 
ecosystem structure and function131 remaining within the “narrow range of parameters”132 
required to secure the production of the essential ecosystem services which are critical to 
maintaining an ecosystem’s ability to sustain life.133 As Decision VII/11 of the Conference 
of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity notes:134   
 
Ecosystems must be managed within the limits of their functioning…Just as there 
are limits to the demands (production, off-take, assimilation, detoxification) that 
can be made on ecosystems, so too there are limits to the amount of disturbance 
that ecosystems can tolerate, depending on the magnitude, intensity, frequency and 
  
129 Nicolas de Sadeleer, above n 75, at 14-19. James E Hickey and Vern R Walker, above n 74, at 423. 
Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, above n 43, at 204. Nicolas de Sadeleer, above n 65, at 182. 
130 Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 99. 
131 See the discussion of ecosystems in Chapter II. 
132 Allan Boyle and David Freestone “Introduction” in Alan Boyle and David Freestone (eds), above n 12, at 
1. Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 64. 
133 Allan Boyle and David Freestone, above n 132, at 64.  
134 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity The Ecosystem Approach (CBD Guidelines, 
Montreal, 2004) at 18. 
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kind of disturbance… 
 
Vulnerability therefore exists because it is much easier than first thought for human 
activities to eclipse an ecosystem's capacity to assimilate impacts, and in turn, cause 
significant and irreparable harm.   
 
The second ecosystem characteristic revelation was that contrary to the traditional 
view that harm generated by unassimilated impacts can always be made good ex post facto, 
ecosystems in fact can and do suffer deleterious and irreparable changes to their integrity 
as a result of human activities. For example, where human activities induce a deviation 
from the parameters of variance tolerated by receiving ecosystems, this can trigger 
“ecosystem shifts” which are likely impossible to correct.135 As the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity noted in the context of exceeding such 
parameters:136  
 
If these limits are exceeded, an ecosystem undergoes substantial change in 
composition, structure and functioning, usually with a loss of biodiversity and 
resulting lower productivity and capacity to process wastes and contaminants.      
 
Schettler and Raffensperger further explain:137   
 
[w]hen change is sufficient to cause a system to cross a threshold, it operates within 
a new dynamic equilibrium that has its own stability and does not change...These 
new interactions become the norm…from which there is not turning back…When 
systems exist near a threshold, small perturbations at a critical point may be 
sufficient to cause a shift to a new dynamic equilibrium or more chaotic activity…  
 
  
135 H Osterblom and others “Making the Ecosystem Approach Operational – Can Regime Shifts in Ecological 
and Governance Systems Facilitate the Transition?” (2010) 34 Marine Policy 1290 at 1293.      
136 Decision V/6 by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its fifth 
meeting, above n 53.   
137 Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 64, 67 and 84.  
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Such shifts can come about when human activities subject an ecosystem to one or multiple 
anthropogenic stressors, and often lead to the re-organised ecosystems capacity to confer 
life-supporting and enhancing ecosystem services being severely compromised.138  
 
The third characteristic is that ecosystems are highly connected systems. Specifically, 
they are replete with complex inter-connections, intra-connections and co-dependencies 
that exist between their innumerable component parts.139 Furthermore, their continued 
functioning and resilience hinges on the health of the dynamic relationship between such 
components.  The following relationships illustrate this characteristic:140  
 
(1) The relationship within species groups and between various organisms.  This includes 
biological dependencies (where the survival or wellbeing of one kind of organism is 
contingent on the survival and wellbeing of another),141 as well as biological 
interactions (for example, where chemicals and energy are transferred between trophic 
levels via food chain or web interactions).142  
  
138 PM Vitousek and LR Walker “Biological Invasion by Myrica Faya in Hawaii: Plant Demography, 
Nitrogen Fixation, Ecosystem Effects” (1989) 59 Ecol Mon at 247 to 265. J Terborgh and others “Ecological 
Meltdown in Predator Free Forest Fragments” (2001) 94(2) Science 1923 at 1923-1926. Thomas Elmqvist 
and others “Response Diversity, Ecosystem Change, and Resilience” (2003) 9(1) Frontiers in Ecology and 
the Environment 488 at 489. H Osterblom, above n 135, at 1293.      
139 Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea United Nations Ecosystem Approaches and Oceans 
E.07.V.4 (2007) at 77. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, above n 134, at 12. Decision 
V/6 by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its fifth meeting, above n 
53, Principle 3. 
140 Decision VII/11 of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its seventh 
meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 20 February 2004 UNEP/COP, principle 6. Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, above n 134, at 6. 
141 JA Estes and others “Killer Whales Predation on Sea Otters Linking Oceanic and Nearshore Ecosystems” 
(1998) 282 Science 473–476; KT Frank and others “Trophic cascades in a formerly cod dominated 
ecosystem” (2005) 308 Science 1621–3; Myers RA et al “Cascading effects of the loss of apex predatory 
sharks from a coastal ocean” (2007) 315 Science 1846–1850, as cited in Larry Crowder and Elliott Norse 
“Essential ecological insights for marine ecosystem-based management and marine spatial planning” (2008) 
32 Marine Policy 772 at 774-776. Karl-Hermann Kock and others “Fisheries in the Southern Ocean: An 
Ecosystem Approach” (2007) 362 PhiL Trans' R' Soc' B 2333 at 2333-2349. Ted Schettler and Carolyn 
Raffensperger, above n 124, at 64.  
142 For example: “Removing top predators…can have effects that cascade down the food web…These 
cascades can link factors not linked in the minds of most…” (i.e. “an increase in abundance of killer whales 
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(2) The relationship between organisms and their abiotic environment, as well as the 
physical and chemical interactions within the environment.  This includes ecological 
process, such as biogeochemistry cycles, where organisms participate in the uptake, 
transfer, transformation and storage of chemical substances that are of fundamental 
importance to life-sustaining biological processes.143  
(3) The relationship between abiotic components and ecosystem processes.144  
 
It is through such dependencies and connections that these ecosystem components interact 
as a functional unit, whereby these component parts support, facilitate and regulate each 
  
in the North Pacific could drive declines in threatened kelp rockfishes—when Orca increase, they reduce the 
abundance of sea otters, releasing herbivorous sea urchins from predation. Abundant urchins can then 
overgraze giant kelp, reducing habitat for juvenile rockfish”). Larry Crowder and Elliott Norse, above n 141, 
at 774-776.  
143 Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 64. Larry Crowder and Elliott Norse, above n 
141, at 772, 775-778. DU Hooper and others “Effects of biodiversity on ecosystem functioning: a consensus 
of current knowledge” (2005) 75 Ecological Monographs 3 at 3-5 as cited in Cagan Sekercioglu “Ecosystem 
functions and services” in Navjot Sodhi and Paul Ehtlich Conservation Biology for All (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2010) 45 at 45 and 53. R Wang “Understanding eco-complexity: Social-Economic-Natural 
Complex Ecosystem approach” (2011) 8 Ecological Complexity 15 at 21. Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, above n 134, at 32. SM Ferreira, and DR Towns “An ecosystem approach to maximise 
conservation of indigenous biological assets of New Zealand” (paper presented to the Department of 
Conservation, Auckland, 2001). A Hector and others “Conservation implications of the link between 
biodiversity and ecosystem functioning” (2001) 129 Oecologia 624 at 624-628, as cited in Anne-Marie Smit 
Adaptive monitoring: an overview (Department of Conservation, DOC Science Internal Series 138, 2003) at 
13. Jon Day “The need and practice of monitoring, evaluating and adapting marine planning and management 
– lessons from the Great Barrier Reef” (2008) 32 Marine Policy 823 at 824. Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron 
and Andrew Jordan “The Evolution of the Precautionary Principle” in Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron and 
Andrew Jordan (eds) Reinterpreting the Precautionary Principle (Cameron May, London, 2001) 9 at 19. 
Malcolm McGarvin “Science, Precaution, Facts and Values” Principle in Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron 
and Andrew Jordan (eds) Reinterpreting the Precautionary Principle (Cameron May, London, 2001) 35 at 
38. Erik Jaap Molenaar “Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management, Commercial Fisheries, Marine Mammals 
and the 2001 Reykjavik Declaration in the Context of International Law” (2002) 17 Int'l J Marine and Coastal 
L 561 at 572.   
144 Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea United Nations Ecosystem Approaches and Oceans 
E.07.V.4 (2007) at 77. Nordic Council of Ministers Workshop on the Ecosystem Approach to the 
Management and Protection of the North Sea Oslo (Nordic Council, Norway, June 1998) at 41. G Likens, 
above n 48, at 10. RV O’Neill and others, above n 48, at 68-69. BG Hatcher “Coral Reef Ecosystems: How 
Much Greater Is the Whole than the Sum of the Parts?” (1997) 16 Coral Reefs S83 as cited in Hanling Wang, 
above n 34, at 43. Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General, above n 49, at [113].  
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other’s existence.145 This is particularly the case for marine ecosystems, where such 
interactions persist in unparalleled abundance (e.g. by comparison to terrestrial 
ecosystems).146  
 
The fourth characteristic is that individual ecosystems themselves are not closed 
systems, but rather, are open systems with ambiguous boundaries and common 
characteristics.147 Importantly, through shared ecosystem processes and overlapping 
structures ecosystems are inextricably linked with other ecosystems that surround them.148 
For example, in the marine context:149  
 
…the active movement of species provides a link between ecosystems by the 
transport of energy predation pressure, competition pressure and genetic 
variation…water masses containing different levels of salinity, temperature and 
oxygen…different levels of nutrients, toxins and living planktonic organisms…are 
transported between open sea and coastal areas...  
 
  
145 For example, ecosystem components regulate one and other via “negative feedback loops” whereby one 
or more components can act to stabilise the system by pushing pack against change to preserve the system in 
a status quo. International Risk Governance Council “Preparing for Future Catastrophes: Governance 
principles for slow-developing risks that may have potentially catastrophic consequences” (Lausanne, 2013) 
at 10. Decision V/6 by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its fifth 
meeting, above n 53, at 36. Hatcher and Bradbury above n 46,  at 207 and 208. Strategy for Managing the 
Environmental Effects of Fishing: New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries at iv. 
http://www.fish.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/B7A02B28-7F2D-4419-BD81-903686124DD5/0/smeefpapa2.pdf.  
146 “First marine ecosystems explicitly include the interactions among organisms and the viscous, energetic 
environment then inhabit…The fluid medium of the ocean connects marine populations, communities, 
habitats and pools of biochemical far more intimately that their terrestrial counterparts. Second, marine 
ecosystems implicitly exhibit some form of integrity reflected in emergent properties (i.e. the whole is greater 
than the sum of the parts…) and organisational or thermodynamic closure (i.e. internal transformations 
exceed trans boundary fluxes). J Steele, above n 50, at 185-192. S Woodley, J Kay and G Francis (eds), above 
n 50. BG Hatcher “Coral reef ecosystems: How much greater is the whole than the sum of the parts?” (1997) 
16 Coral Reefs 77 to 91 as cited in Hatcher and Bradbury above n 46, at 207. Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 
above n 49, preamble.  
147 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, above n 134, at 12. Decision V/6 by the Conference 
of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its fifth meeting, above n 53, principle 3.  
148 H Osterblom, above n 135, at 1293.      
149 H Osterblom, above n 135, at 1293.      
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As one author notes, in essence “…the entire planet is a vast network of integrated 
ecosystems”.150  
 
Such connectivity and dependency leaves ecosystems highly vulnerable to the impacts 
caused by human interference. For example, the fact ecosystems operate as a functional 
unit makes their respective components vulnerable. This is because such connectivity 
makes the health and integrity of the ecosystem as a whole (or large parts or systems within 
it) highly contingent on the continued health and viability of the various dynamic 
relationships that exist between the various ecosystem components.151  
 
Therefore, vulnerability arises because of the “open structure and connectedness of 
ecosystems [because it] ensures that effects on ecosystem functioning are seldom confined 
to the point of impact or only to one system”. This is because such connections and 
dependencies often operate as vectors for harm, which communicate the detrimental impact 
of an activity beyond ecosystem components, which are directly or initially impacted – e.g. 
which are within the immediate location (i.e. receiving environment) that the activity is 
conducted in.152 For example:  
 
(1) an initial ecological impact can trigger “knock-on” or “cascading effects”, which “feed 
through” such connections causing changes to various linked ecosystems components, 
and in doing so, can culminate in significant harm to ecosystem structure and function 
over time;153  
  
150 Cagan Sekercioglu, above n 143, at 45.   
151 Decision VII/11 of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its seventh 
meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 20 February 2004 UNEP/COP principle 6. Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, above n 134, at 6.  
152 Philippe Sands, above n 9, at 3. See also Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, above n 43, at ix: who note 
the physical reality that the “biosphere [is] composed of interdependent elements that do not recognise 
political boundaries”. Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron and Andrew Jordan, above n 143, at 19. Malcolm 
McGarvin, above n 143, at 38.  
153 J Ebbesson Compatibility of international and national environmental law (6th ed, Kluwer Law 
International, London, 1996) at 8. M’Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 110.  David Vanderzwaag, above n 
2,  at 171 and 182. WC Kerfoot “Cascading effects and indirect pathways” in WC Kerfoot and A Sih (eds) 
Predation: direct and indirect impacts on aquatic communities (University Press of New England, Hanover, 
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(2) through biological dependencies,154 human-induced “…change in the abundance of 
one species [can produce] a relatively large impact on the mortality, growth or 
recruitment of another species…”; and 
(3) since “the planet’s climate, ecosystems, and creatures are tightly linked” by 
biogeochemical cycles, human-induced “changes in one component can have drastic 
effects on another…” (e.g. because interfering with one component can drastically 
affect the distribution of such substances).155  
 
Cognisance of the true mobility of anthropogenic impacts between environmental 
mediums is critical to effective environmental management. This is because such 
awareness best ensures that decision-makers:  
 
(a) readily acknowledge that human activities have the capacity to create regional and 
sometimes global harm or threats of harm (as exemplified by impacts such as global 
warming, ocean acidification, and loss of biodiversity); and 
(b) in turn take steps to account for the potential high mobility or far reaching nature of 
such harms.   
 
Such awareness is growing. For example, states increasingly acknowledge this aspect of 
ecosystem vulnerability through their recognition that  “global environmental stresses and 
strains” are often generated by activities conducted within domestic boarders, and that this 
  
1987) 57 at 57-70. PA Larkin “Concepts and issues in marine ecosystem management” (1996) 6 Reviews in 
Fish Biology and Fisheries 139 at 140, 151. Cagan Sekercioglu, above n 143, at 52-53 and 63. Division for 
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea United Nations Ecosystem Approaches and Oceans E.07.V.4 (2007) 
at 15. Erik Jaap Molenaar, above n 143, at 584. Larry Crowder and Elliott Norse, above n 141, at 775. Daniel 
Pauly “Fishing Down Marine Food Webs” (1998) 279 Science 860 – 863 as cited in L. Juda, “Rio Plus Ten: 
The Evolution of International Marine Fisheries Governance” (2002) 33 Ocean Development and 
International Law 109 at 141. 
154 Estes, above n 141, at 473–476; Frank and others, above n 141, at 1621–1623; Myers and others 
“Cascading effects of the loss of apex predatory sharks from a coastal ocean” (2007) 315 Science 1846–50, 
as cited in Larry Crowder and Elliott Norse, above n 141, at 774-776. Karl-Hermann Kock and others, above 
n 141, at 2333-2349. Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 64.  
155 Larry Crowder and Elliott Norse, above n 141, at 775. 
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has significant implications for the way in which such human impacts are managed.156 As 
von Moltke notes, due to this ecological reality:157  
 
…countries are not alone in managing the environment. No country is sovereign 
when it comes the environment. Indeed only historical accident has left national 
governments in charge of managing resources which are locally based and globally 
linked.  
3 Susceptibility to non-linear changes 
 Finally, it emerged that human impacts can cause non-linear changes to ecosystems, 
and these changes can sometimes be "abrupt…large in magnitude and difficult, expensive, 
or impossible to reverse”.158 Initially, it became clear that ecosystem functions and 
processes often operate in a non-linear fashion, whereby small changes to one ecosystem 
component would produce sudden and disproportionally large changes in another.159 
Consequently, small human-induced changes to ecosystem components that form part of 
such a non-linear process could produce sudden and disproportionate harmful changes to 
another part of that process.  
 
  
156 Timothy O’Riordan and James Cameron, above n 123, at 12. 
157 Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 107. 
158 Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 64. A Kumar Duralappah and others Ecosystems 
and Human Wellbeing: Diversity Synthesis: A Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report (Washington, DC, 
2005) at 11. 
159 Jamie Benidickson et al “Practicing Precaution and Adaptive Management: Legal, Institutional and 
Procedural Dimensions of Scientific Uncertainty” Final Report Submitted to SSHRC and Law Commission 
of Canada (University of Ottowa, June 2005) at 20. Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124,  
at 68. James Lovelock “Taking Care” in Timothy O’Riordan and James Cameron (eds) Interpreting the 
Precautionary Principle (Cameron May, London, 1994) at 114. Jeroen van der Sluijs and Wim Turkenburg 
“Climate change and the precautionary principle” in Elizabeth Fisher, Judith Jones and Rene von Schomberg 
(eds) Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Perspectives and Prospects (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
2006) 245 at 248, 257 and 265.  Decision VII/11 of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity at its seventh meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 20 February 2004 UNEP/COP principle 6 
Rationale. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, above n 134, at 6. Douglas Clyde Wilson 
The Paradoxes of Transparency: Science and the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management in Europe 
(Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2009) at 170. Christopher Stone “Is there a Precautionary 
Principle?” (2001) 31 ELR 10790 at 10795. 
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 In addition, it became apparent that harm could come about suddenly and violently 
when an ecological ‘threshold’ (i.e. point at which a given human impact can no longer 
be assimilated) is met.160 This phenomenon is known as 'cumulative effects', and can occur 
when, for example, negative feedback loops, buffering capacities, and like mechanisms 
that make ecosystems resilient to limited quantities of change, are overwhelmed.161 As 
one author notes:162 
 
When systems exist near a threshold, small perturbations at a critical point may be 
sufficient to cause a shift to a new dynamic equilibrium or more chaotic activity…  
 
This may subsequently trigger an “ecosystem shift”, whereby the affected system post 
“shift”, continues to operate, however the ecological structure, function and various 
interactions within and between each, are irreversibly “reorganised” in a new “stable”, but 
typically less dynamic (i.e. robust and productive) equilibrium.163 Speaking in the context 
of ecological re-organisation, one author notes that “[t]his is true of both individual 
populations that have complex behaviour, and of whole ecosystems” (i.e. can apply to 
ecosystems as a whole or individual species alone).164 
 
 Under the principle of assimilative capacity, the belief in a regulator’s ability to 
prevent harm is largely premised on the assumption that harm manifests itself in a gradual 
and linear fashion. Thus, because of this, assimilative capacity asserts that regulators and 
others will have sufficient time to prove causation and subsequently intervene (i.e. by 
stopping the offending activity or taking steps to mitigate the harm) before any significant 
  
160 “The problems are often non-linear, so that a little more pollution may produce a profound change, like 
the last step before falling off a cliff” Durwood Zaelke, Matthew Stilwell and Oran Young “Compliance, 
Rule of Law and Good Governance: What Reason Demands: Making Law Work For Sustainable 
Development” in Durwood Zaelke, Donald Kaniaru and Eva Kruzikova (eds), above n 123, at 37. M’Gonigle 
and others, above n 79, at 110 (see footnote 26).  
161 Such as “response diversity” see footnote 138 above. R Wang, above n 143, at 21. Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, above n 134, at 32.   
162 Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 64, 67 and 84.  
163 Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 69. H Osterblom, above n 135, at 1292. Larry 
Crowder and Elliott Norse, above n 141, at 776. 
164 Larry Crowder and Elliott Norse, above n 141, at 776. 
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or irreversible harm results. However, as demonstrated above, due to the non-linear 
manner in which harm can arise, significant yet avoidable harm can often occurs long 
before there is any meaningful opportunity to identify its cause and take steps to avoid or 
mitigate it.   
C Scientific uncertainty and limited ability to predict ecological impacts  
The second insight to come out of the failure of the traditional approach, and rise of 
the precautionary principle, was the realisation that environmental science is inherently 
uncertain and, in particular, has a limited ability to detect, predict, understand and prove 
the nature, gravity and probability of ecological impacts caused by human activities. Put 
another way, science has a very limited ability to predict and prove cause-and-effect 
relationships.165  
 
Commentators assert that such scientific uncertainty, and limited predictive ability of 
science (a factor that distinct from uncertainty but which is a key contributor to it), is largely 
due to the complexity and variability of natural systems and processes (e.g. as such 
complexity frustrates most efforts to fully understand ecosystems and accurately predict 
the impact of human interference on them).166 It is indeed true that:167  
 
[e]cosystems are inherently complex. They are not easily reducible to a simple 
model or scientific theory and typically neither their components nor processes, 
nor the interrelationships between these are well understood. Consequently 
uncertainty is the norm in environmental management…   
 
As de Saadler also notes:168 
 
  
165 Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, at 2.  
166 Arie Trouwborst, above n 116, at 116 to 117. Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 
68.  
167 Elizabeth Fisher and Ronnie Harding “Uncertainty, risk and precaution: exploring the links” in Ronnie 
Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 2, at 163. 
168 Nicolas de Sadeleer, above n 75, at 18.  
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…as scientists discover new facts about how ecosystems operate, they find it 
increasingly difficult to precisely evaluate the scope of [harm]…science cannot 
deliver certainty…To some extent the more science learns, the more it understands 
the limits of its knowledge…The entire foundation of the ‘assimilative capacity’ 
approach, which rests upon a blind confidence in science, is thus crumbling under 
the pressure of uncertainty.    
 
This led to almost universal recognition (especially amongst the scientific community) that 
science is frequently unable to provide decision-makers with the information and means 
necessary to avoid them encroaching on the capacity of ecosystems to assimilate human 
impacts.169 This is demonstrated by the fact that:170 
 
[m]any industrial activities and by-products have followed a pattern of an initial 
judgement of safety, followed by uncertainty and circumstantial evidence of harm, 
acrimonious debate, and finally hard evidence of detrimental effects. 
 
Accordingly, for the above reasons (particularly when taken together with the insights 
regarding the potential magnitude of anthropogenic harm discussed above), environmental 
management regimes that require proof of causation before taking steps to avoid or mitigate 
harm will often fail to protect the environment.  As Schettler and Raffensperger note, the 
uncertainty of environmental science means that:171    
 
…human activities often have effects that are difficult to predict or even to 
recognize until damage is done…by the time a fact or causal relationship has been 
established by rigorous standards of proof, considerable avoidable damage may 
have already occurred.  
In particular, it became apparent that scientific uncertainty renders decision-makers blind 
  
169 Charmian Barton, above n 75, at 510-511. Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, at 2. 
M’Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 108. 
170 M’Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 101. 
171 Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 70. 
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to whether (if consented to or allowed to continue), an activity would:172  
 
(1) compromise the structure, proper functioning, and essential processes necessary to 
maintain the resilience and overall integrity of the effected ecosystem over time;173 
and 
(2) unduly impact any existing competing human uses of the affected ecosystem.   
 
As such, science, and in particular the science-led risk assessment process employed in 
most (traditional approach based) environmental decision-making frameworks, is unable 
to determine with sufficient accuracy, the use and protection balance required to ensure 
that consenting decisions secure sustainable development outcomes.  
 
This insight, more so than the recognition of the irreversibility of ecological harm, is 
the primary impetus behind the formation of precautionary principle. As Tickner and 
Kriebel note:174   
 
Put simply, the need for precaution arises because of uncertainty. If all potential 
hazards could be quantitatively assessed with minimal error, then it would be 
relatively easy to base…decisions on quantative risk assessments, and little else. 
 
Scientific uncertainty, therefore, is, “by definition, at the core of the precautionary 
principle”.175 Although not typically described in so many words, fundamentally, the 
problems caused by scientific uncertainty makes up the core mischief that the precautionary 
principle seeks to address. 
 
  
172 Malcolm MacGarvin, above n 94, at 74.  
173 Oceans and the law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General, above n 49, at [135]. 
174 Joel Tickner and David Kriebel “The role of science and precaution in environmental and public health 
policy” in Elizabeth Fisher, Judith Jones and Rene von Schomberg (eds), above n 159, at 43.  
175 Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, at 9. Arie Trouwborst, above n 116, at 116. Simon Marr, 
above n 11, at 9 and 24.   
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D Exploring scientific uncertainty  
Given that scientific uncertainty is “the basic ingredient of the precautionary 
principle”, close analysis of the nature of this uncertainty is critical to understanding: its 
substantive meaning; and, how to apply it in practice (i.e. to ensure proper giving of effect 
to its purpose).176  Indeed, as Trouwborst notes, a meaningful discussion about the 
precautionary principle cannot occur without such context.177 On this basis a strong 
argument can be made that where decision-makers’ fail correctly to apply the precautionary 
principle and as a result regress into or gravitate back towards more traditional approach 
based decision-making, this is often because scientific uncertainty and its implications 
“remain largely unappreciated”.178 For this reason, the remainder of this chapter explores 
scientific uncertainty and its implications in detail.  
 
While commentators typically assert that the uncertainty of environmental science is 
entirely due to the complex and variable nature of ecosystems,179 in reality, the concept of 
scientific uncertainty is far more multi-faceted.180 Fundamentally, scientific uncertainty is 
a product of the scientific method itself.181 Ecological complexity is a major contributor to 
the uncertainty that pervades environmental science. However, the very nature of the 
scientific method itself also frequently limits the ability of science to effectively and 
accurately predict and address ecological harm. As the European Commission states in its 
  
176 Elizabeth Fisher and Ronnie Harding, above n 167, at 164. 
177 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 71. 
178 Malcolm MacGarvin “The precautionary principle, science and policy” in Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth 
Fisher, above n 2, at 226.  
179 Arie Trouwborst, above n 116, at 116 to 117.   
180 Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, at 9. Elizabeth Fisher and Ronnie Harding, above n 167, 
at 164. Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 68. Steve Maguire and Cynthia Hardy “The 
Emergence of New Global Institutions: A Discursive Perspective” (2006) 27(1) Organisational Studies 7 at 
17. European Commission Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, 
COM(2000) 1 final: 2000 Brussels at 25. 
181 Douglas Clyde Wilson, above n 159, at 39-40. Morgan, GM & Henrion, M Uncertainty. A guide to dealing 
with uncertainty in quantitative risk and policy analysis, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990) at 
47. Simon Marr, above n 11, at 25. 
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2000 communication on the precautionary principle:182 
 
‘Scientific uncertainty results usually from five characteristics of the scientific 
method: the variable chosen, the measurements made, the samples drawn, the 
models used, and the causal relationship employed’, as well as ‘controversy on 
existing data or lack of some relevant data’ and ‘uncertainty’ related to ‘qualitative 
or quantitative elements of the analysis’   
 
Accordingly, in order to facilitate a better understanding of the principal reason, or rather 
‘mischief’, behind the precautionary principle’s existence, the principle itself, and how to 
ensure it is properly applied, the remainder of this chapter explores important aspects of 
scientific uncertainty. 
1 The scientific process, its limitations, inherent uncertainty, and lack of suitability to 
environmental decision-making   
In order to gain a good appreciation of scientific uncertainty and the issues it creates 
for decision-makers, it is necessary to have a sufficient grasp on the scientific process (i.e. 
the typical process through which scientific knowledge accrues). Such an understanding 
helps one appreciate how:  
 
(a) this iterative process generates information (i.e. scientific understanding) over long 
periods of time; and  
(b) the information that is ultimately produced is often inherently uncertain and sometimes 
ill-suited to environmental decision-making.  
 
First, it is important to acknowledge that scientific knowledge (e.g. on a given cause 
and effect relationship) is typically derived over long time periods. This is because such 
knowledge is usually the product of working one or a multitude of theses through a lengthy 
and robust process of theorising, experimentation and peer review. Until this process is 
  
182 Steve Maguire and Cynthia Hardy, above n 180, at 17. European Commission Communication from the 
Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM(2000) 1 final: 2000 Brussels at 25. 
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completed, science is unable to offer the courts anything that they would consider scientific 
evidence that is capable of proving a causal relationship to the required standard of proof. 
In providing a high-level summary of this process and the nature of the information it 
produces, Underwood notes:183 
 
A scientific study involves an empirical attempt to falsify a model or theory about 
some process by demonstrating that its predictions fail to come true. Thus scientists 
start with observations, our knowledge about the physical world, and then attempt 
to explain why the observations have been made…There are, however, usually 
many possible explanations (or theories or models) and some mechanism is needed 
to distinguish among them. 
 
A logically constructed procedure is to make a hypothesis from each model; that is, 
predictions about what will be observed under certain conditions not yet seen. These 
hypothesis are then tested by experiment – the creation of defined conditions so that 
the accuracy of the predictions can be measured.   
 
Because of the difficulties in proving events, it is usual to design the experiment as 
a attempt to disprove a null hypothesis – the logical opposite of the hypothesis. 
Disproof or refutation of the null hypothesis provides support for the hypothesis and 
the model from which it is derived. If the null hypothesis cannot be disproved, the 
hypothesis (and therefore the relevant model) is considered to be falsified and must 
be discarded.  
 
In discussing such difficulties, as well as the wider gestation process of scientific 
knowledge accrual (i.e. process of moving from mere theory to proof) Shelton makes the 
following observations:184  
 
Theories guide research and experimentations, which become refined, reshaped 
  
183 AJ Underwood “Precautionary principles require changes in thinking about planning and environmental 
sampling” in Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 2, at 255-256. 
184 Dinah Shelton, above n 63, at 224. 
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and ultimately accepted or rejected in light of the observation of results… 
Claims are judged in terms of reason and evidence. Scientists evaluate their ideas 
by criteria of testability, objectivity, impartiality and logic. All evolve along with 
scientific knowledge. Testing hypothesis by observation and experimentation over 
time helps eliminate distortions and errors and should enhance their predictive 
quality.  
Acceptance depends on experimental testing over time. The greater the risk from 
wrong conclusions, the more certainty may be required. Refinement comes from 
critical review and retesting, for which publication is essential.  
…scientific communities interact and…cross-reference each other, generating 
greater testing and acceptance.   
This process, and the nature of the information it generates, is problematic for 
environmental decision-makers who rely entirely on science to provide the information 
upon which their decisions are based.185 As Von Moltke notes, science offers "a highly 
imperfect method for making environmental phenomena manifest”. Ecosystem complexity 
aside, this is true for two reasons, namely, statistical uncertainty, and model uncertainty.  
The following two sections explore these two concepts in more detail and in doing so, 
identify their implications for environmental decision-making.    
2 Implications of statistical uncertainty  
 When a hypothesis is tested in a context of scientific uncertainty, there are in principle 
at least two possible types of erroneous outcome. In considering such erroneous outcomes 
in the environmental context:186  
 
(1) the first, known as a “type I error” (or “false positive”), is where scientists 
  
185 Charmian Barton, above n 75, at 511. HL Rouse and N Norton “Managing Scientific Uncertainty for 
Resource Management Planning in New Zealand” (2010) 17 Australasian Journel of Environmental 
Management 66 at 66.   
186 M’Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 104. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 194.  
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“…incorrectly conclude[e] that there is an effect when one actually does not exist”;187 
and   
(2) the second, known as a “type II error” (or “false negative”), is where scientists; 
“…incorrectly concluding that there is no effect when one actually exists)”.188  
 
 Both type I and type II errors each give rise to different consequences. First, type I 
errors result in invalid concerns about an activity (i.e. false assertion that a given activity 
will cause a given harm), which in turn often lead to the imposition of costly regulatory 
restrictions that are later shown to be unnecessary.189 In short, they lead to unnecessary 
financial and resource costs. Conversely, type II errors lead to concealment or the 
overlooking of legitimate ecological impacts or harm. Thus, because of type II errors, 
“…regulations that should be imposed are not because it is incorrectly assumed that no 
effect exists”.190 In turn, type II errors can result in regulators allowing harmful activities 
to continue without any harm avoidance measures, which would otherwise have be 
imposed, being put in place.191     
  
 The problem with science in the ecological setting is that it is particularly prone to type 
II errors.192 This is because scientists are trained to try to “...add only reasonably certain 
  
187 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 194. M’Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 104. See also Ted Schettler 
and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 71. Kriebel et al “The precautionary principle in environmental 
science” (2001) 109 Environmental Health Perspectives at 871 to 876. AJ Underwood “Precautionary 
principles require changes in thinking about planning and environmental sampling” in Ronnie Harding and 
Elizabeth Fisher, above n 2, at 256-264. 
188 Or as Shettler and Raffensperger provide in defining it generally; “…the mistake of failing to recognise 
an association or phenomenon when it does exist”. As Trouwborst exemplifies; where “…a researcher 
concludes there is no effect [between chemical X and alga Y] when there actually is one” see M’Gonigle and 
others, above n 79, at 104; and Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 194. Ted Schettler and Carolyn, above n 124, 
at 71. AJ Underwood “Precautionary principles require changes in thinking about planning and 
environmental sampling” in Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 2, at 256-264. 
189 M’Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 104. Timothy O’Riordan “The Precautionary Principle and Civic 
Science” in Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron and Andrew Jordan (eds), above n 143, at 102. Ted Schettler 
and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 71.  
190 M’Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 104. 
191 Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 71. M’Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 104. 
192 Jamie Benidickson, above n 159, at 237. 
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information to the body of knowledge as opposed to more speculative knowledge”.193 As 
Shettler and Raffensperger suggest, science “generally requires strong evidence that 
something is scientifically “true” before being willing to say so…”,194 hence the established 
view amongst the scientific community that:195 
 
…committing a Type I error is worse than committing a type II error…[because i]t 
is regarded as ‘better science’ to incorrectly claim there is no effect than to 
incorrectly claim there is an effect. 
 
For this reason science is inherently geared towards committing type II errors more often 
that type I errors.196 By extension, it can also be said that in the environmental setting, 
science consciously prefers (i.e. is tilted towards) committing errors that lead to 
environmental harm over those that result in redundant (i.e. unnecessary) protective 
measures being imposed. This choice is aptly characterised as selecting a preferred trade-
off. Thus, in making this choice, science makes a significant value judgement in isolation 
from any transparent and democratic policy or law making process.  
 
 In environmental management, this reasoning is applied to the determination of 
hazards to the environment and human health.197 Therefore, when attempting to ascertain 
  
193 John Lemons, Kristin Shrader-Frechette and Carl Cranor “The Precautionary Principle: Scientific 
Uncertainty and Type I and Type II Errors (1997) 2 Foundations of Science 207 at 227. Joe Tickner and 
Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 76, at 14. 
194 Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 71. Jamie Benidickson, above n 159, at 237. 
Joe Tickner and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 76, at 14. 
195 Kristen Schrader-Frechette “Methodological risks for four classes of scientific uncertainty” in J Lemons 
Scientific Uncertainty and Environmental Problem Solving (Blackwell, Oxford, 1996) 12 as cited in Timothy 
O’Riordan “The Precautionary Principle and Civic Science” in Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron and Andrew 
Jordan (eds), above n 143, at 102. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 194. Ted Schettler and Carolyn 
Raffensperger, above n 124, at 71. David Gee and Andrew Stirling “Late lessons from early warnings: 
improving science and governance under uncertainty and ignorance in Marco Martuzzi & Joel Tickner (eds), 
above n 124, at 122. Charmian Barton, above n 75, at 511. 
196 John Lemons, Kristin Shrader-Frechette and Carl Cranor “The Precautionary Principle: Scientific 
Uncertainty and Type I and Type II Errors (1997) 2 Foundations of Science 207 at 227. 
197 Joe Tickner and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 76, at 14. 
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ecological effects:198   
 
[s]cientific experiments incorporate this bias. Stringent standards of 
experimentation and replication are implemented to minimise the possibility of 
false positives. The burden of proof so to speak, is assigned accordingly to the 
scientist deviating from the null hypothesis…that is the hypothesis that there is no 
effect…  
 
This is not unlike the reasoning that lies behind the legal presumption of innocence: the 
decision-maker will presume there is no guilt or liability, unless and until the accuser 
proves there is.  The justification is that it is more palatable to be wrong about innocence 
than it is to be wrong about guilt or liability.  Explaining how this bias operates in the 
environmental science context, Kriebel et al makes the following observations:199  
 
By convention, Type I…errors are guarded against by setting that error rate low, 
usually at 5%. In other words, the finding must be so strong that there is less than 
a 5% probability that this result would have been seen by chance alone in a world 
in which no such phenomenon actually exists. In this case the result is called 
statistically significant...The Type II error, failing to detect something that actually 
does exist, is, by convention, often set at 20%...Twenty percent of the time, a real 
phenomenon will be missed because the data were not strong enough to 
convincingly demonstrate its existence. 
 
 This statistical bias is one instance of a “value-laden judgement” being embedded in 
the scientific method used in ecosystem risk identification. As Shettler and Raffensperger 
note:200  
 
Establishing type I and type II error rates is a choice that reflects certain biases and 
is largely done by [scientific] convention, often without considering the 
  
198 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 194.  
199 Kriebel et al “The precautionary principle in environmental science” in Marco Martuzzi & Joel Tickner 
(eds), above n 124, at 153-154. 
200 Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 71.  
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consequences… 
  
Because of this skewed approach, type II errors are frequently “…the inevitable result of a 
consistent bias towards avoiding type I errors…”,201 and, in practice, operate as “…a de 
facto bias in favour of industrial freedom of action”, and in turn, against environmental 
protection.202  This approach, therefore, leads to a comparatively detrimental outcome for 
environmental protection initiatives and objectives.  
3 Model uncertainty  
Ecological modelling has emerged as a predominant tool in predicting environmental 
outcomes, particularly in relation to marine ecosystem management. “Model uncertainty” 
or “model error” arises where there are “gaps in scientific theory” (e.g. the thesis that X 
impact will generate Y ecological effects),203 or “imprecision in the models used to bridge 
information gaps” (e.g. as to how a given activity will affect a given receiving ecosystem 
or part thereof).204 The result is that the subsequent model fails to accurately identify or 
specify, or sufficiently capture the relevant causal processes (e.g. between an activity and 
the subsequent impact induced ecological outcomes that culminate in harm), including the 
full extent and nature of the subsequent harm.205    
  
201 Kristen Schrader-Frechette “Methodological risks for four classes of scientific uncertainty” in J Lemons 
Scientific Uncertainty and Environmental Problem Solving (Blackwell, Oxford, 1996) 12 as cited in Timothy 
O’Riordan “The Precautionary Principle and Civic Science” in Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron and Andrew 
Jordan (eds), above n 143, at 102. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 194. Ted Schettler and Carolyn 
Raffensperger, above n 124, at 71. David Gee and Andrew Stirling “Late lessons from early warnings: 
improving science and governance under uncertainty and ignorance in Marco Martuzzi & Joel Tickner (eds), 
above n 124, at 511. 
202 M’Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 102. Jamie Benidickson, above n 159, at 237-238. 
203 P.A. Larkin, "Concepts and Issues in Marine Ecosystem Management", (1996) 6 Reviews in Fish Biology 
and Fisheries 139 at 150. Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment Te Kaitiaki Taiao 
a Te Whare Pāremata  “Illuminated or blinded by science? A discussion paper on the role of science in 
environmental policy and decision-making” (PCE, Wellington, July 2003) at 31. United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development, Development, Report, Annex II, 12 August 1992, UN Doc A./Conf. 
151/26 (Vol II-IV). D Gascuel “Towards the implementation of an intergrated ecosystem fleet-based 
management of European fisheries” (2012) 36 Marine Policy 1022 at 1022 to 1032. Hanling Wang, above n 
34, at 42-43.  
204 Joe Tickner and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 76, at 11. 
205 Douglas Clyde Wilson, above n 159, at 40. 
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Scientific modelling entails developing an abstract, usually mathematical, 
representation of an ecological system, or part of (e.g. equations that “describe” ecosystem 
phenomena),206 or developing a “relative approximation” of that system.207 The 
representation or approximation then attempts to simulate all of the various relevant 
ecological interactions and their responses to anthropogenic inputs.208 As such, modelling 
requires scientists to accurately identify and define all germane system variables and how 
they interact, and to subsequently reduce them to mathematical terms in a way that again, 
operates as a sufficiently accurate relative approximation of the actual ecosystem. This is 
a difficult task, particularly in the marine space, given:  
 
(1) the ever-present knowledge deficit which typically precedes most attempts to execute 
such a task;  
(2) the complex, multifaceted and variable nature of ecological relationships between 
ecological components; and  
(3) the reality that establishing the role of an ecological component (for example, a given 
species) “demands long-term detailed observation and…experimental manipulation”, 
something that is typically not possible when conducting a modelling exercise.209     
 
Arguably, these difficulties “cripple” scientists' ability accurately to represent the modelled 
system.210  Furthermore, “…complex models can include only a finite number of variables 
and interactions”. As Schettler & Raffensperger go on to note, such models typically are 
unable to account for or incorporate all germane ecological variables because:211             
  
206 G.M. Watters et al “Decision-making for ecosystem-based management: evaluating options for a krill 
fishery with an ecosystems dynamics model” (2013) 23(4) Ecological Applications 710 at 711. 
207 P.A. Larkin, "Concepts and Issues in Marine Ecosystem Management", (1996) 6 Reviews in Fish Biology 
and Fisheries 139 at 141. 
208 G.M. Watters et al “Decision-making for ecosystem-based management: evaluating options for a krill 
fishery with an ecosystems dynamics model” (2013) 23(4) Ecological Applications 710 at 710. 
209 Malcolm MacGarvin, above n 94, at 77-79. 
210 Adriana Fabra and Viginia Gascon “The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic marine Living 
Resources (CCAMLR) and the Ecosystem Approach” (2008) 23 The International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 567 at 577. Malcolm MacGarvin, above n 94, at 77. 
211 Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 69. 
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The real world, however, is a confluence of biological, ecological, social, cultural, 
economic and political systems. No experimental model can fully account for each of 
these and their interrelationships. Ongoing research, monitoring and refining models 
may help to reduce uncertainty, but imprecision is inevitable. 
 
In particular, where there are multiple and interacting variables, there is a fundamental 
uncertainty in the relevant model, even before one takes into account the compounding 
complexity generated by spatial and temporal dynamics.212 Absent an ability to model 
complete systems and include all of their intricacies and idiosyncrasies, it is difficult - if 
not impossible - to anticipate anthropogenic impacts on the synergistic properties of 
ecosystems.213  
4 Ecological complexity as a source of uncertainty  
In short, the inordinate complexity, variability, and dynamic and non-linear nature of 
ecosystems confound the ability of science (i.e. the above scientific process) to comprehend 
and predict ecological phenomena.214 Specifically, because of these ecosystem 
characteristics, science:   
 
(1) has a considerably limited ability to understand how human impacts resonate 
throughout ecosystems (namely, the impact on structure and function);  
(2) is often unable accurately to determine the assimilative thresholds that a given 
  
212 Ted Schettler and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 124, at 74. P.A. Larkin, "Concepts and Issues in Marine 
Ecosystem Management", (1996) 6 Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries 139 at 151. International Risk 
Governance Council, above n 145, at 10. 
213 International Risk Governance Council, above n 145, at 11.  
214 J Steele, above n 50, at 185-192. S Woodley, J Kay and G Francis (eds), above n 50. B G Hatcher “Coral 
reef ecosystems: How much greater is the whole than the sum of the parts?” (1997) 16 Coral Reefs 77 to 91 
as cited in Bruce G Hatcher and Roger H Bradbury “Marine Ecosystem Management: Is the whole greater 
than the sum of the parts?” as cited in Donald R Rothwell and David L VanderZwaag, above n 145, at 207. 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea, above n 49, preamble. Decision VII/11, Ecosystem Approach (Kuala Lumpur, 
20 February 2004), principle 6 Rationale. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, above n 134, 
at 6. Douglas Clyde Wilson, above n 159, at 170. Thomas Elmqvist et al “Response diversity, ecosystem 
change, and resilience” (2003) 1, 9 Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 488 at 488. 
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ecosystem possesses (i.e. its capacity to absorb, without material harm, a given human 
impact);215 and 
(3) is, in turn, often unable to detect, understand and prove the ecological harm, which 
many proposed activities will or are  likely to cause.216 
 
Therefore, even though relationships do often exist between an activity and a subsequent 
harm, in spite of extensive scientific testing, such relationships will often remain largely 
hidden.217  
 
As discussed above, ecological complexity is manifested in ecosystems' innumerable 
biotic and abiotic parts, bound together by a sophisticated web of intimate and systematic 
interactions (such as negative and positive feedback loops), which maintain the optimal 
physical and chemical conditions for life.218 These features are present at the global 
environment, which itself is comprised of a myriad of interdependent and inextricably 
linked major ecosystems, which again, interact as a functional unit. In addition, complexity 
arises from the fact that interactions between ecosystem components generate properties 
and behaviours characteristic of the ecosystem as a whole (i.e. where the properties of the 
whole are greater than that generated by the sum of its component parts).219 
 
Several key ecological characteristics also contribute to the variable nature of 
ecosystems. First, as noted above, ecosystem processes and functions are also non-linear 
in nature. In addition, the outcome of such processes is often subject to considerable time 
lags. As experience has shown, “[t]he result is discontinuities, leading to surprise and 
  
215 Simon Marr , above n 11, at 26. 
216 Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, at 2. M’Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 108. 
217 M’Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 101. 
218 A Kumar Duralappah, above n 158, at 18. Douglas Clyde Wilson, above n 159, at 170. RL Smith and TM 
Smith Elements of Ecology (4th ed, Pearson Publishing, Virginia, 2000) at 344.     
219 International Risk Governance Council, above n 145, at 33. B G Hatcher above n 212, at 91. Oceans and 
the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General, above n 49, at [113]. A Belgrano et al “Toward 
ecosystem-based management for the oceans: a perspective for fisheries in the Bering Sea” In Report of the 
PICES/NPRB Workshop on Integration of Ecological Indicators of the North Pacific with Emphasis on the 
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uncertainty”.  Secondly, variability often arises because ecosystem structure and function, 
and the innumerable sub-components within each, are not static; rather, as a result of 
ecological processes, they are variable and in flux, with change occurring constantly on a 
multitude of differing spatial and temporal scales.220 Furthermore, at a macro level, entire 
ecosystems go through “phase transitions” where they naturally alternate between various 
“alternate stable ecosystem states”.221 As the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity of states:222 
 
Those changes include shifts in species composition, population abundance, and 
physical characteristics…Such changes are not necessarily constant, [but are] 
variable, dynamic and usually difficult to predict at any point in time.    
 
Because of the above:223 
 
…[e]cosystems…have ‘moving boundaries’…some habitats may stay relatively 
stable…other systems…can be highly variable. Changes can occur in the short-term 
with changes in currents or in line with decadal shifts. Some species inhabit different 
scales of the ecosystem at different stages of their life cycles, such as a pelagic state 
  
220 Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General, above n 49, at [110] -[113], [150], and 
[154]. Donna R Christie “Implementing an Ecosystem Approach to Ocean Management: An Assessment of 
Current Regional Governance Models” (2005) 16 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F 117 at 128. Karl-Hermann Kock 
and others, above n 141, at 2342. H Osterblom, above n 135, at 1291. Erik Jaap Molenaar, above n 143, at 
583.     
221 Scheffer M et al “Catastrophic shifts in ecosystems” (2001) 413 Nature at 591 to 596. Scheffer, M. & 
Carpenter, S. “Catastrophic regime shifts in ecosystems: linking theory to observation” (2003) 18 Trends 
Ecol. Evol. At 648 to 656, as cited in Michael Litzow and Lorenzo Ciannelli “Oscillating trophic control 
induces community reorganisation in a marine ecosystem” (2007) 10 Ecology Letters at 1 to 11. Larry 
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222 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, above n 134, at 24. Karl-Hermann Kock and others, 
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223 MRAG & UNEP-WCMC (2008) Defining concepts of ecosystem structure and function for UK marine 
monitoring. Joint Nature Conservation Committee, Peterborough. 65 pages. JNCC report No. 397, Annex 1 
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during larval stages and a benthic existence as an adult. 
 
Consequently, the parameters of the anthropogenic impact that an ecosystem can tolerate 
(i.e. a given ecosystem’s capacity to assimilate or neutralise harm) “…are not static but 
may vary across sites, through time, and in relation to past circumstances and events” (i.e. 
they are in essence a moving target).224  
 
Such ecosystem characteristics generate uncertainty for a multitude of reasons. 
Speaking at a high level, von Moltke notes uncertainty arises because the scientific process 
described above:225 
 
…is a highly imperfect method for making environmental phenomena manifest…the 
best [it] can do is provide a hypothesis which has stood up well under repeated 
scrutiny… [it] almost never provides clear proof of major environmental impacts 
because the environment is too complex to be described in strictly scientific terms   
 
As M'Gonigle et al also explain:226 
 
Despite considerable scientific data about the dynamics of natural and human-
disturbed environmental systems, large gaps in our understanding still exist. 
Because of the complexity of most ecological systems, it is sometimes difficult 
either to identify causes of past observations or to forecast future responses to a 
proposed activity. Many features of ecological systems can increase the variance 
of data so as to reduce the statistical power of a study, thus posing interpretive 
difficulties for regulators who depend on scientific studies. 
In discussing the uncertainty that flows from ecosystem complexity and variability, 
Trouwborst also adds to the above by making the following observations:227  
 
  
224 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, above n 134, at 18. 
225 Konrad von Moltke, above n 66, at 98.  
226 Michael M’Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 108.  
227 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 75. 
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In the multilayered planetary ecosystem with all its cycling and feedback, causes 
and effects are apparently inseparable, as effects become causes for new effects and 
so on. Even the question of where to begin scientific examination of such a system 
is difficult to approach. The more is learnt about the dynamics of ecosystems, the 
more it is realised how extremely difficult it is to comprehensively understand or 
even predict them. 
In truth, the uncertainties flowing directly from nature’s complexity are of such 
magnitude and variety that they are highly unlikely to ever be significantly reduced, 
let alone resolved. No environmental study can ever pretend to capture all checks 
and balances on an ecosystem; invariably there are conditions that escape 
observation and comprehension, or extend beyond the studied range.  
Significantly, while science often excels in the discrete exploration and analysis of 
individual, minute parts of ecosystems, the scientific process and tools it employs are 
“often at a loss where it comes to comprehending the intricacies of ecological linkages”, 
and, in turn, the way harm in which communicates through them (e.g. via trophic cascades 
or similar knock-on effects). By way of example, M'Gonigle et al note that the limited 
predictive ability of science, and in turn, its often-limited ability to resolve uncertainty, can 
arise because scientific studies: 228  
 
(1) can only test a limited number of ecosystem components at a time, under a limited 
range of conditions, and as a result may: overlook important cumulative or synergistic 
effects; fail to identify emergent properties or behaviors; ignore impact of a related 
ecosystem component on that which is being tested; or, given the interconnected nature 
of ecosystems, fail to notice there may be more than one causative agent for the 
observed effect. 
(2) often focus on the effect a given human interference has on indicator species at a single 
stage of its life, they are limited in their ability to detect cumulative effects on that 
  
228 For example, as M’Gonigle et al note, where a particular ecosystem function is facilitated by more than 
one ecological pathway “…the potential effect of a human disturbance that interferes with only one of these 
pathways may be masked, while a latter disturbance affecting the remaining pathways may have an 
observable effect – an effect that may be difficult to trace to its source. M’Gonigle and others, above n 79, at 
110. 
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particular species, and the potential effects on species of different trophic levels. 
 
In addition, establishing cause-and-effect relationships through repeated scientific 
experimentation can be difficult, or even impossible, because of several factors, namely:229  
 
(1) latency periods caused by time delays between human impacts and resulting harm 
prevent identification by such experiments;  
(2) natural variability in ecosystems, as a result, for example, of ‘phase transitions’, 
making it difficult to identify clear associations and differentiate between naturally 
occurring changes and those caused by human activities (that is, differentiating 
between “phase transitions” and “ecosystem shifts”); 
(3) the capacity of an ecosystem’s species, or of an ecological process, to tolerate 
interference is a constantly shifting target; and 
(4) complex interactions being counterintuitive and not easily foreseeable except by 
modelling the system as a whole (that is, so as to discern “emergent properties”).230 
5 Practical implications of scientific uncertainty 
All of the above difficulties led to the scientific community and states acknowledging 
that the absence of evidence that an may or will activity cause harm cannot be equated with 
the proof that there is no harm.231 It also led to the acknowledgement that, due to the manner 
and pace at which scientific knowledge accrues and evolves, science is frequently unable 
to provide decision-makers with the kind of ecological information they need, at the time 
they need it, in order to conduct an effective risk assessment.   
 
In addition, the information generated by science does not possess the necessary clarity 
and precision that is required for good environmental decision-making. Science does not 
put forward unequivocal assertions;232 rather, “[t]he best science can do is provide a 
  
229 See Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, ch I. Charmian Barton, above n 75, at 512-514. 
230 International Risk Governance Council, above n 145, at 10.  
231 Steve Maguire and Cynthia Hardy, above n 180, at 69. Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, 
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232 Nicolas de Sadeleer, above n 75, at 152-153. 
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hypothesis which has stood up well under repeated scrutiny”.233   
 
Difficulty also arises in the disjunct between science and time.234 As indicated above,  
“science is a cumulative effort, with answers generated through a long sequence of 
hypothesis, each moving closer towards a fuller insight”. If, at a particular point in time, 
science fails to confirm or disprove a hypothesis, scientists may continue to “refine, 
modify, or discard, variables or models when more information is available” in an effort 
eventually to prove the causal relationship. Furthermore, “most answers in science are 
considered subject to revision in light of new evidence” and, as such, may change. 
Regulators and courts, however, must make a choice based on the existing scientific 
knowledge at that point in time.  This means that environmental decisions often require 
proof of a causal relationship years or even decades before any semblance of scientific 
certainty can be achieved.235
  
233 Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 98. 
234 Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 99. 
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Precautionary Principle” (1991) 33.7 Environment 4 at 4.  
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V Introducing the Precautionary Principle 
 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the precautionary principle arose in response to increasing 
understanding that the harm inflicted on the environment by human activities can have 
grave and irreversible consequences in conjunction with:236  
 
(1) acknowledgement of the multiple uncertainties surrounding threats to the 
environment;  
(2) the realisation that science often has a limited ability to accurately to predict the effects 
of human behaviour; and  
(3) an understanding of the need to take preventative action to protect the environment in 
the face of these uncertainties and inabilities (especially in light of the severity of some 
harms).    
 
Driven by the above collection of insights and realisations, the precautionary principle 
rapidly emerged as a general principle of international law in the early 1980s. In doing so 
the precautionary principle (which is often also referred to as the ‘precautionary 
approach’),237 facilitated a paradigmatic shift in the way states sought to manage 
environmental threats.238 Specifically, this shift entailed a move: 
 
  
236 Arie Trouwborst , above n 2, at 10.  
237 A comprehensive discussion regarding whether the terms precautionary principle and precautionary 
approach refer to differing precautionary standards is beyond the scope of this paper. Previously, it was 
argued that ascribing the label "precautionary approach", instead of "precautionary principle" to a 
precautionary provision is a clear indication that negotiating states intended to be subject to a less restrictive 
precautionary standard (that is, the precautionary principle indicated an intention to be bound by a more 
“hard-line” obligation to take precautionary measures; whereas the precautionary approach indicated a 
relaxation of the strength of the obligation imposed, thereby preserving negotiating states discretion as to 
whether precautionary measures are to be adopted or not in a given situation). Now it is widely accepted that 
such nomenclature has no substantive effect on the strength of a decision maker's obligations to adopt 
precautionary measures under that provision. An examination of those international instruments containing 
precautionary provisions and state practice demonstrate use of ‘approach’ and ‘precaution’ with indifference 
to the basic characteristics and legal consequences of a precautionary provisions application. See also: Ellen 
Hey, above n 79, at 304.  
238 David Vanderzwaag, above n 2, at 166.  
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(1) from an approach that is: reactive, as protective steps may only be taken after proving 
causation, a task science typically undertakes in response to suspicion that the given 
harm is already manifest; and fragmented, as harm is typically proven on an ad hoc 
basis in relation discrete instances of harm, thereby constraining efforts to implement 
coordinated protective measures that take a long-term view; and  
(2) towards a holistic and anticipatory approach, whereby decision-makers are legally 
entitled to take action to protect the environment in advance of definitive scientific 
proof that:239 (a) a causal link exists between a suspected activity and resulting harm; 
and (b) the suspected damage will materialise.  
 
Importantly, this shift was also characterised as facilitating a move “away from a belief in 
the supremacy of science to accurately gauge the health of the environment”, to an 
understanding that effective environmental decision-making requires regulators to go 
beyond science.240  
 
The precautionary principle thus arose to tackle mischiefs that proved fatal to 
humankind’s ability effectively to manage its impact on the environment, and, in turn, the 
environment itself. Driven by this, early predictions the precautionary principle would 
“become the fundamental principle of environmental protection policy and law”, were 
subsequently confirmed by “the speed with which…[it] has been brought on to the 
international agenda, and the range and variety of international forums which have 
explicitly accepted it”.241         
A Introducing the precautionary principle 
At its core, the precautionary principle advises decision-makers to err on the side of 
caution where the effects of an activity cannot be predicted with confidence. Applying the 
  
239 David Freestone and Ellen Hey, above n 9, at 13. 
240 PE Taylor “From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New Dynamic in International Law?” 
(1998) 10 Geo Int’l Env L Rev 309 at 330. 
241 Jonathan Wiener “Precaution” in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnee and Ellen Hey (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) at 599. 
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principle means giving the benefit of the doubt to the environment: in dubio pro natura.242 
In essence, it codifies the common-sense notion of precaution, and in doing so formalises 
and structures its application to the specific problem area of environmental regulatory 
decision-making.243 In this regard, Stein J notes:244  
 
the precautionary principle is a statement of common sense…It is directed towards 
prevention of serious harm to the environment in situations of scientific uncertainty. 
Its premise is that where uncertainty or ignorance exists concerning the nature or 
scope of environmental harm (whether it flows from policies, decisions or activities), 
decision makers should be cautious. 
 
Despite the fact that some variance in wording exists between the multitude of 
precautionary principle formulations found in various international and domestic law 
instruments, at a minimum, all formulations share the same “quintessential elements” and 
basic structure,245 which are explored below.   
1 Common purpose and conceptual core 
The precise stated purpose of different precautionary principle formulations can vary 
depending on the particular environmental subject dealt with. In spite of this, each 
formulation shares the common purpose of ensuring the adequate protection of the 
  
242 Arie Trouwborst above n 75, at 184. 
243 Ellen Hey, above n 79; Jonathan Wiener, above n 241, at 599; Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 8. Chris 
Tollefson and Jamie Thornback “Litigating the Precautionary Principle in Domestic Courts” (2008) 19 JELP 
33 at 35; David Vanderzwaag, above n 2, at 166; Gary E Marchant, above n 7, at 1799; Tim O’Riordan, 
above n 2, at 283. 
244 James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, above n 2, at 46. 
245 Per Sandin “Dimensions of the Precautionary Principle” (1999) 5.5. Human and Ecological Risk 
Assessment: An International Journal 889 at 890. M Matthee and D Vermersch “Are the Precautionary 
Principle and the International Trade of Genetically Modified Organisms Reconcilable?” (2000) 12 JAEE 59 
at 61; A Epiney and M Scheyli “Strukturprinzipien des Umweltvölkerrechts” (Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, 
1998) at 109-110. James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, above n 2, at 45. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 30. 
Daniel Bodansky “Deconstructing the Precautionary Principle” in David D Cameron and Harry N Scheiber 
(eds) Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Berkeley/Boston, 2004) 381 at 386; 
Gary E Marchant, above n 7, at 1800. Stephen Gardiner “A Core Precautionary Principle” (2006) 14(1) J 
Polit Philos 33 at 36. 
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environment, and in particular, ecosystem health246 both:247  
 
(1) as an end in itself, on the basis that there is inherent value in preserving the 
environment for its own sake;248 and  
(2) for the benefit of humankind, because the preservation of ecosystems within it, and in 
particular the life-sustaining services they provide, are critical to the survival and 
wellbeing of humans.249 
 
In pursuit of this purpose, the core notion of the precautionary principle provides:250 
where there is a threat of environmental harm, the environment and the well-being and 
interests of future generations can only be adequately protected if decision-makers take 
protective measures in advance of the establishment of scientific certainty (i.e. proof of 
causation between, the relevant activity and the potential environmental harm).251  As de 
Saadler further explains:252  
  
246 Christopher C.E. Hopkins “The Concept of Ecosystem Health   and Association with the Ecosystem 
Approach to Management and Related Initiatives” (BSRP Study Group on Baltic Ecosystem Health Issues, 
November 2004) at 2 to 3. 
247 Arie Trouwborst, above n 116, at 108. Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 12. James Cameron “The 
Precautionary Principle: Core meaning, constitutional framework and procedures for implementation” in 
Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 2, at 40. Jacqueline Peel “The Precautionary Principle in 
Practice: Environmental decision-making and scientific uncertainty” (Federation Press, Melbourne, 2005) at 
viii.   
248 Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 12; James Cameron, above n 247, at 40.   
249 Arie Trouwborst, above n 116, at 108. Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 12. 
250 Rosie Cooney, above n 57, at 4. Philippe Sands, above n 9, at 268-279. Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 
245; James Cameron, above n 247, at 29-36. Andrew Jordan & Timothy O’Riordan “The precautionary 
principle: a legal and policy history” in Marco Martuzzi and Joel Tickner (eds), above n 124, at 42. David 
Freestone and Ellen Hey, above n 9, at 13.  John S Applegate, above n 9, at 14. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, 
at 245. 
251 David Freestone and Ellen Hey, above n 9, at 13. John S Applegate, above n 9, at 26. See also James 
Cameron, above n 247, at 29-36. Andrew Jordan & Timothy O’Riordan, above n 250, at 42. David Freestone 
and Ellen Hey, above n 9, at 13. Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 245. James Cameron, Will Wade-Gery and 
Julie Abouchar “Precautionary Principle in Future Generations” in Emmanuel Agius and others Future 
Generations in International Law (Routledge, London 1998) at 98-99. James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, 
above n 2, at 46. 
252 Andrew Jordan & Timothy O’Riordan, above n 250, at 42. David Freestone and Ellen Hey, above n 9, at 
13. 
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...precaution means that the absence of scientific certainty – or conversely… 
scientific uncertainty – as to the existence or the extent of a risk should…no longer 
delay the adoption of preventative measures to protect the environment. Put simply, 
the principle can be understood as the expression of a philosophy of anticipated 
action, not requiring that the entire corpus of scientific proof be collated in order 
for a public authority to be able to adopt a preventive measure. (emphasis added) 
 
Thus, it can be said that the raison d'être of the precautionary principle is its particular 
temporal relationship between scientific certainty and regulatory action; namely, that in 
appropriate cases, regulatory action should precede certainty.253  
 
Lead commentators note that, upon examining “the myriad of different definitions 
found in the numerous agreements, declarations, action programmes, resolutions, 
decisions, statutes, strategies, judgements and other sources”,254 it becomes clear that:255   
 
[r]egardless of the differences in wording, all…examples can be seen to possess the 
same three common elements: 
 
1)  regulatory inaction threatens non-negligible harm;  
2)  there exists a lack of certainty on the cause and effect relationships; and 
3)  under these circumstances regulatory inaction is unjustified. 
 
These elements form a conceptual core. 
 
This “uniform core message” of the precautionary principle is most recognisably reflected 
in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration,256 which, because of being the most widely accepted 
  
253 David Freestone and Ellen Hey, above n 9, at 13. John S Applegate, above n 9, at 26.   
254 Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 245.  
255 James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, above n 2, at 46. James Cameron “The Precautionary Principle in 
International Law” in Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron and Andrew Jordan (eds), above n 143, at 116. 
256 Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 245. James Cameron, Will Wade-Gery and Julie Abouchar, above n 251, 
at 46. 
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international formulation of the precautionary principle, is now the most authoritative 
international statement of the principle.257 Specifically, it provides:258  
 
[i]n order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely 
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific evidence shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.  
2 A common structure  
Comprehensive examination of the various precautionary principle formulations also 
discloses a common structure. In particular, each is comprised of:259  
 
(1) a “precautionary trigger”, which prescribes the factors, or rather, risk thresholds, which 
if met trigger recourse to the precautionary principle (i.e. they stipulate the 
circumstances when precautionary measures are warranted);260 and  
(2) a “precautionary response”, which prescribes what precautionary action is warranted 
(i.e. what the decision-maker can or must do when confronted with a given risk).261  
 
  
257 Daniel Bodansky, above n 245, at 383. Philippe Sands, above n 9, at 269; John S Ahteensuu “The Taming 
of the Precautionary Principle” 27 (2002) Wm & Mary Envtl L & Pol’y Rev 13 at 13. Simon Marr, above n 
11, at 7. 
258 John S Ahteensuu, above n 257, at 13. Simon Marr, above n 11, at 7. 
259 Daniel Bodansky, above n 245, at 386. Commission of the European Communities “Communication from 
the Commission: on the precautionary principle” (COM 1, Brussels, February 2000) at 13. Noah M Sachs 
“Rescuing The Strong Precautionary Principle From Its Critics” (2011) (4) University of Illinois Law Review 
1285 at 1338; John S Applegate, above n 9, at 17. 
260 Daniel Bodansky, above n 245, at 387. 
261 Daniel Bodansky, above n 245, at 386. Jon M Van Dyke “Evolution and International Acceptance of the 
Precautionary Principle” in David D Cameron and Harry N Scheiber, above n 245, at 359. Gary E Marchant, 
above n 7, at 1800. Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, at 14 and 21. Simon Marr, above n 11, 
at 79. Stephen Gardiner, above n 245, at 36.  
  86 
Pointing to a representative cross-section of precautionary principle formulations, 
Sandin observes that the precautionary trigger in each can be further broken down into 
the:262 
 
(1)  “threat dimension”, which specifies the minimum level (i.e. gravity) of the potential 
harm (or “possible threat”) that is required in order to invoke the principle; and  
(2)  “uncertainty dimension”, which specifies the lowest level of knowledge about the 
threat of harm (e.g. knowledge as to its nature, extent of impact and causal relationship 
with the activity in question) that is required to invoke the principle.  
 
Furthermore, he notes that the precautionary response in each formulation is also further 
broken down into the: 
  
(1) “action dimension”, which specifies how to respond to the identified threat; and  
(2) “command dimension”, which specifies the strength of the decision-makers duty to 
implement the prescribed precautionary action (e.g. whether precautionary action is 
discretionary a or a compulsory response).  
 
In applying this analytical framework to the Rio Declaration formulation, it can be shown 
that the precautionary principle entails:  
 
(1) a threat dimension, expressed as “threats of serious or irreversible environmental 
damage”;  
(2) an uncertainty dimension, expressed as “lack of full scientific certainty”;  
(3) an action dimension, expressed as “measures to prevent environmental degradation”; 
and 
(4) a command dimension expressed as “…[uncertainty] should not be used as a reason 
for postponing”.  
 
  
262 Per Sandin, above n 245, at 890. Runyu Wang “The precautionary principle in maritime affairs” (2011) 
10(2) WMU J Marit Affairs 143 at 149. Daniel Bodansky, above n 245, at 386.  
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As will be shown later in this chapter, this analytical framework is extremely useful when 
applying the precautionary principle in practice. In particular, it provides a structured 
approach to applying it and, importantly, operates as the starting point for identifying the 
legal content and parameters of a given formulation.  
3 The essence of the precautionary principle   
Drawing on a comprehensive review of precautionary principle formulations, 
Freestone and Hey observe that common to each are three elements, which together make 
up the “essence” of the precautionary principle and key considerations that assist with 
ascertaining what proper implementation of precaution entails generally.263 Logically any 
meaningful consideration of the precautionary principle and how it ought to be applied 
must start with a firm understanding of these elements. 
 
(a) First fundamental element 
 
The first element is a shift from focusing on determining acceptable levels of insult 
that a receiving ecosystem can assimilate, to an approach that seeks to minimise harm as 
much as possible. In this regard, the precautionary principle instead looks to practices and 
technology that will eliminate or at least reduce human impacts. In this regard, as Barton 
notes, owing to the scientific uncertainty that flows from the limited ability of science:264 
 
…to determine accurately the effect of human activities, especially in light of 
cumulative and synergistic effects…the precautionary principle advocates giving 
the environment room to manoeuvre and recognizes that environmental tolerance 
thresholds "should not even be approached, let alone breached. 
 
Thus, stemming from this recognition of uncertainty and limited predictability, proper 
application of precaution entails “safeguarding ecological space”. As Cameron et al note, 
  
263 David Freestone and Ellen Hey, above n 9, at 12-13.  
264 Charmian Barton, above n 75 at 512. Timothy O’Riordan and James Cameron, above n 123, at 17. Simon 
Marr, above n 11, at 26. 
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“because we cannot be sure of how tolerant ecosystems are to human intervention, it is 
necessary to leave ecological space as a buffer against ignorance”, by deliberately holding 
back from possible harmful use of the environment.265 This shift is exemplified in the text 
of the 1991 Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary 
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, which states:266   
 
The parties shall cooperate with each other in taking the appropriate measures to 
implement the precautionary principle to pollution prevention through application 
of clean production methods, rather than pursuit of a permissible emissions 
approach based on assimilative capacity assumptions.  
 
On the above basis, precaution entails a shift away from policies based on “dilute and 
disperse” and identifying thresholds of harm that ecosystems can tolerate (and in turn 
allowing activities to operate up to such limits), to those based on “minimisation and 
containment” of harmful human impacts to ecosystems. Thus, in practice the 
precautionary principle in part focuses on employing clean methods of production and 
technological advancement to achieve such minimisation.267      
 
(b)    Second fundamental element 
 
The second element is “preventative anticipation”.268 Decision-makers should not 
rely on determinations of detrimental effects after an activity has taken place, but instead 
attempt to ascertain the possible negative impacts prior to the activity taking place and 
take positive steps to avoid harm in the first place. This rationale for this is explored and 
explained at length in Chapter IV.  
 
(c)    Third fundamental element 
 
  
265 Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron and Andrew Jordan, above n 143, at 19. 
266Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 19. 
267 David Freestone and Ellen Hey, above n 9, at 12-13. 
268 David Freestone and Ellen Hey, above n 9, at 13. Timothy O’Riordan and James Cameron, above n 123, 
at 17. 
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The third element involves a shift away from the short-term nature of cost-benefit 
analysis under a traditional approach (i.e. short-term planning horizons that are an 
inevitable consequence of requiring proof of causation before action) towards recognition 
of:  “the need for long-term, holistic economic considerations, accounting for, among 
other things, environmental degradation and the costs of waste treatment”.269 In doing so, 
it acknowledges that the acceptability of costs associated with environmental protection 
must be considered within the context of the matters discussed in Chapter IV. In this regard 
O’Riordan and Cameron note:270  
 
 [it] introduces a bias to conventional cost benefit analysis to include a weighting 
function of ignorance, and the likely dangers for future generations if the life 
support capacities [of ecosystems] are undermined when such risks could be 
avoided.  
 
The cost of protective measures therefore needs to be weighted against the long-term 
nature of harm. Furthermore, precaution acknowledges that, given the potential severity 
of harm and uncertainty as to whether an activity will cause it to materialise, the cost of 
taking environmental steps that later prove to be redundant pales in comparison to the cost 
of failing to act when needed to prevent significant or permanent harm.271 On this basis 
the precautionary principle recognises that it is acceptable for regulators to impose the cost 
of protective measures, which in time may prove unnecessary, as this is by far the lesser 
of two evils.  
B Going beyond the conceptual core 
Beyond the skeletal framework of the conceptual core and common structure of the 
precautionary principle, there is little in the way of agreed normative flesh. The main 
substantive differences that persist between formulations typically relate to or stem from 
one or more of the four dimensions identified above. Based on such differences, 
  
269 Ellen Hey, above n 79, at 308. 
270 Timothy O’Riordan and James Cameron, above n 123, at 17. 
271 Timothy O’Riordan and James Cameron, above n 123, at 17..  
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formulations are grouped in terms of the strength of environmental protection they afford 
and the level of normative character they possess. In this sense versions of the 
precautionary principle sit along a continuum ranging from weak to strong.272  
1 Weak formulations  
Weak formulations offer less environmental protection and closely resemble (or even 
preserve) the traditional environmental management status quo. Furthermore, they are 
usually not sufficiently prescriptive to constitute legal norms, but, rather, are guiding 
principles intended to overlay the application of related legal norms. In terms of the 
precautionary trigger, such versions typically feature: 273  
 
(1) a high harm threshold, where the principle is triggered by “threats of serious or 
irreversible harm”, thereby leaving lesser forms of harm to be managed under a 
traditional approach, presumably on the understanding the assimilative capacity 
approach adequately manages such lesser forms of harm; and  
(2) a higher certainty threshold, which does not go as far as demanding the quality and 
quantity of scientific evidence required to prove causation, but nevertheless requires 
such a large body of scientific proof before triggering a precautionary response that in 
practice it offers little respite from the demands of causation than stronger versions.  
 
As to the “precautionary response”, weak versions usually only go as far as stating that 
lack of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing taking steps to avoid 
harm.274 As such, they afford much less in the way of environmental protection, as they do 
not:  
  
272 David Flemming “The Economics of Taking Care: An Evaluation of the Precautionary Principle” in David 
Freestone and Ellen Hey (eds), above n 2, at 147. See also John S Applegate, above n 9.  
273 Jonathan Wiener, above n 241, at 604; Daniel Bodansky, above n 245, at 384. See, for example, United 
Nations Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, UN Doc.A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I) 
(1992); 31 ILM 874 (1002). Convention on Biological Diversity opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 
UNTS 79, 142 (entered into force 29 December 1993). and United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, art 3(3), opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 10. 
274 Daniel Bodansky, above n 245, at 384; Jonathan Wiener, above n 241, at 604. 
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(a) prescribe any specific precautionary measures to be taken in response to an identified 
threat (i.e. measures that are in substance effective and precautionary in nature);  
(b) impose a positive duty to act when the trigger thresholds have been met,275 rather  they 
merely permit taking action ahead of scientific certainty rather than compel it.276  
 
Many commentators assert that due to the above such formulations lack the fundamental 
character of a legal norm because there is no objective behavioural standard that one is 
required to meet.277  
 
Finally, weak formulations often incorporate considerations of the cost of preventative 
measures and their alternatives,278 thereby elevating the primacy of cost considerations as 
an express justification for not electing to take anticipatory protection.   
2 Strong formulations  
In contrast, strong formulations offer more environmental protection in a few ways. 
First, their precautionary trigger typically entails a much lower harm threshold, (i.e. one 
that is triggered by a much larger range of environmental impacts). In terms of the certainty 
threshold, strong formulations either:279  
 
(1) possess a low certainty threshold, which demands the production of considerably less 
scientific evidence before the precautionary response is triggered; and/or 
  
275 Daniel Bodansky, above n 245, at 384. 
276 Jonathan Wiener, above n 241, at 604. 
277 Mark Geistfeld “Implementing the Precautionary Principle” (2001) 31 Envtl L Rep 11,326 at 11,326, 
citing Christopher Stone, above n 159. Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 101. 
278 Catherine J Iorns Magallanes, above n 8, at 5-6. 
279 Judith Jones and Simon Bronitt “The burden and standard of proof in environmental regulation: the 
precautionary principle in an Australian administrative context” in Elizabeth Fisher, Judith Jones and Rene 
von Schomberg (eds), above n 159, at 137-145.  Jamie Benidickson, above n 159, at D-43 to D-44. The Royal 
Society of Canada Elements of Precaution: Recommendations for the Regulation of Food Biotechnology in 
Canada (Health Canada, Canadian Food Inspection Agency and Environment Canada, Expert Panel Report, 
January 2001) at 196 and 201-202. James Cameron and Will Wade-Gery, above n 75, at 18. 
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(2) reverse the burden of proof, so that it is incumbent on the proponent of an activity to 
prove that an activity is safe before they may undertake it.   
 
Finally, strong versions also usually entail a prescriptive precautionary response that: 
stipulates the steps to be taken, which themselves can vary in strength; and, creates a 
positive duty to act (i.e. take such prescribed precautionary steps), once it has been 
demonstrated that the precautionary trigger thresholds are met. Such a positive duty may 
be absolute (i.e. compulsory), or subject to a tightly prescribed discretion (i.e. one that 
specifies a narrow range circumstances where nonetheless, precautionary measures may be 
foregone). It is these characteristics, which imbue the strong formulations of the principle 
with normative character and as such, separates them from those versions that are more 
characteristic of a guiding principle or aspirational statement.    
C German origins of the precautionary principle  
A first express articulation of precaution as a legal principle can be traced to German 
environmental law in the 1970s.280 Therefore, it is unsurprising that Germany has done the 
most in terms of unpacking the substantive content of their formulation of the precautionary 
principle, known in as the ‘Vorsorgeprinzip’, and in terms of stepping out what its proper 
application involves in practice.281 The precautionary principle’s rapid uptake and in turn 
rapid emergence as a general principle of international law stemmed from the 
Vorsorgeprinzip adoption at an international level. Thus, consideration of the principle’s 
incorporation into Germany’s existing risk-based environmental legal system is instructive, 
because arguably, an equivalent version of the precautionary principle has incorporated 
directly into New Zealand environmental legislation.282  
 
In response to growing claims “over long-term…possibly irreversible habitat damage 
associated with acid rain”,283 the Vorsorgeprinzip, which translates to precautionary 
  
280 Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 17. 
281 Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 102.  
282 Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 102.  
283 Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 17. Claudia Saladin “Precautionary Principle in International Law” (2000) 
6 Int J Occup Environ Health 270 at 270. Sonia Boehmer-Christiansen “The Precautionary Principle in 
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principle,284 was codified in air pollution legislation. As Jordan notes, the Vorsorgeprinzip 
was regarded as a strong formulation of the precautionary principle.285 At its core was the 
belief that regulatory agencies and government should move as early as is possible, to 
minimise environmental risks by anticipating danger and, if possible, preventing it.286 
Indeed, the literal meaning of the Vorsorgeprinzip is the principle of “beforehand or prior 
care or worry”.287  
 
By 1976, the Vorsorgeprinzip had become the cornerstone of German environmental 
law enshrined in legislation as a Gebot - “vague legal commandment" - intended to guide 
administrators in their dealings with polluters.288 
1 Nebulous concept  
An important feature of the Vorsorgeprinzip is that it is not a tightly prescribed norm, 
but, rather, a nebulous principle covering “…a territory of meaning that combines caution 
with caring for the future, as well as providing for it…”.289 As a result, one cannot glean 
from the basic core definition the full battery of this concepts substantive legal content.  
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Within this territory of meaning, the Vorsorgeprinzip encapsulates “notions of risk 
prevention, cost effectiveness…ethical responsibilities towards maintaining the integrity 
of natural systems, and the fallibility of human understanding”.290 In this regard it:291   
 
…[endows] public authorities with the responsibility for the protection of the 
natural foundations of life and of maintaining the physical world intact for the 
future and present generations 
 
Inclusion of this principle in the corpus of policy principles amounted to a recognition by 
the German Government that there were physical limits to economic growth, that humans 
had a particular moral responsibility for the earth, that there were non-economic values in 
environmental protection, and that there was a need for ecological understanding.292  
 
In addition to the above, the Vorsorgeprinzip had an economic rationale. As one author 
notes, Vorsorge was a significant component part of a wider set of ideas or an ideology 
they label “ecological modernization”:293  
 
This formulation suggests that the relationship between environmental protection 
and economic development is not necessarily antagonistic, but can, with the right 
mix of inducements, be mutually supportive. 
 
In short, Germany asserted that high standards of environmental protection provide an 
opportunity for economic growth, rather than placing a constraint upon it.  
 
2     Beyond the duty to avoid harm  
The Vorsorgeprinzip imposes a more onerous duty on policy makers and 
administrators than the traditional tortious legal duty ‘sorgfaltspflicht’ (duty of care or 
  
290  Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron and Andrew Jordan “The Evolution of the Precautionary Principle” in 
Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron and Andrew Jordan (eds), above n 143, at 11. 
291 Sonia Boehmer-Christiansen, above n 283, at 55. 
292 Sonia Boehmer-Christiansen, above n 283, at 41. 
293 Jordan & O’Riordan above n 250, at 33. 
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‘duty to take care’) to avoid harm. Unlike Vorsorge, the standard duty to take care does not 
require that the future be taken into account. Conversely, Vorsorge is inherently future-
focused. It requires decision-makers to consider the future risks that may not be apparent 
at the time of making a decision, due to the limited ability of science to understand and 
forecast the impacts of our actions.  
 
Accordingly, linked to Vorsorge are concepts such as investment in the future, liability 
and to the reversal of the burden of proof. In this regard, at a government policy level the 
Vorsorgeprinzip authorised German regulators to take certain key steps regarded as being 
integral to any meaningful action to protect the environment.294   
 
First, at the core of this early conception of the precautionary principle; “…was the 
belief that society should seek to avoid environmental damage by careful forward planning, 
blocking the flow of potentially harmful activities”. 295 In particular, it acknowledged that 
“…[e]nvironmental policy is not fully accomplished by warding off imminent hazards and 
the elimination of damage which has occurred,296 primarily because harm is often 
significant and/or irreversible, and furthermore, often:  
 
(1) manifests itself through complex, non-linear, time-delayed, and cumulative ecological 
processes, often as a result of cumulative human impacts generated by an array of 
temporally and spatially diffuse activities; and 
(2) cannot be predicted or sufficiently proven by science in time.  
 
In turn, the Vorsorgeprinzip recognises that in order to bring such dangers, which have not 
yet been scientifically proven under some form of environmental control,297regulators must 
  
294 Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 17; Andrew Jordan and Timothy O’Riordan, above n 250, at 33; James 
Cameron and Juli Abouchar, above n 284, at 6-7. 
295 Joe Tickner and Carolyn Raffensperger, above n 76, at 4. 
296 Umbeltbericht ’76 – Fortschreibung des Umweltprogramms der Bundesregierung of 14 July 1976; English 
text from Konrad Von Moltke “The Vorsorgeprinzip in West German Environmental Policy”, 12th Report of 
the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, HMSO 1988, cited in James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, 
above n 2, at 31.  
297 James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, above n 284, at 7. 
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be able to intervene when the risks of environmental damage “are not [yet] identifiable” in 
a causal sense.298 Furthermore, it recognises that to do so effectively, policy makers must 
undertake long-term environmental planning that looks ahead and addresses environmental 
threats at the earliest possible opportunity. In this sense it acknowledges that given the 
scientific uncertainty and limited predictability of science explored in Chapter IV, the 
traditional approach of requiring proof of causation ahead of action, severely limits the 
temporal range of environmental planning (i.e. limits it addressing to more immediate and 
readily predictable harms). Thus, embedded in the notion of Vorsorge is the view that long-
term government planning for the environment (regarding what, in order to protect the 
environment, should or should not be done) is axiomatic with successfully anticipating and 
avoiding harm that arises in such a manner. In this respect, Weale contrasts the Vorsorge 
with a traditional approach stating that, since these ecological realities make it difficult to 
muster sufficient proof that a particular long-term plan and its associated interventions are 
necessary, the traditional approach can be:299 
 
“characterised…in terms of an absence of explicit and medium- or long-term 
objectives on one hand, and unplanned, and incremental decision making in which 
policies are arrived at by a continuous process of adjustment between a plurality of 
actors on the other” 
Regarding the types of intervention, closely related to Vorsorgeprinzip is the concept 
of Gefahrenabwehr, which translates into ‘defence against dangers and threats’.300 
Accordingly, the greater the threat, the greater the need for Vorsorge and, in turn, the more 
power public authorities will need in order to be able to put in place environmental planning 
measures that are capable of effectively guarding against such threats. 
 
In support of the need to plan long term, the Vorsorgeprinzip also emphasises the need 
for “early detection of dangers…through comprehensive research”. This is asserted on the 
basis that such research is critical to such long term planning and anticipation of harm 
  
298 Andrew Jordan, above n 285, at 144.  
299 A Weale The new politics of pollution (Manchester University Press, London, 1992) at 81. 
300 Sonia Boehmer-Christiansen, above n 283, at 35. 
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generally. In this regard, the role of science was most important at the earlier stages of 
policymaking, but less so during implementation of the law produced by such policies 
(namely, during a consenting process) where the emphasis then shifted to technology (see 
below).  
 
Linked to the above and the limited predictability of science generally, the 
Vorsorgeprinzip seeks to reduce the impacts of activities (i.e. prevent them from 
encroaching on carrying capacity of receiving ecosystems) by promoting technical 
developments that reduce harm as much as possible. On this note, in contrasting the 
Vorsorgeprinzip with traditional legal approaches, Boehmer-Christiansen observes:301  
 
Vorsorge demands more than care, it goes beyond Sorgflatspflicht, which literally 
means duty to take care and does not require that the future is taken into account. 
Vorsorge is readily linked to the concepts of investment… 
 
For this reason it has been used to overcome cost/benefit proportionality requirements, 
which essentially only take into account short-term considerations that are readily proven, 
thereby enabling regulators to justify the use of the best available technology (i.e. by 
reference to longer-tem but less easily proven considerations).302  
 
Finally, and above all else, the Vorsorgeprinzip provides that decision-makers must be 
entitled to act in advance of scientific proof of harm. It recognises that, as scientific 
uncertainty surrounds the kinds of harm that only long-term planning can address,303 
imposing an obligation to prove causation through science paralyses regulators’ ability to 
implement those long-term planning and early intervention measures needed to anticipate 
and avoid such harm. Thus, the Vorsorgeprinzip was prompted by the recognition of the 
  
301 Sonia Boehmer-Christiansen, above n 283, at 38. 
302 Sonia Boehmer-Christiansen, above n 283, at 50. 
303 A Weale, above n 299, at 80. As is often the case, future impacts from proposed activities, or impacts 
from existing activities yet to inflict serious or irreversible damage, are less manifest or have not manifested 
themselves at all. 
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German Government that, in order to be capable of anticipating and preventing harm 
through the above measures, policy-makers must be entitled to:304  
 
go ‘beyond science’, in the sense of being [required or entitled] to make decisions 
where the consequences of alternative policy options are not determinable within 
a reasonable margin of error and where potentially high costs are involved in taking 
action. 
D The precautionary principle in international law 
The precautionary principle introduced first at international law in the marine context 
during the International North Sea Ministerial Conference, where the participating states 
had convened to formulate a coordinated response to trans-boundary pollution in the North 
Sea.305 At this conference, Germany successfully lobbied for the adoption of a translated 
version of the Vorsorgeprinzip by the participating states. As a result, the parties implicitly 
incorporated into the preamble of the 1984 Ministerial Declaration of the parties to the 
conference. Specifically, this formulation provided:306  
 
damage to the marine environment can be irreversible or remedial only at 
considerable expense and over long periods and that, therefore, coastal states and 
the EEC must not wait for proof of harmful effects before taking action. 
  
304 For example: to impose a legal requirement that private individuals undertake precautionary 
environmental actions such as installing desulphurisation filters in flues. A Weale, above n 303, at 80 and 
81-82. 
305 Sonia Boehmer-Christiansen, above n 283, at 31. Konrad Von Moltke, above n 296, at 57. Andrew Jordan 
and Timothy O’Riordan, above n 250, at 34. David Freestone and Ellen Hey, above n 9, at 4 and 5. see also 
Peter Ehlers, “The History of the International North Sea Conferences”, in David Freestone and Ton Ijlstra 
(eds) The North Sea: Basic Legal Documents on Regional Environmental Co-operation (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1991) 3 at 5. Simon Marr, above n 11, at 48. Ministry of the Environment and 
Energy, Danish Environmental Protection Agency “Ministerial Declarations: International Conferences on 
the Protection of the North Sea; Bremen, Germany, 1984. London, United Kingdom 1987. The Hague, The 
Netherlands, 1990” (1995) OSPAR Commission. Noelle Eckley and Henrik Selin “All talk, little action: 
precaution and European chemicals regulation” (2004) 11(1) JEPP 78 at 81. Andrew Jordan, above n 285, at 
146. David Freestone and Ellen Hey, above n 9, at 4.  
306 The 1984 Ministerial Declaration of the International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea (1 
November 1984), Preamble. 
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It is worth noting that the above introduced to international law the idea that the 
precautionary principle may be justified on economic grounds (that is, preventative 
measures to avoid harm are less costly than remedial measures).307  
 
The 1987 Ministerial Declaration issued following the second North Sea Ministerial 
Conference contained the first express formulation of the precautionary principle.308 
Equipped with the conceptual core outlined above, it provides:309 
 
…in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the most 
dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may require 
action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has been 
established by absolutely clear scientific evidence.  
 
If the state of knowledge is insufficient, a strict limitation on emissions of pollutants 
at source should be imposed for safety reasons… 
 
In concert with adopting this express formulation, the participants also agreed to:310 
 
Accept the principle of safeguarding the marine ecosystem of the North Sea by 
reducing emissions of substances that are persistent, toxic and liable to 
  
307 Philippe Sands, above n 9, at 269. 
308 James Cameron, above n 247, at 30-31. David Freestone and Ellen Hey, above n 9, at 5. Philippe Sands, 
above n 9, at 269. Simon Marr, above n 11, at 5. Lothar Gundling “The Status in International Law of the 
Precautionary Principle of Precautionary Action” (1990) 23, 24 Int’l J of Estuarine & Coastal L 23 at 24.  
309 Ministerial Declaration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, 24-
25 November 1987, articles VII and XV(i)C10 as cited in Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 25.  
310 Ministerial Declaration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, 24-
25 November 1987, articles VII [XVI]. As Iorns also notes above n 8: “In 1989 the Paris Commission, which 
was established by the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, adopted 
the Principle of Precautionary Action, which incorporated a similar statement. This approach was also 
adopted in 1989 in relation to the Mediterranean Sea by the parties to the Convention for the Protection of 
the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, opened for signature 16 February 1976, 15 ILM 290 (entered into 
force 12 February 1978) (‘Barcelona Convention’) and by the Nordic Council in relation to pollution of the 
Northern Seas: Nordic Council, International Conference on Pollution of the Seas (October 1989)”. 
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bioaccumulate at source by the use of the best available technology and other 
appropriate measures. This applies especially when there is reason to assume that 
certain damage or harmful effects on the living resources of the Sea are likely to 
be caused by such substances, even where there is no scientific evidence to prove 
a causal link between emissions and effects (‘the principle of precautionary 
action’). 
 
While the above is not legally binding, this weaker precautionary principle formulation 
operated as a non-binding “hortatory” principle designed to guide regulatory and policy 
decisions made at the domestic level by each state going forward.311 The 1987 declaration 
also went on to state that marine ecosystems should be safeguarded with the best available 
technology "even where there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between 
emissions and effects". While declaration’s precautionary principle definition does not 
capture this additional provision, it is linked to the principle’s application by member 
states.  
 
Although the 1987 declaration was regional and dealt entirely with dangerous sea 
pollutants, most academics acknowledge “its drafting and subsequent ratification marks 
the beginning of widespread international acceptance and employment of the precautionary 
principle”.312 
 
Many commentators also note that the precautionary principle gained a footing in 
international law because of its inclusion in all but name in the 1982 World Charter for 
Nature.313 Specifically Article 11 of the charter contained what was in substance, “a 
deliberation guiding version of the” precautionary principle.314 Specifically, this 
  
311 James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, above n 284, at 5; Simon Marr, above n 11, at 48. 
312 Scott Lafranchi “Surveying the Precautionary Principle's Ongoing Global Development: The Evolution 
of an Emergent Environmental Management Tool” (2005) 32 BC Envtl Aff L Rev 679 at 680. Simon Marr, 
above n 11, at 47. 
313 Article 11, World Charter for Nature 1982 UN Doc. GA RES 37/7. Simon Marr, above n 11, at 47. Scott 
Lafranchi, above n 312, at 682. 
314 Simon Marr, above n 11, at 47.  
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formulation provides as follows:315  
 
Activities which might have an impact on nature shall be controlled, and the best 
available technologies that minimize significant risks to nature or other adverse 
effects shall be used; in particular: 
 
(a)  Activities which are likely to cause irreversible damage to nature shall be 
avoided; 
(b)   Activities which are likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall be preceded 
by an exhaustive examination; their proponents shall demonstrate that 
expected benefits outweigh potential damage to nature, and where potential 
adverse effects are not fully understood, the activities should not proceed; 
(c)   Activities which may disturb nature shall be preceded by assessment of their 
consequences, and environmental impact studies of development projects shall 
be conducted sufficiently in advance, and if they are to be undertaken, such 
activities shall be planned and carried out so as to minimize potential adverse 
effects. 
 
While Article 11 does not espressly mention precaution it embodies the fundamental 
precautionary elements that collectively comprise the precautionary principle. 
Furthermore, it is regarded as one of the strongest formulations of the precautionary 
principle because it:316  
 
(a) reverses the burden of proof by making it incumbent on the proponent of a potentially 
harmful activity to prove first that the activity is harmless.  
(b) bans any potentially harmful activity if there is scientific uncertainty (i.e. regarding its 
effects) is such that it prevents a complete impact assessment ex ante.  
 
Finally, like the Vorsorgeprinzip, Article 11 expressly calls on policy makers (through sub-
articles 11(a) to (c)) to take varying levels of environmental action in proportion to the 
  
315 Article 11, World Charter for Nature 1982 UN Doc. GA RES 37/7. Simon Marr, above n 11, at 47. 
316 Sonia Boutillon “The Precautionary Principle: Development of an International Standard” (2002) 23 Mich 
J Int'l L 429 at 433. 
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intensity of the risk posed by a given activity. 
 
 The Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development was the first 
international instrument to treat the precautionary principle as a guiding principle of 
general application and to state that inextricably linked to achieving sustainable 
development is the proper application of the precautionary principle.317 Its formulation 
provides:318 
 
In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the 
precautionary principle. Environmental Measures must anticipate, prevent and 
attack the causes of environmental degradation. Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.  
 
The declaration was the product of the 1990 Bergen Conference on Sustainable 
Development, one of a series of regional meetings held in advance of the United Nations 
Conference on Environmental Development (“UNCED”), which produced Agenda 21 and 
the Rio Declaration. As Sands explains:319 
 
Central to this text is the element of anticipation, reflecting the need for effective 
environmental measures to be based upon actions which take a longer-term 
approach and which might predict changes in the bias of our scientific knowledge.     
 
In addition, it was the first formulation to link the implementation of the principle (that is 
taking action in spite of uncertainty) to the risk of a "serious or irreversible damage” to the 
environment.320 Regarding this latter substantive element, Boutillon notes, “[t]his baseline 
for intervention has rapidly become a landmark of the precautionary principle”.321 
  
317 Philippe Sands, above n 9, at 269. Sue Elworthy and Jane Holder Environmental Protection: Text and 
Materials (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997) at 154. J Segal “An Industry Perspective on the 
Precautionary Principle” in Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 2, at 73. 
318 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region, 16 May 1990 at [7]. 
319 Philippe Sands, above n 9, at 269. 
320 Philippe Sands, above n 9, at 269; Sue Elworthy and Jane Holder, above n 317, at 154. 
321 Sonia Boutillon, above n 316, at 433. 
  103 
1 Widespread adoption of the precautionary principle  
Since its introduction as an express principle to the sphere of international 
environmental law,322 the precautionary principle has risen rapidly and now enjoys “wide, 
unprecedented recognition”,323 so much so that it is frequently heralded as the most 
fundamental ‘norm’ of international law to better protect the environment.324 As one 
commentator aptly notes (summarising the view of most), “it occupies a central place in 
any realistic strategy for the achievement of sustainable development, and particularly 
sustainable use of the planet’s natural resources”.325  
 
The principle’s importance is evinced by the fact that, since its emergence at 
international law, it has featured in almost every international law instrument tasked with 
regulating human interaction and relationship with the natural environment.326 As 
Lafranchi notes:327 
 
These international instruments have addressed a broad spectrum of environmental 
issues, ranging from general environmental policy to precise issues of 
environmental concern. Moreover, both soft and hard law instruments have 
  
322 Clauses containing the hallmarks of precaution appeared in international law instruments before the first 
explicit reference to the precautionary principle in international instruments came about. However it was not 
until this point in time that it first appeared as an express general principle sui generis. D Freestone and Z 
Makauch “The New International Environmental Law of Fisheries: The 1995 UN Straddling Stocks 
Convention” (1996) 7 EIEL 3 at 14; J M Van Dyke “Applying the Precautionary Principle to Ocean 
Shipments of Radioactive Materials” (1996) 27 ODIL 379 at 390, note 12 as cited in Arie Trouwborst, above 
n 2, at 20, note 88. 
323 Philippe Sands, above n 9, at 269.  
324 David VanderZwaag “The Precautionary Approach and the International Control of Toxic Chemicals: 
Beacon of Hope, Sea of Confusion and Dilution” (2011) 33(3) Hous J Int'l L 605 at 607. James Cameron and 
Juli Abouchar, above n 284, at 2. Ellen Hey, above n 79, at 303. Jonathan Wiener, above n 241, at 599. Gary 
E Marchant and Kenneth Mossman Arbitrary and Capricious: The Precautionary Principle in the EU Courts 
(AEI Press, Washington, 2004) at 1. Nicolas de Saadeleer, above n 65, at 184. Daniel Bodansky, above n 245 
at 381-386; David Van der Zwaag, above n 5, at 363. Daniel Bodansky, above n 245, at 381. 
325 David Freestone, above n 12, at 134.  
326 Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 8. David Freestone and Ellen Hey, above n 9, at 3. David Freestone, above 
n 12, at 134 and 137. Simon Marr, above n 11, at 2. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 7. David VanderZwaag, 
above n 5, at 356; Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, above n 43, at 205. 
327 Scott Lafranchi, above n 312, at 680. 
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embraced the precautionary principle, meaning that both binding and nonbinding 
instruments have endorsed a precautionary approach.   
 
Significantly, the precautionary principle has become an especially prominent feature 
in international legal instruments established to manage and protect the marine 
environment.328 This is essentially due to the fact scientific uncertainty pervades the ocean 
space in unparalleled abundance (i.e. by comparison to terrestrial ecosystems), and that (as 
discussed in Chapters II and IV), owing to the fluid medium of marine ecosystems, harm 
caused in this space is particularly more mobile in nature.329  
 
The subsequent North Sea conferences continued to approve the general application 
of the precautionary principle as a basis for action.330 Extension of the geographic scope of 
the precautionary principle’s application occurred during the Oslo and Paris commissions 
(“OSPAR”). Specifically, in addition to re-iterating the concept, in 1989 the commission 
adopted various instruments, which fleshed out how to implement the precautionary 
principle. Instruments of note include: PARCOM Recommendation 89/2, which imposed 
the requirement that available technology be applied to land-based sources of pollution; 
and OSCOM Decision 98/1, which provided the dumping of industrial waste is subject to 
a “prior justification procedure”. The latter requires states that intend to issue a permit for 
dumping industrial waste to demonstrate there are no practical alternatives on land and that 
doing so will not cause harm to the marine environment.331  
 
The above culminated in the precautionary principle’s incorporation into The 
Convention for the Protection of the marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
(“OSPAR Convention”), which provided:332 
  
328 David Van der Zwaag, above n 2, at 165 to 166. 
329 Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 26 - 27. 
330 The Hague Declaration (8 March 1990) Preamble, cited in David Freestone and Ellen Hey, above n 9, at 
6. 
331 Oslo Commission (‘OSCOM’) Decision 89/1 (14 June 1989) [1] in David Freestone and Ellen Hey (eds) 
The Precautionary Principle and International Law (1996) at 6. 
332 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic, opened for signature 
September 22 1992, 32 ILM 1069, Art 2 (entered into force 25 March 1998) (‘OSPAR Convention’). 
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The precautionary principle, by virtue of which preventative measures are to be 
taken when there are reasonable grounds for concern that substances or energy 
introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine environment may bring about 
hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems, damage 
amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is no 
conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between the inputs and effects. 
 
Of note is the fact this formulation possesses a low certainty threshold. In particular it 
provides that “no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship” is required to trigger a 
precautionary response. Thus, as little in the way of scientific proof is required before 
precautionary measures can be taken, this version is regarded one of the strongest 
precautionary principle formulations.333  
 
Outside the European Union, the United Nations Environmental Planning (UNEP) 
governing council adopted the precautionary principle in relation to marine pollution and 
ocean dumping in 1989.334 In the following year, the Meeting of Parties to the London 
Dumping Convention also agreed to adopt a precautionary principle formulation which 
provides:335 
 
…that in implementing the London Dumping Convention the Contracting Parties 
shall be guided by the precautionary approach to environmental protection 
whereby preventative measures are taken when there is reason to believe that 
substances or energy introduced into the marine environment are likely to cause 
harm even where there is no conclusive evidence to prove causal relations between 
inputs and their effects.   
 
  
333 Nicolas de Saadeleer, above n 65, at 189.  
334 United Nations Environmental Planning Governing Council Decision on the Precautionary Approach to 
Marine Pollution, Including Waste-Dumping at Sea, Decision 15/27, UN GAOR 44th
 
sess, Supp No 25 UN 
Doc A/44/25 152 (25 May, 1989) as cited in Catherine J Iorns Magallanes, above n 8, at 10. 
335 Resolution LDC 44(14) on the Application of the Precautionary Approach to Environmental Protection 
within the Framework of the London Dumping Convention, Annex 2, Doc. LDC 14/16, December 30 1991. 
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Again, this formulation indicated a willingness to adopt a strong formulation in relation to 
activities that result in marine pollution. Notably, this version also elucidated what an 
appropriate precautionary response entails in considerably more detail than other 
formulations:336 
 
…the Contracting Parties shall take all necessary steps to ensure the effective 
implementation of the precautionary approach to environmental protection and to 
this end they shall:  
 
(a) encourage prevention of pollution at its source, by the application of clean 
production methods, including raw material selection, product substitution 
and clean production technologies and processes and waste minimisation 
throughout society;  
(b) evaluate the environment and economic consequences of alternative methods 
of waste management, including long-term consequences;  
(c) encourage and use as fully as possible scientific and socio-economic research 
in order to achieve an improved understanding on which to base long-term 
policy options;  
(d) endeavour to reduce risk and scientific uncertainty relating to proposed 
disposal operations;  
(e) continue to take measures to ensure potential adverse impacts of dumping are 
minimised, and adequate monitoring is provided for early detection and 
mitigation of these impacts.  
   
Following the London Convention, the principle was also adopted in the widely 
endorsed Rio Declaration (discussed above), and in Agenda 21. Of particular note is 
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, which provides:337  
 
A precautionary and anticipatory rather than reactive approach is necessary to 
prevent degradation of the marine environment. This requires inter alia, the 
  
336 Resolution LDC 44(14), above n 335.   
337 Agenda 21: A Programme for Action for Sustainable Development: Report of the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development, Chapter 22.5,[(c)], UN Doc A./Conf. 151/26 (13 June 1992). 
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adoption of precautionary measures, environmental impact assessments, clean 
production techniques, recycling, waste audits and minimisation, construction 
and/or improvement of waste treatment facilities, quality management criteria for 
handling of hazardous substances, and a comprehensive approach to damaging 
impact from air, land and water. Any management framework must include the 
improvement of coastal human settlements and integrated management and 
development of coastal areas.       
  
This is significant, not only because it represented global endorsement of the precautionary 
principle’s application to marine management, but also because it ties its application to a 
number of specific measures that decision-makers must implement in order properly give 
effect to it.338 Commentators note that, although non-binding, Agenda 21 was significant 
because its adoption by over 165 signatory states indicated its elevation to a truly global 
level339 and, arguably, constituted a salient example of state practice in support of the view 
that the principle had attained customary status.340  
 
The scope of the precautionary principle’s application was subsequently broadened to 
a wider array of environmental management issues because of its inclusion in a number of 
multilateral agreements that stemmed from Agenda 21 and the Rio Convention. For 
example, it was included in the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, which is 
particularly pivotal as it was a binding agreement. Its formulation of the principle was set 
out at Article 3(3), which provides:341  
 
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise 
the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific research should not 
be treated as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account the 
  
338 James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, above n 2, at 42. 
339 David Freestone, above n 12, at 141; James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, above n 2, at 267. 
340 James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, above n 2, at 42; James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, above n 2, at 
267; David Freestone, above n 12, at 141. 
341 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, above n 273. 
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policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to 
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.    
 
This formulation is regarded as being one of the weakest formulations, primarily because 
of the text inclusion, which places an overriding emphasis on cost effectiveness. As Iorns 
notes, this is largely a product of political concern “arising from controversy and debate 
about the risks and costs of preventative measures and their alternatives”.342 It is also likely 
the result of the fact the convention’s binding nature.  
 
Also of note was the principle’s adoption in the widely endorsed Convention on 
Biological Diversity where in the preamble it notes:343 
 
Where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack 
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason form postponing measures 
to avoid minimisation of that threat.  
 
Given versions of the principle relating to management of living resources, tend to be 
cast in weaker terms, the General Assembly Resolution on Driftnet Fishing formulation is 
particularly noteworthy as it is the first instrument in this setting to contain a formulation 
that deviates from this trend. Although implicit, its formulation provides that any state 
wishing to engage in driftnet fishing may do so provided that “management measures be 
taken based upon statistically sound analysis” in order to “prevent the unacceptable impact 
of such fishing practices…and ensure the conservation of the living resources”.344  
Significantly, this version essentially represents the strongest formulation found in the 
living resource management context, as it is the only precautionary principle found in this 
setting which shifts the burden of proof to those wishing to undertake the harmful activity.  
  
342 Catherine J Iorns Magallanes, above n 8, at 5-6. 
343 Convention on Biological Diversity opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79, 142 (entered into 
force 29 December 1993). 
344 UN General Assembly Resolution 44/225 on Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its impact on the 
Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Sea’s, March 15, 1990, (1990) 29 ILM 1555. 
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2 Status of the precautionary principle in international law 
 
The legal status of the precautionary principle in international law is subject to varying 
opinion, and largely focuses on whether or not it has attained status as a customary law 
norm. According to well-established legal doctrine, in order for a legal principle to 
crystallise into customary international law there must be:  
 
(1) constant and uniform state practice, which can only be achieved if the principle has 
content that is uniform and specific enough to prescribe a particular behaviour;345 and  
(2) opinio juris sive necessitates, or: “a belief in the legally permissible or obligatory 
nature of the conduct in question, or its necessity”.346  
 
 Principal factors in favour of the precautionary principle having attained customary 
status include its widespread adoption at international law and the increasing adoption and 
endorsement at a domestic level.347 As Freestone argues, the precautionary principle’s:348  
 
explicit endorsement by a wide range of international and national bodies, by a large 
and growing number of international environmental and natural resource treaties, 
national constitutions, and legislation, as well as by courts and tribunals suggests a 
pattern of state practice and a breadth of application which must support ―a good 
argument that it has emerged as a principle of customary international law. 
 
Trouwborst’s views support this, so much so that he considers that “[s]upport for the 
precautionary principle is comparable to support for the basic duty of states not to cause 
transboundary harm”, which itself has unequivocally attained this status.349 In terms of 
  
345 David Freestone and Ellen Hey “The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law” in David 
Freestone and Ellen Hey (eds), above n 2, at 35. James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, above n 2, at 263. 
346 MH Mendelson “The Formation of Customary International Law” (1998) 272 RdC at 155. Malcom Evans 
(ed) International Law (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) at 202.   
347 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 9. Simon Marr, above n 11, at 69-98, 111-113, 166-176, and 197-200. 
Runyu Wang, above n 262, at 162-163.  
348 Philippe Sands, above n 9, at 279. David Freestone, above n 12, at 137. 
349 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 8. Runyu Wang, above n 262,  at 162-163. 
  110 
opinio juris, states have arguably demonstrated unequivocal belief in the precautionary 
principle’s absolute necessity through:350  
 
(1) its rapid rise and adoption by states in response to avoidable but significant global 
harms arising on an increasingly frequent basis; and  
(2) the repeated acknowledgement in the various international instruments that states sign 
that the principle is integral to achieving sustainable development and 
intergenerational equity, outcomes which most environmental agreements revolve 
around.  
 
The main counterargument is that "the great variety of interpretations given to the 
precautionary principle, and the novel and far-reaching effects of some applications, 
suggest that it is not yet a principle of international law."351 In other words, it is too vague 
and the content of each formulation applied by states to varied to demonstrate sufficiently 
uniform and specific behaviour to the extent required to establish state practice.   
 
In spite of this, many lead commentators now accept that “[a]t some level of generality, 
precaution is undoubtedly a customary rule of international law”. As Sands states:352 
 
The legal status of the precautionary principle is evolving. At a minimum, however, 
there is sufficient evidence of state practice to justify the conclusion that the 
principle, as elaborated in the Rio Declaration and Climate Change and 
Biodiversity conventions, has now received sufficiently broad support to all a good 
argument to be made that it reflects a principle of customary law.   
    
In support of this, Cameron and Abouchar also note, that most of the vocal criticism of the 
precautionary principle occurred during 1990 and 1992 in the lead up to the United Nations 
  
350 Malcom Evans above n 346. 
351 David Freestone and Ellen Hey, above n 345, at 37. Harald Hohmann Precautionary Legal Duties and 
Principles of Modern International Environmental Law (Martinus Nijhoff, London, 1994). Owen McIntyre 
and Thomas Mosedale, above n 79, at 235.  
352 Philippe Sands, above n 9, at 213.  
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Conference on Environment and Development. At this conference, the extensive and 
uniform nature of the conceptual core was demonstrated through its acceptance by over 
160 states in the binding United Nations Convention on Climate Change and Convention 
on Biological Diversity, as well as in the non-binding Agenda 21 and Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development.353  
 
In addition to asserting that a high-level and generally applicable formulation of the 
precautionary principle has attained customary law status, commentators also assert that 
formulations that are more specific have achieved this status in certain settings.354 As Iorns 
notes, whether states have accepted application of the precautionary principle “across all 
subject areas of international law, it is widely accepted in the area of marine environmental 
protection and has been so since the mid-1990s”.355  
 
In a comprehensive analysis of the precautionary principle’s application in the marine 
setting Marr convincingly demonstrates that the principle “has been implemented 
differently in various sectors” (e.g. different formulations are applied by international law 
instruments relating to: the management of pollution; the maintenance of marine 
biodiversity; hazardous substances; and the conservation and management of living 
resources).356 As Marr asserts, this variance is because:357 
 
[i]n some sectors of environmental law the effects of human activity on the 
environment and health are sometimes easier to predict than others. Also the scope 
and intensity of environmental precautionary action could be completely divergent 
in different sectors.  
 
  
353 James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, above n 2, at 337 - 338.   
354 See Simon Marr, above n 11. Jonathan Wiener, above n 241, at 600. Serge Garcia “The Precautionary 
Approach to Fisheries and its Implications for Fisheries Research, Technology and Management: An Updated 
Review” in FAO Fisheries Technical Papers 350/2 (FAO, 1993) at 9. Catherine J Iorns Magallanes, above n 
8, at 5-6. 
355 David Freestone, above n 12, at 137.  
356 Simon Marr, above n 11, at 2. 
357 Simon Marr, above n 11, at 3. 
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In short, Marr aptly concludes that the strength or weakness of the particular formulation 
that states, and subsequently domestic regulators, are in the practice of applying, essentially 
“depends on the subject matter of the relevant instrument, and the corresponding level of 
scientific uncertainty and potential harm”.358 Fisher shares this view,359 which Garcia 
illustrates well through identifying the stark difference between the strength of the 
precautionary principle formulation applied in the fisheries setting on the one hand and, in 
the pollution setting on the other. In doing so, Garcia notes that360  
  
In considering the introduction of more precaution in fisheries management and 
development, the main differences between fisheries impacts and chemical 
industries pollution (for the control of which the precautionary principle was 
created) must be kept in mind: 
 
• the assimilative capacity in relation to fisheries impact (i.e., the quantities of 
fish that can be removed without damaging the system's productivity) exists 
without doubt and can be determined with some accuracy, even though it varies, 
and 
• the impacts are, in most cases, reversible and, as a result, the potential 
consequences of an error would rarely be dramatic, even though they can be 
significant in socio-economic terms. 
 
This paper agrees with this approach. This is largely because it accords with the principles 
underpinning its existence, as set out in Chapter IV. As such, this approach is strongly 
aligned with, and gives effect to, the precautionary principle’s purpose, particularly so far 
as it relates to sustainable development (i.e. which entails balancing protection and use, 
whereby protection limits use only insofar as it is necessary to preserve the sustainability 
of ecosystems).  
  
358 Catherine J Iorns Magallanes, above n 8,  at 5.  
359 Elizabeth Fisher “Precaution, Precaution Everywhere: Developing a 'Common Understanding' of the 
Precautionary Principle in the European Community” (2002) 9 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 7 at 15.  
360 Serge Garcia, above n 354, at 10-11. 
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E Relationship with other environmental norms 
In large measure, the above stated precautionary principle derives its purpose from the 
fact its application is widely regarded as being essential for the achievement of sustainable 
development.361 As discussed in Chapter II, sustainable development is typically the 
principle objective of those legal environmental management regimes that the principle 
features in.362 Sustainable development is underpinned by corollary objectives, which the 
precautionary principle also serves and which inform its normative character.363 As one 
author notes, the precautionary principle rarely stands alone, but rather is articulated with 
other norms or processes.364 Consequently, “the norms of sustainable development thus 
make up part of the institutional context within which precautionary decision-making takes 
place”.365 Furthermore, because these norms influence one and other because the share 
many substantive links and overlap. Thus, commentators assert that once cannot consider 
the precautionary principle cannot in isolation from sustainable development and the 
principles derived from it.366  
 
As noted above, New Zealand’s legislative regimes such as the Fisheries Act 1996 and 
the EEZ Act expressly reflect the close pairing of these fundamental environmental norms 
  
361 Ellen Hey, above n 79, at 311. Arie Trouwborst, above n 116, at 108. Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 12. 
Jacqueline Peel, above n 247, at 25. David Vanderzwaag, above n 2, at 175. Andrew Jordan & Timothy 
O’Riordan, above n 250, at 42. Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, at 6.  Rosie Cooney, The 
Precautionary Principle in Biodiversity Conservation and Natural Resource Management (IUCN Policy and 
Global Change Series No. 2) IUCN, 2004, 5-6 at 14. 
362 David Vanderzwaag, above n 2, at 175. Jacqueline Peel, above n 247, at 25. Rosie Cooney, above n 361, 
at 14.    
363 David Vanderzwaag , above n 2, at 175. Jacqueline Peel, above n 247, at 25.     
364 Sonia Boutillon, above n 316, at 433.  
365 Jacqueline Peel, above n 247, at 25. David Vanderzwaag, above n 2, at 175. Andrew Jordan & Timothy 
O’Riordan, above n 250, at 42. John Paterson “Sustainable development, sustainable decisions and the 
precautionary principle” (2007) 42 Natural Hazards 515 at 517. Marco Martuzzi & Joel Tickner “Introduction 
– the precautionary principle: protecting public health, the environment and the future of our children” in 
Marco Martuzzi & Joel Tickner (eds), above n 124, at 7. 
366 Stephen Dovers “Precautionary policy assessment for sustainability” in Elizabeth Fisher, Judith Jones and 
Rene von Schomberg (eds), above n 159, at 88. See also Benedicte Sage-Fuller The Precautionary Principle 
in Marine Environmental Law (Routledge, London, 2013) at 76 and 93.  
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(more specifically the precautionary principle and sustainable management).367 On this 
basis, consideration of sustainable development and its derivative norms is instructive to 
understanding the principle generally, the exercise of expounding precautionary principle’s 
legal content, and the task of determining how to apply the principle in practice.     
1 Sustainable development  
As touched on in Chapter II, in broad terms sustainable development entails managing 
the use, development, and protection of ecosystems in a way and at a rate that enables the 
present generation to meet its needs, while maintaining environmental resources and 
ecological processes, so that future generations can also meet their needs and enjoy similar 
levels of environmental quality.368 As such, sustainable development requires decision-
makers to balance often-competing ecological, social and economic factors when assessing 
whether to grant a proposed activity consent.369 As Sage-Fuller notes, in doing so this 
concept:370   
 
seeks to set standards to ensure that development projects are carried out with due 
regard to longevity and durability, not just immediate profit and necessity. The 
precautionary principle can therefore assist in setting standards and guidelines for 
sustainable development where the impacts of activities…may result in damage to 
the environment…without conclusive scientific evidence of such damage or of its 
occurrence.   
 
In other words, the principle is essential to achieving sustainable development because, 
absent scientific certainty as to how an activity impacts proper functioning, essential 
processes or the overall integrity of receiving ecosystems, decision-makers are blind as to 
where the balance between environmental protection and use must be struck (i.e. in order 
  
367 See for example s 10 of the Fisheries Act 1996, s 10 and s 31 and 61 of the EEZ Act.  
368 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development GA Res, 42/187 XLII annex to 
A/42/427 (1987). David Vanderzwaag, above n 2, at 175. Arie Trouwborst, above n 116, at 108. 
369 Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 8, at 6.  
370 Benedicte Sage-Fuller, above n 366, at 93.  
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to secure sustainable development outcomes).371 
 
In terms of its influence on the precautionary principle, Marr and Vanderzwagg note 
that the need to balance competing economic and environmental considerations that 
sustainable development places in tension informs determination of the appropriate 
precautionary response (i.e. the action dimension of the principle).372 In particular such 
considerations assist to avoid an excessively harsh response in terms of restrictions on 
development. 
 
2     Intergenerational equity  
Viewed either as a central component of sustainable development or as a stand-alone 
principle sui generis, the principle of inter-generational equity is also tightly intertwined 
with the precautionary principle.373 Generally speaking, intergenerational equity requires 
each generation to use and develop the environment and its resources in a way or at a rate 
that enables them to be passed onto future generations in no worse condition that they were 
received.374 In particular this concept:375  
 
(1) envisages partnership between generations and thus raises the issue of the temporal 
allocation of environmental resources;  
(2) recognises that the world’s ecosystems and economies are interconnected and as such 
the generational partnership is global; and 
(3) recognises that each generation inherits the environment and on this basis, is obligated 
to pass it on in a comparable state to that when it was received from the previous 
  
371 David Vanderzwaag , above n 2, at 166 and 175. Sonia Boutillon, above n 316, at 433. 
372 Simon Marr, above n 11, at 42. David Vanderzwaag , above n 2, at 166 and 175. 
373 MD Young “The Precautionary Principle as a key element of ecologically sustainable management” in 
Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, above n 2, at 127. 
374 Alan Boyle and David Freestone “Introduction” in Alan Boyle and David Freestone (eds), above n 12, at 
12. Jacqueline Peel, above n 247, at 25-26. See for example: United Nations Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, Principle 3, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I) (1992); 31 ILM 874 (1002). MD Young, 
above n 373, at 127. 
375 MD Young, above n 373, at 127. 
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generation.  
 
From a purely economic perspective the principle also asserts that ecological goods that 
will have an equal or higher value later, should be preserved today and that failure to do so 
(i.e. as a result of allowing avoidable environmental degradation to occur) will be very 
costly.376  
 
As explored in Chapter IV, it is difficult to predict ecological impacts of human 
activities. Such difficulty proliferates when asked to predict the longer-term impacts of 
activities. This is because such impacts are less manifest and readily predictable. In turn, 
the ability of science to prove inter-generational impacts of a given activity diminishes 
when asked to predict such harm over generational timescales.377 For this reason the 
precautionary principle is integral to achieving intergeneration equity, as without the ability 
to act in advance of scientific certainty, uncertain long-term ecological gains by way of 
obviated long-term or irreversible harm, will often be discounted and give way to certain 
short to medium term economic losses.378 Chapter VI below discussed the normative 
influence that intergenerational equity has on the implementation of the precautionary 
principle.  
3       Ecosystem approach 
Within this context the precautionary principle is also closely linked to the 
‘ecosystem approach’. Born of the virtually the same scientific insights that gave rise to 
the precautionary principle,379 the ecosystem approach “is generally associated with 
management based on the “best understanding of the ecological interactions and processes 
necessary to sustain ecosystem structure and function”. Its fundamental purpose or goal is 
  
376 Sonia Boutillon, above n 316, at 433. 
377 John Paterson, above n 365, at 517.  David Farrier, above n 51, at 106. MD Young, above n 373. 
378 David Farrier, above n 51, at 114. 
379 Arie Trouwborst “The Precautionary Principle and the Ecosystem Approach in International Law: 
Differences, Similarities and Linkages” (2009) 18 RECIEL (1) 26. 
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long-term sustainable development.380 In providing a representative example of its purpose, 
the United Nations ICP-7 report expresses what in ecological terms must be achieved to 
secure sustainability. In doing so it states:381 
 
…the aim of ecosystem approaches [is] to manage the interaction between often 
conflicting environmental, economic and social values and interests in order to 
maintain the integrity of the structure and functioning of ecosystems, while also 
allowing the sustainable use of marine living resources. 
 
This purpose is premised on the understanding that maintaining ecosystem integrity is 
desirable because doing so in turn preserves the continued delivery of ecological services 
on which both biological organisms` and people depend to survive, and in the case of 
humans, derive economic and other benefits.382  
 
  
380 Which is also expressed in synonymous terms such as: “sustainable development” “long-term 
sustainability of natural resources” Jakarta Mandate Objective 2.1 see 
https://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=7742  
http://www.ngo.grida.no/wwfneap/Projects/Reports/jakmand.pdf,  Oceans and the Law of the Sea, above n 
49, at [119(b)]. United Nations General Assembly, Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans 
and the Law of the Sea (2006) at its 7th Meeting in New York, U.N. Doc. A/61/156 17 July 2006) ICP Report-
7 at para 5(a). A/RES/62/215 at para [99(c)]. Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General, 
above n 49, at [123]. Hanling Wang, above n 34, at 44 and 51.  Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea United 
Nations Ecosystem Approaches and Oceans E.07.V.4 (2007) at 164. Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report 
of the Secretary General, above n 49, at [121]. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.I.8 and 
corrigenda) at principle 4. David Freestone “Principles Applicable to Modern Oceans Governance” (2008) 
23 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 385 at 389. 
381 United Nations General Assembly, Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of 
the Sea (2006) at its 7th Meeting in New York, U.N. Doc. A/61/156 17 July 2006) ICP Report-7 at [28]. See 
also Convention on Biological Diversity 1760 UNTS 79, 142 (opened for signature 5 June 1992, entered into 
force 29 December 1993). Statement on the ecosystem approach to the management of human activities, First 
Joint Ministerial Meeting of the Helsinki and OSPAR Commissions, Bremen, Germany, 25-26 June 2003. R 
Schlaepfer, above n 46, at 9 and 16 www.iufro.org/download/file/556/387/op6_pdf/ Benedicte Sage-Fuller, 
above n 366, at 198. Declaration of the Joint Ministerial Meeting of the Helsinki and OSPAR Commissions, 
Bremen, 25 June 2003 p 1 to 2.     
382 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, above n 134, at 12. Decision V/6 by the Conference 
of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its fifth meeting, above n 53, principle 5. See for 
example Secretariat of the CBD, Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the e Use of Biodiversity (CBD 
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Specifically, the ecosystem approach states that environmental management must 
employ an integrated and holistic approach. Under this approach, decisions must be based 
on the best understanding of an ecosystem’s full array of species, processes, structures and 
their interrelationships as an integrated management unit.383 Furthermore, such decisions 
must also take into account the cumulative effects generated by all activities that impinge 
on the receiving ecosystem at a given time. As noted in Chapter II, such matters are the 
exclusive domain of science. Thus, the ecosystem approach is science-based. 
Consequently, the main modes of implementing it include:384 
 
(1) scientific research and analysis of the components of the ecosystem, their interaction 
and functioning;  
(2) assessment of the status or condition of ecosystems, using the best information and 
practice available;  
(3) establishment of ecological and operational objectives to maintain biodiversity, 
productivity, habitat quality and so on;  
(4) identification of human pressures and impacts on the ecosystem;  
(5) selection of ecological indicators to ensure that ecological objectives are being met 
and that the monitoring of changes in ecosystems and the effects of management 
measures through monitoring of ecological indicators;  
  
Secretariat, 2004), at 2 Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General, above n 49, at [115]. 
Decision V/6 by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its fifth meeting, 
above n 53, principle 1. Arie Trouwborst, above n 379, at 32. See also Günther Handl “Declaration Of The 
United Nations Conference On The Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), 1972 And The Rio 
Declaration On Environment And Development, 1992” United Nations Audiovisual Library of International 
Law at 3. 
383 Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General, above n 49, at [137]: Arie Trouwborst, 
above n 379, at 28. Hanling Wang, above n 34, 41 at 46. 
384 J Brunée and S Toope, “Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: A Case for International 
Ecosystem Law,” (1994) 5 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 41 at 53 as cited in DEJ Currie 
Ecosystem-Based Management in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Progress towards Adopting the 
Ecosystem Approach in the International Management of Living Marine Resources WWF, Rome, 58 pp 
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http://www.msfd.eu/knowseas/library/PB2.pdf at 4. Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary 
General, above n 49, at [116] and [138]. 
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(6) management systems and tools that (due to inability of science ability to deal with 
ecosystem complexity and variability up front) employ adaptive management 
techniques, where activities are allowed to occur but are periodically monitored, 
reassessed and the applicable management strategies or measures are updated in 
response to feedback; and  
(7) the application of the precautionary principle where the scientific uncertainty cannot 
be adequately addressed via the above methods.   
 
Collectively the ecosystem approach and the precautionary approach effected the 
paradigmatic shift in the way states sought to manage environmental threats from reactive 
and fragmented approaches to those that are holistic and anticipatory.385 While both 
concepts contributed to this shift as a whole:   
 
(1) the precautionary principle is viewed as being primarily responsible for affecting the 
reactive to anticipatory shift; and 
(2) the ecosystem approach is viewed as facilitating the shift from a fragmented (i.e. 
sectorial or species specific approaches) to a holistic approach that accounts for the 
true battery of ecological impacts caused by activities.386  
 
The implications of this distinction in function relate to the implementation of the 
precautionary principle and are discussed in Chapter IV. 
 
 
  
385 David Vanderzwaag , above n 2, at 166.  
386 Arie Trouwborst, above n 379. Edward Maltby Using the Ecosystem Approach to Implement the 
Convention on Biological Diversity: Key Issues and case Studies (IUCN, Cambridge, 2003) at 17. Oceans 
and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General, above n 49, at [137]. DA Laffoley and others The 
ecosystem approach: Coherent actions for marine and coastal environments. A report to the UK Government 
(English Nature, Peterborough, 2004), at 7. Hanling Wang, above n 34, at 46. 
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V Implementing the Precautionary Principle  
 
In the context of applying the principle at the domestic level, a frequently cited English 
judgement of the Queen’s Bench identifies that which this paper asserts is the root cause 
of difficulty in applying the precautionary principle. In doing so the Queen’s Bench 
notes:387 
 
There is, at present, no comprehensive and authoritative definition of the 
precautionary principle. It is an expression which has in recent years been used in 
a number of international declarations, conventions and treaties...In none of these 
documents is the principle comprehensively defined, although often the document 
describes what the principle is intended to mean in the context of the subject matter 
concerned. 
 
Lead commentators agree, noting that, once you go beyond its basic conceptual core it is 
difficult to obtain a clear “normative fix” on the precautionary principle because so many 
aspects of its substantive content and issues associated with how it ought to be applied 
remain uncertain or await clarification.388 Hey observes that, given that most commentators 
and states now regard the precautionary principle as being “the most important new policy 
approach in international environmental cooperation”, such doctrinal and application 
uncertainty is especially regrettable.389   
A Definitional ambiguity and its implications    
The lack of clarity seems largely due to the fact the various international law 
formulations that represent our understanding of what precaution entails and, upon which 
  
387 R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex parte Duddridge [1994] Env LR 226 (QB), J. Smith  
as cited in LJ Farquharson and J Dmith “The Status of the Precautionary principle in International Law: R v. 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex parte Duddridge and Others” (1995) 7(2) Journal of 
Environmental Law at 224. [Court of Appeal decision, The Times, 26th October 1995]. 
388 David Vanderzwaag , above n 2, at 166. Simon Marr, above n 11, at 2. John S Applegate, above n 9, at 
14.  
389 Ellen Hey, above n 79, at 303. 
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our domestic formulations are based, intentionally lack detail and precision. This is because 
many initial formulations were only intended to serve as a “declaratory” statement or 
guiding principle and as such, were cast in broad and flexible terms.390 In addition, 
subsequent formulations that are intended to operate in a more binding fashion (i.e. as a 
legal norm), prompted considerable disagreement between negotiating states. Thus, in 
order to achieve a formulation that participating states would agree to, vague and  high-
level language that leaves contentious definitional aspects unresolved and provides little in 
the way of objective standards (against which states behaviour can be measured), were 
employed. Thus, the resulting precautionary principle definitions were impregnated with 
considerable uncertainty regarding their normative meaning and application.  
 
Fisher also asserts that much of this definitional uncertainty is likely also in part due 
to the fact that, beyond the simple direction to act in advance of science:391  
 
…what is deemed to be the appropriate basis for a decision and the appropriate 
measures to be taken will vary depending on the circumstances…It will be 
influenced by legal and socio-political culture, the specific statutory regime, the 
nature of the particular environmental or public health problems, the availability 
and ease of implementation of ‘precautionary measures’, and more general 
understanding of legitimate decision-making”   
 
As noted in Chapter IV, in addition to being caste in high-level terms, difficulty arises 
when trying to pin down what the precautionary principle entails (i.e. beyond its core 
definition) because it is an inherently nebulous concept, not a neatly defined and self-
contained concept. As the examination of its origins in Chapter V illustrates (and as this 
chapter will do further), the full principle is most aptly described as a “territory of 
meaning”. In particular, it houses a multitude of subset notions. Furthermore, it also 
interacts intimately with overlapping environmental principle and norms (e.g. sustainable 
  
390 Derek Nolan, above n 15.  
391 Elizabeth Fisher and Ronnie Harding “The precautionary principle and administrative constitutionalism: 
the development of frameworks for applying the precautionary principle” in Elizabeth Fisher, Judith Jones 
and Rene von Schomberg (eds), above n 159, at 113 and 116.  
  122 
development, intergenerational equity and the ecosystem approach), which also inform its 
substantive content and how it ought to be applied.392 In failing to be more prescriptive, 
existing formulations are silent as to precisely what this broad array of substantive legal 
content entails and how it is drawn on and comes together under the various strong and 
weak formulations when applied in practice by decision-makers.  
1 Lack of normative character 
For the above reasons commentators now recognise that by definition the international 
versions of the precautionary principle are not operational. Rather, such definitions are 
“situated at a meta-level” and for this reason “require[] explication and operationalization”, 
the process of which involves determining the precautionary principle’s “relationship to 
legal norms and economic analysis”.393 Citing Bodansky, in the context discussing 
international precautionary principle formulations of the kind explored in Chapter V, 
Sandin asserts that:394 
 
“[I]t is too vague to serve as a regulatory standard because it does not specify how 
much caution should be taken.” In another article, he writes that the Precautionary 
Principle “provides a useful overall orientation, [but] is an insufficient basis for 
policy and largely lacks legal content” 
Others support this view.395 They note that the precautionary principle’s lack of a clear and 
sufficiently detailed definition, and sufficiently detailed exposition of its normative content 
and parameters, renders it difficult to operationalise and, in turn, apply during a decision-
making process.396 As Stone notes:397 
 
  
392 Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron and Andrew Jordan, above n 143, at 19. Sonia Boehmer-Christiansen, 
above n 283, at 38 as cited in Arie Trouwborst, above n 2, at 7. 
393 Konrad Von Moltke, above n 66, at 101. James Cameron and Will Wade-Gery, above n 75, at 37-38. 
394 Per Sandin, above n 245 at 890 
395 Gary Marchant and K Mossman, above n 324, at 11.   
396 David Freestone and Ellen Hey, above n 9, at 14.  John S Applegate, above n 9, at 13. Stephen Dovers, 
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if the core aspects of the principle cannot yield a well-defined decision rule—if the 
essential, widely agreed upon aspects of the principle do not translate into a 
coherent set of performance obligations—the hard question arises whether the 
precautionary principle is anything more than sentiment or political slogan. 
In direct response to this issue, Boutillon states:398  
 
“[t]he issue is to determine the legal implications of the principle. What level of 
risk should trigger the implementation of the principle? Which costs should be 
offset, as against the environmental damage? Is the principle a procedural 
obligation, or does it carry an obligation to attain a certain result in terms of 
environmental protection? 
 
On this point, Hickey suggests that such operational detail should entail criteria objective 
enough to enable any actor or decision-maker to determine in advance whether the 
contemplated activity triggers precautionary measures under the agreement (i.e. criteria 
which assist a decision-maker to ascertain when a given formulations threat and uncertainty 
thresholds have been met).399 Where such objective criteria are not provided, the 
precautionary principle is not considered ‘operationalised’.  
 
Commentators agree that a failure to provide objective criteria undermines the efficacy 
of the precautionary principle and threatens its continued status as a respected principle. 
As Hickey and Walker note for example:400  
 
[v]ague references to covered activities can undermine a primary objective of the 
precautionary approach by creating the possibility that an activity is not known to 
be covered until after the environmental harm occurs. Identification of specific 
activities to which precaution applies enables private and governmental actors to 
plan their conduct, and provides them due notice concerning potential costs and 
penalties. Specification also helps to ensure that obligated states do not construe 
  
398 Sonia Boutillon, above n 316, at 431. 
399 James E Hickey and Vern R Walker, above n 74, 445. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 132. 
400 James E Hickey and Vern R Walker, above n 74, at 445. 
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the covered activities too narrowly or too broadly. 
 
Conversely, excess discretion afforded by the absence of operational detail or guidance 
can also result in excessively precautionary or restrictive outcomes that: (a) defeat the 
principle’s ability to strike the appropriate balance between use and protection and thereby 
serve its ultimate purpose of achieving sustainable development; and (b) operate to 
undermine its credibility amongst political, economic and public stakeholders.401 Thus, 
attempting to apply vague and substantively undercooked formulations creates a live risk, 
that when applying the principle, regulators will impose too little or too much in the way 
of environmental protection measures. 
 
In light of this, the pithy definitions of the precautionary principle found in 
international instruments should at best be treated as summaries of, or rather mere 
shorthand references to, the much wider conceptual whole of the precautionary principle.402 
Furthermore, these factors indicate that the precautionary principle is yet to become a 
properly developed operational legal norm, as its normative boundaries are not ye 
articulated in a manner that confers the requisite clarity, certainty and rigor expected of a 
legal rule.403  
2 Relevance to New Zealand environmental law  
The first express adoption of the precautionary principle was in 1995 when the 
Ministry for the Environment incorporated it by express reference it in the “Environment 
2010 Strategy” as a general environmental policy.404 The strategy first acknowledges that 
there is often:405 
 
  
401 Stephen Gardiner, above n 245, at 36. HL Rouse and N Norton, above n 185, at 66.   
402 Elizabeth Fisher, above n 35, at 318-319. This view was supported in the Australian cases Vertical 
Telecoms Pty Ltd v Hornsby Shire Council [2000] NSWLEC 172 and Miltonbrook Pty Ltd v Kiama Municipal 
Council [1998] NSWLEC 281.  
403 James E Hickey and Vern R Walker, above n 74, at 437; Sonia Boutillon, above n 316, at 451. 
404 Ministry for the Environment Environment 2010 Strategy: A Statement of the Government’s Strategy on 
the Environment (1995) at 14 as cited in Alexander Gillespie, above n 15, at 374. 
405 Ministry for the Environment, above n 404, at 374. 
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…limited knowledge or understanding about the potential for adverse 
environmental effects or the risks of serious or irreversible environmental 
damage…We cannot anticipate all possible environmental effects of our action.  
 
On this basis, the strategy goes on to provide:406 
 
Where there is limited information available to decision-makers, or limited 
understanding of the possible effects of resulting from an activity and there are 
uncertain risks or uncertainties (for example, over the extent of environmental 
damage), a precautionary approach should be applied.  
 
In terms of legislation, the Resource Management Act 1991 is regarded as being New 
Zealand’s first statute to incorporate the precautionary principle. While it does not 
expressly referenced the precautionary principle by name, the courts have consistently 
ruled that the precautionary principle is inherent in the Act’s provisions.407 As Nolan and 
Williams summarise, in enacting the Resource Management Act 1991:408 
 
Parliament…has chosen to include elements of the precautionary principle in the s 
104 considerations (which in turn call into consideration definitions of the term 
“effect” and the “environment”). These include concepts such as “future effect” 
and “potential” effects of a “low probability but high potential impact” and 
sustaining resources “to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future 
generations (etc). There are precautionary aspects which are quite properly taken 
into account”.   
 
In the course of seeking to interpret and infer what substantive content this implicit 
  
406 Ministry for the Environment, above n 404, at 374.  
407 Vernon Rive, above n 31, at 1185; Alexander Gillespie, above n 15, at 375. Linda Cameron, above n 13, 
at 15. Derek Nolan and Martin Williams “Electromagnetic Radiation Emissions and the ‘precautionary 
principle’” (1996) 16 NZRMB 215 at 216 to 217. Rotorua Bore Users Association Inc v Bay of Plenty 
Regional Council NZEnvC Auckland A 138/98, 27 November 1998 at 49. Shirley Primary School v 
Christchurch City Council (1999) NZRMA 66 (EnvC) at [114]. Golden Bay Marine Farmers v Tasman 
District Council EnvC Christchurch W42/2001, 27 April 2001 at [421]-[423].    
408 Derek Nolan and Martin Williams, above n 407,  at 216-217. 
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formulation entails the Courts have typically resorted to and taken their cues from the 
weaker formulations that simply assert scientific uncertainty is not a reason to postpone 
action, but give no direction on how to respond when confronted with uncertainty.409   
 
The precautionary principle is also imported into the Resource Management Act 1991 
consent framework through its express inclusion in the substantive provisions of the New 
Zealand Coastal Policy Statement (“NZCPS”).410 Although referred to as a statement of 
policy, this instrument is arguably part of the mandatory legal framework, as section 
104(1)(b)(iv) stipulates that decision-makers “…must have regard to…” the policy when 
considering consent applications.411 This includes policy 3, which in the applicable 
circumstances requires decision-makers to:412 
 
1. Adopt a precautionary approach towards proposed activities whose effects on 
the coastal environment are uncertain, unknown, or little understood, but 
potentially significantly adverse. 
2. In particular, adopt a precautionary approach to use and management of 
coastal resources potentially vulnerable to effects from climate change, so 
that: 
a. avoidable social and economic loss and harm to communities does not 
occur; 
b. natural adjustments for coastal processes, natural defences, ecosystems, 
habitat and species are allowed to occur; and 
c.  the natural character, public access, amenity and other values of the 
coastal environment meet the needs of future generations. 
 
There are several matters of note about the NZCPS precautionary principle. First, as will 
be considered further below, policy 3 is characteristic of a strong version of the 
  
409 See for example Shirley Primary School v Christchurch City Council (1999) NZRMA 66 (EnvC) at [219]-
[220]. 
410 Department of Conservation New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement (2010), policy 3 at 12.  
411 Resource Management Act 1991, section 104(1)(b)(iv). Sustain Our Sounds Inc v the New Zealand King 
Salmon Company Ltd [2014] NZSC 40; (2014) 10 BRMB 137. 
412 New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement, above n, 410.  
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precautionary principle. Secondly, the Supreme Court has arguably further strengthened 
the cautious nature further when it recently held that (emphasis added):413  
 
Policy 3 of the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement requires a precautionary 
approach to managing activities in the coastal environment when the effects of 
those activities are uncertain, but potentially significantly adverse.  
Thirdly, it is worth noting that the revision of the NZCPS, which occurred in 2010 
following a Department of Conservation and Independent Board of Inquiry review of its 
predecessor’s effectiveness. Following the review the precautionary principle was elevated 
to a substantive policy set out at the beginning of the core policies in the 2010 version. In 
revising the NZCPS, the Minister of Conservation noted that these changes were made in 
response to the need for the statement’s aim “to be clearer and stronger…and address new 
issues that have become more pressing over the past decade”. The issues referred to 
primarily stemmed from the increased industrial and technological uses of the coastal 
marine area (such as the proliferation of aquaculture) and climate change.414 
 
The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (“HSNO”) is one of the first 
domestic statutes to expressly adopt the precautionary principle and is the only statute to 
do so by name. The HSNO does so in section 7, which provides:415 
 
7 Precautionary approach 
 
All persons exercising functions, powers, and duties under this Act…shall take into 
account the need for caution in managing adverse effects where there is scientific 
and technical uncertainty about those effects. 
 
  
413 Sustain Our Sounds Inc v the New Zealand King Salmon Company Ltd, above n 411, at [127].  
414 Hon Steve Chadwick, Minister of Conservation “New Zealanders to have their say on coastal 
development” media release, 10 March 2008 as cited in Derek Nolan & Claire Kirman, above n 31, at 333. 
Department of Conservation “Monitoring the Effectiveness of the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement: 
Views of Local Government Staff” 2003 at 31. 
415 Hazardous Substances and New Organisims Act 1996, s 7.  
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In the same year that the HSNO was enacted the Fisheries Act 1996 (“Fisheries Act”) 
also expressly adopted the precautionary principle in all but name. Despite being titled 
“information principles”, it is readily acknowledged that section 10 of the Fisheries Act 
expressly incorporates the precautionary principle by providing:416  
 
All persons exercising or performing functions, duties, or powers under this 
Act…shall take into account the following information principles: 
 
(a) decisions should be based on the best available information: 
(b) decision makers should consider any uncertainty in the information available 
in any case: 
(c) decision makers should be cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable, 
or inadequate: 
(d) the absence of, or any uncertainty in, any information should not be used as a 
reason for postponing or failing to take any measure to achieve the purpose of 
this Act. 
 
As Iorns notes, “[i]nterestingly, the approach is not expressly labelled as a precautionary 
approach but is instead titled ‘Information Principles’”.
 
However, as she points out, the 
Minister of Fisheries when introducing the Bill expressly recognised section 10 as 
implementing the precautionary approach. In doing so, Hon Don Kidd MP stated that 
section 10 was intended:417   
 
[t]o help decision makers to achieve the purpose of the Bill, guidance is provided 
through the statement of high-level principles...the clause provides information 
principles. This allows the adoption of precautionary approaches. It recognises the 
limits of scientific information... 
 
 Finally, the most recent, and arguably, notable statutory inclusion of the precautionary 
  
416 Iorns above n 8. 
417 Hon Don Kidd MP (6 December 1994) 45 NZPD 5390.   
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principle is in the EEZ Act, where two express formulations are included.418 As both 
formulations are largely analogous, for the purpose of this paper, I will focus on section 
61.  
 
 In the context of comparing the precautionary principle related statutory provisions, 
the recent Trans-Tasman Resources decision observed that; “[s]ection 61 is unlike any 
provision in the Resource Management Act 1991. It is directive”.419 Titled “information 
principles”, it provides:420 
 
(1) When considering an application for a marine consent, the Environmental 
Protection Authority must— 
(a) make full use of its powers to request information from the applicant, obtain 
advice, and commission a review or a report; and 
(b) base decisions on the best available information; and 
(c) take into account any uncertainty or inadequacy in the information available. 
(2) If, in relation to making a decision under this Act, the information available is 
uncertain or inadequate, the EPA must favour caution and environmental 
protection. 
(3) If favouring caution and environmental protection means that  an activity is 
likely to be refused, the EPA must first consider whether taking an adaptive 
management approach would allow the activity to be undertaken.  
(4) Subsection (3) does not limit section 63 or 64. 
(5) In this section, best available information means the best information that, in 
the particular circumstances, is available without unreasonable cost, effort, or 
time.  
 
  
418 Specifically, it is included in section 31, which prescribes how the Minister for the Environment must deal 
with scientific uncertainty when promulgating regulations; and another, in section 61, which prescribes how 
the Environmental Protection Authority must respond when confronted with scientific uncertainty during the 
decision-making process. 
419 Environmental Protection Authority, Trans-Tasman Resources Ltd Marine Consent Decision, June 2014 
at [116]. 
420 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012, s 61.  
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Interestingly Parliament consciously decided to import the substance of the precautionary 
principle into the EEZ Act expressly without ascribing it the labels precautionary 
‘approach’ or ‘principle’. As the explanatory note explains this was done on the basis that 
employing such labels would tempt unnecessary litigation over the subsequent meaning to 
be derived from the section’s content.421 This statement is particularly helpful as it operates 
as a strong indication of Parliament’s acknowledgement that there is no substantive 
difference between the precautionary principle and precautionary approach.       
 
In essence, the EEZ Act’s formulation of the precautionary principle is spread across 
sections 61(1)(c) and 61(2). Although this chapter explores the dimension of this 
formulation later, at a glance s 61 appears to contain the strongest domestic formulation of 
the precautionary principle, primarily because the formulations strong command 
dimension creates an obligatory duty to act once the Act’s precautionary trigger thresholds 
a met.422 As noted above, in Trans-Tasman Resources decision, the committee 
distinguishes it from the RMA formulation on the basis that it makes environmental action 
in response to uncertainty compulsory. On this point the decision-making committee 
notes:423 
 
Section 61(2) contains an important direction. We must “favour caution and 
environmental protection” where the information is uncertain or inadequate. This 
provision is an explicit statement that, within the context of the EEZ Act, the 
promotion of sustainable management requires a cautious approach. The taking of 
risks in this environment is not encouraged, and we note that this direction is not 
  
421 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Bill 2011(321-1) (explanatory 
note) at 3; Ministry for the Environment Departmental Report on the Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Bill (March 2012) at 12. 
422 This view is supported by Greg Severinsen “A cautionary tale: treatment of uncertainty under the EEZ 
Act” (2015) 11 BRMB 22. However, it is argued in Ceri Warnock “Regulating the environmental impact of 
oil and gas activities in the exclusive economic zone and extended continental shelf” (2011) 9 BRMB 76 that 
with this formulation in fact “the legislature has chosen to adopt a weak form of precaution by prescribing 
an adaptive management approach to be taken in the event of uncertainty”. See Daniel Bodansky, above n 
245, at 387. Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnee and Ellen Hey, above n 67, at 599.  
423 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Bill 2011(321-2) (explanatory 
note). 
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to be traded off against the attainment of economic wellbeing. In other words, the 
requirement to favour caution and environmental protection in the face of uncertain 
or inadequate information is an absolute one, and we remind ourselves of section 
10(3), which makes it clear that applying the information principles in section 61 
is one of the ways the purpose of the EEZ Act is achieved. 
 
In addition to this, the EEZ Act formulation is of note as it likely represents 
Parliament’s most decisive effort to create an operational precautionary principle. In part, 
this is evidenced through the structural changes made between the first and second readings 
of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Bill. 
Specifically, the precautionary principle was moved from the “Purpose and principles” 
subpart in the Bill’s preliminary provisions,424 to the operational “Marine Consents” 
“Decisions” provisions.425 In explaining these changes the Local Government and 
Environment Committees notes under the heading “Achieving the purpose of the Bill”:426 
 
Moving the requirements in clauses 12 and 13 to the substantive decision-making 
clauses of the bill would strengthen the connection between decision-making and 
the relevant considerations, including the need for caution in the event of 
uncertainty. We note that the need for caution would only apply to…and the 
consideration of consent applications or reviews…   
 
The prominence accorded to the precautionary principle and the strength of the 
formulation implemented under this Act is appropriate. First, it aligns with international 
law instruments relating to management of the marine space, which as noted in Chapter V, 
tend to adopt stronger precautionary provisions. Secondly, the strength and status of the 
EEZ Act formulation appears to have been calibrated to suit the specific threat and 
uncertainty circumstances it is required to operate in. In terms of the threat circumstances, 
as repeatedly emphasised in the “Managing Our Oceans” discussion document, which gave 
  
424 EEZ Bill 321-1, cl 13 (in Part 1, Sub-part 2).  
425 EEZ Bill 321-2, cl 60A (in Part 2, Sub-part 2). 
426 EEZ Bill 321-2, at 3. 
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rise to the EEZ Act, the principal reason for its enactment were the facts that:427  
(1) the technological, novel and inherently risky activities governed by the Act are likely 
to increase; and  
(2) in turn, the significant risk of “…environmental harm, affecting marine life, habitats 
and biodiversity” associated with the activates will also increase. 
Thirdly, it is also likely due to Parliament’s recognition of the fact that scientific 
uncertainty is considerably more abundant in marine context. As Quinn notes, discussing 
section 10 of the Fisheries Act upon which section 61 of the EEZ Act was based:428   
 
It is appropriate that the precautionary principle has first been applied to the marine 
environment and its resources. In general, far less is known about marine 
ecosystems than terrestrial ones, and it is this uncertainty and ignorance which 
necessitates a precautionary approach. 
3 Legislative recognition of the link with sustainable development 
Like the international formulations that the New Zealand precautionary principle 
formulations were adopted from, or inspired by, the above legislation closely pairs 
sustainable management (New Zealand’s domestic equivalent to sustainable development), 
and the precautionary principle, in a manner that indicates Parliament is of the view that 
achieving sustainable management relies on proper application of the precautionary 
principle. For example, in section 10(1) of the EEZ Act it expressly states “[t]he purpose 
of this Act is to promote the sustainable management of the natural resources of the [EEZ]” 
and that “[i]n order to achieve the purpose, decision-makers must…apply the information 
principles…” (i.e. the precautionary principle) “to the consideration of applications for a 
  
427 Ministry for the Environment “Managing our Oceans”, above n 16, at 9. 
428 Marguerite Quin, above n 27. Specifically, like section 10 of the Fisheries Act 1996, section 61 of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012: is titled “information 
principles”; contains both “information management” principles and the precautionary principle; and 
employs similar language to expresses these components (as was recognised by Hon Dr Nick Smith during 
the third reading of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Bill).  
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marine consent”.429 Similarly, the Fisheries Act 1996 ties achievement of its sustainability 
purpose to the application of the precautionary principle as articulated in s 10 of that Act.430 
Although achieved by way of less express coupling, the same linkage also exists in the 
Resource Management Act 1991.431  
4 New Zealand’s use of the precautionary principle     
Speaking generally, Tollefson and Thornback note that a distinction can be made 
between implementing the precautionary principle: “as a discretionary consideration or 
background interpretive cannon” on the one hand; and, doing so “in a more doctrinal 
fashion” whereby it is given “some specific work to do” on the other.  
 
This paper asserts that, based on the above discussion of the precautionary principle’s 
inclusion in this domestic environmental management and decision-making legislation, it 
is clear that Parliament has elected to implement it in the latter fashion. This is particularly 
the case for the EEZ Act. In particular, this is demonstrated by the:  
 
(1) explanation behind the legislature’s decision to re-house the EEZ Act’s precautionary 
principle formulation found in the two primary operative decision-making parts of the 
Act;  
(2) express acknowledgement that the precautionary principle’s proper application is 
integral to achieving the EEZ Acts purpose; and 
(3) fact ss 31 and 61 impose a legal duty to act and do not confer discretion in this regard.  
 
As noted above, the King Salmon decision states Principle 3 of the NZCPS “requires 
  
429 EEZ Act, s 10.  
430 Fisheries Act 1996, s 10. 
431 As discussed a pages 101 to 103, the conceptual core of the precautionary principle was deemed to be 
inherent in “risk management” language adopted in the Acts sustainable development purpose (which is 
“forward-looking…preventative, precautionary and proactive”), definition of “effect” in s 103 and section 
104. See Shirley Primary School v Christchurch City Council (1999) NZRMA 66 (EnvC) at [114]. Rotorua 
Bore Users Association Inc v Bay of Plenty Regional Council NZEnvC Auckland A 138/98, 27 November 
1998 at 49. 
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a precautionary approach” when the threat and certainty thresholds are met. Like the EEZ 
Act, application of this precautionary principle formulation is imported directly into the 
key decision-making provisions of s 104 of the Resource Management Act. Furthermore, 
given that the courts have repeatedly determined that the precautionary principle is inherent 
in s 104, the decision to import a more prescribed and directive express formulation into 
the decision-making process under this section demonstrates that it is intended to operate 
in a more doctrinal fashion. Although cast in less directive terms, similar arguments can be 
made in relation to the principle’s inclusion in the Fisheries Act 1996 and HSNO on 
account of the express and intimate link between proper application of the precautionary 
principle and achievement of the respective Acts’ sustainability based purposes.     
 
To make comparison easier and to aid the discussion below, the following table breaks 
down these domestic precautionary principle formulations into the four dimensions 
discussed in Chapter V. In doing so, this table also categorises each New Zealand 
formulation on the basis of precautionary strength and juxtaposes them with those 
international formulations deemed emblematic of each corresponding strong and weak 
formulations: 
  
432 As discussed below, at a minimum, all formulations, including those which are silent, possess this 
minimum harm threshold.  
Strong precautionary principle formulations 
Formulations  Threat 
Dimension 
Certainty 
Dimension 
Command 
Dimension   
Action Dimension 
EEZ Act, s 61(2): 
If [when] making 
a decision under 
this Act…  
[significant 
adverse effects]432  
 
“information 
available is 
uncertain or 
inadequate” 
“the EPA must” “favour caution and 
environmental protection” 
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As the above comparison between New Zealand’s statutory precautionary principle 
formulations and their international law counterparts demonstrates, Parliament has 
employed the verbatim transfer approach discussed by Fisher and others above.434 Thus, 
  
433 “Required” inserted to the actual text on the basis of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Principle 3. 
See Sustain Our Sounds Inc v the New Zealand King Salmon Company Ltd [2014] NZSC 40; (2014) 
10 BRMB 137. 
434 Elizabeth Fisher, Judith Jones and Rene von Schomberg “Implementing the precautionary principle: 
perspectives and process” in Elizabeth Fisher, Judith Jones and Rene von Schomberg (eds), above n 159, at 
1. 
NZCPS, principle 
3 
“Effects on the 
coastal 
environment [that] 
are potentially 
significantly 
adverse.  
“effects [that] are 
uncertain, 
unknown, or little 
understood ” 
 
“[required to]433 
adopt” 
“a precautionary approach 
towards proposed 
activities” 
London Protocol, 
Article 3(1): In 
implementing this 
protocol… 
“when there is reason to believe that 
wastes or other matter introduced into 
the marine environment are likely to 
cause harm even when there is no 
conclusive evidence to prove a causal 
relation between inputs and their 
effects.” 
“contracting parties 
[(i.e. their decision-
makers)] shall apply” 
“a precautionary approach 
to environmental 
protection…  whereby 
appropriate preventative 
measures are taken” 
Moderate to weak precautionary principle formulations 
Fisheries Act 
1996: Where 
there are… 
“in relation to the 
utilisation of 
fisheries 
resources” 
“when 
information is 
uncertain, 
unreliable, or 
inadequate” 
“should be 
cautious…[and]… 
“should not be used as 
a reason for 
postponing or failing 
to take” 
“any measure to achieve 
the purpose of this Act” 
HSNO, section 7:  “adverse effects” “ scientific and 
technical 
uncertainty about 
those effects.” 
“ shall take into 
account the need for 
caution” 
“caution in managing 
adverse effects” 
Rio Declaration, 
Principle 15: 
Where there are… 
“threats of serious 
or irreversible 
damage” 
“lack of full 
scientific 
certainty” 
“shall not be used as a 
reason for 
postponing” 
cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental 
degradation” 
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despite Parliament’s clear intention that the precautionary principle operate in an 
operational, or rather normative fashion, it has chosen to adopt wording similar to those 
international law formulations, which were never intended, or equipped, to operate in this 
fashion. Furthermore, in importing these high-level international formulations Parliament 
has also not taken the requisite next step of unpacking (i.e. operationalising) them by 
providing sufficient direction as to what they require of decision makers in practice. In 
taking this short cut approach New Zealand has subsequently inherited the full array of 
application difficulties identified above that flow from the precautionary principles 
definitional ambiguity and lack of normative character.  
 
This paper asserts that in addition to inheriting such difficulties, this cut-and-paste 
approach, coupled with a failure to operationalise the precautionary principle, has also led 
to decision-makers and the courts:  
 
(1) underestimating the precautionary principle’s substantive content;  
(2) overlooking Parliament’s intention that it be applied as a legal rule in a more structured 
manner; and  
(3) mistakenly treating the precautionary principle as something more akin to a mere 
background principle or “interpretive cannon”.  
 
A strong argument can be made that this is indicated in the majority of New Zealand cases 
because in almost every instance, the courts do not look beyond the “meta-level” 
formulation when applying precautionary principle, or seek to elucidate (i.e. drill down 
into) a given formulations more detailed substantive and operational content. A 
representative example of this unstructured and high-level approach typically taken by 
New Zealand decision makers and the Courts is provided in the Aquamarine Limited v 
Southland District Council decision, which provides (emphasis added):435   
 
In McIntyre and Others the Court referred amongst others to a judgment of the 
Land and Environment Court of New South Wales in Leatch v National Parks and 
  
435 Aquamarine Limited v Southland District Council [1997] NZEnvC Invercargil C126/97 at 145.  
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Wildlife Service and Shoalhaven City Council (1993) 81 LGERA 270. In this case 
Stein J said this at page 282: 
 
"In my opinion the precautionary principle is a statement of common sense and 
has already been applied by decision-makers in appropriate circumstances prior 
to the principle being spelt out. It is directed towards the prevention of serious 
or irreversible harm to the environment in situations of scientific uncertainty. 
Its premise is that where uncertainty or ignorance exists concerning the nature 
or scope of environmental harm (whether this follows from policies, decisions, 
or activities), decision makers should be cautious ". 
 
With respect we consider this to be a helpful and lucid exposition of the 
precautionary principle and we gratefully adopt it.  
 
While the application of the precautionary principle has been subject to some relatively 
ad hoc high-level refinements,436 the courts continue to treat and apply the precautionary 
principle in this way.437 The recent King Salmon litigation, which contains what is arguably 
the most comprehensive judicial scrutiny of the precautionary principle to date, largely 
demonstrates this.438 The recent decisions under the EEZ Act also illustrate a tendency to 
take this approach. For example, in the Trans-Tasman Resources decision (despite being 
confronted with considerable scientific uncertainty), the decision-making committee 
applies the precautionary principle as contained in s 61 of the EEZ Act without any 
consideration of its legal parameters or content. In addition, they do not take a structured 
  
436 See for example Sea-Tow Limited v Auckland Regional Council EnvC A066/06 at [462] where the 
Environment Court sets out several “general principles” derived from a number of Environment Court and 
High Court decisions to guide the application of the precautionary principle.  
437 Examples include: Squid Fishery Management Co Ltd v Minister of Fisheries [2003] NZHC WN CP 20/03 
(Unreported, Ronald Young J, 11 April 2003) at [53] to [54]. Shirley Primary School v Christchurch City 
Council [1999] NZEnvC Christchurch C136/98 at [218] to [221].  
438 Final report of the Board of Inquiry New Zealand King Salmon Requests for Plan Changes and 
Applications for Resource Consents, 22 February 2013 at [173] to [178]. Environmental Defense Society v 
The New Zealand King Salmon Company Limited NZHC [2013] 1992 at [73] to [75] where the court sets out 
what it considers to be the legal content of the precautionary principle. In Sustain Our Sounds Inc v The New 
Zealand King Salmon Company Ltd [2014] NZSC 40 at 544 to 554 the Court engages in a more in-depth 
analysis of adaptive management and in doing so delves into the precautionary principle in more depth. 
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approach to applying it (e.g. by working through each of its trigger and response 
dimensions and applying them to the facts at hand).439 However, in doing so the Tribunal 
wholesale adopts the Supreme Court’s reasoning in King Salmon regarding adaptive 
management.440 Unsurprisingly in the Chatham Rock Phosphate decision that followed 
shortly after, the decision-making committee largely followed the Trans-Tasman 
Resources decision so far as application of the precautionary principle was concerned.441  
 
By failing to explore the full substantive content of the precautionary principle and pin 
down its substantive normative content and parameters first, decision-makers and the 
courts are blind to what the precautionary principle means (i.e. what is captured within the 
wider territory of meaning beyond the meta-level definition) and in turn, what is required 
of them when applying it. One can make a strong argument that this, in addition to 
Parliament’s cut-and-paste approach to incorporating it into domestic law is the primary 
cause of confusion amongst New Zealand regulators and the Courts (i.e. in terms of how 
the precautionary principle ought to be interpreted and applied). As identified in Chapter I, 
such confusion is evidenced through the plethora of ad hoc, inconsistent and often-incorrect 
applications of the precautionary principle as reflected in the resulting “range of 
inconsistent judicial approaches” to its application in regulatory decision-making 
context.442  
B Initial steps towards an operational definition  
In response to the above, this chapter employs the analytical framework developed by 
Sandin and others,443 whereby the principle is broken down into the four constituent 
dimensions (outlined in Chapter V above). This chapter will explore each of these 
  
439 Environmental Protection Authority, Trans-Tasman Resources Ltd Marine Consent Decision, June 2014 
at [798]. 
440 At [800] to [802]. 
441 Environmental Protection Authority, Chatham Rock Phosphate Limited Decision, February 2015. 
442 See Catherine J Iorns Magallanes, above n 8. Alexander Gillespie, above n 15. Greg Severinsen, above n 
15. Joan Forret, above n 15, at 51; McIntyre v Christchurch City Council [1996] 2 ELRNZ 84 at 99. Derek 
Nolan, above n 15. 
443 Note that this framework is discussed in Chapter V “Introducing the precautionary principle”. 
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dimensions in more detail in order to ascertain what additional normative content can be 
reasonably inferred. As outlined in Chapter V, when applying the precautionary principle 
decision-makers must:  
 
(1) ascertain whether the harm and certainty dimensions (or risk thresholds) of the 
principle (which together comprise the “precautionary trigger”), have been met; and 
(2) in the event the trigger thresholds are met, determine the appropriate “precautionary 
response”, which is prescribed by the action and command dimensions. 
 
It is hoped that this process of unpacking each of the four dimensions that make up the 
principle’s core skeletal structure will help: identify in detail, the principle’s normative 
substance; and, in doing so, produce a more operational authoritative formulation of the 
principle. It is also hoped that such efforts will: 
 
(1) facilitate a more meaningful and correct application of the principle and in turn enable 
the principle to operate more effectively in New Zealand going forward; and 
(2) in turn enhance the ability of decision-makers to fulfil the sustainable management 
objective of the various environmental legislative regimes it is applied under.    
C Operationalising the harm dimension 
As discussed in Chapter V, the “threat dimension” concerns the potential ecological 
harm that may result if the activity in question is allowed to continue or proceed (that is, 
possible ecological harm which may materialise if there is regulatory inaction).444 In 
particular, it stipulates how severe a potential harm must be in order to trigger 
precautionary action. For those formulations that address specific subject matter, it can also 
limit the harm trigger to specific types of harm (for example, pollution or impacts of 
  
444 Per Sandin, above n 245 at 890. Adrian Deville and Rodney Harding “Applying the Precautionary 
Principle” (The Federation Press, Sydney, 1997) at 25. M Matthee and D Vermersch above n 245 at 61. A 
Epiney and M Scheyli anove n 245 at 109 to 110. James Cameron and Juli Abouchar above n 2 at 45. Arie 
Trouwborst, above n 75 at 30. James Cameron and Will Wade-Gery, above n 75, at 11. James Cameron and 
Juli Abouchar, above n 284 at 21. 
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releasing greenhouse gas).445  
1 Gravity of harm: imposing a harm threshold 
It is understood that the severity of human impacts can vary. Harm may be of an 
increasing magnitude ranging upwards from negligible to minimal to moderate to 
considerable or catastrophic.446 As is evident from the various versions, many harm 
dimensions include qualifiers that stipulate minimum thresholds damage based on severity. 
The purpose of this is to exclude from the principle’s reach those harms that do not warrant 
precautionary action, hence the use of thresholds that limit its application “to threats that 
raise special environmental concerns because of their magnitude and/or type”.447  
 
The rationale behind this limitation to the precautionary principle’s application is that 
the taking of all risks cannot be banned completely. While every ecological change induced 
by human activity may not necessarily manifest itself in anthropogenic damage, most 
human activities do.448 Consequently, as long as humans exist, it is impossible and not 
desirable to prevent all levels of harm regardless of magnitude.449 Thus, a line has to be 
drawn somewhere.450 For this reason, most international law formulations include harm 
dimensions that sit on a continuum between:  
 
(1) High gravity harm thresholds (which, as noted above, reduce the protective strength 
  
445 Per Sandin, above n 245, at 890 to 892. Daniel Bodansky, above n 245, at 387. 
446 Joe Tickner and Carolyn Raffensperger above n 76, at 8. 
Per Sandin, above n 245, at 889 at 891. 
447 Daniel Bodansky above n 245, at 891. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 43. Julian Morris Rethinking Risk 
and the Precautionary Principle (Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, 2000) at 14. James Cameron, above n 
247, at 36. Andre Nollkaemper “What you risk reveals what you value, and Other Dilemmas Encountered in 
the Legal Assault on Risks” in David Freestone and Ellen Hey (eds) The Precautionary Principle and 
International Law: The Challenge of Implementation (Kluwer International, Hague, 1996) 73 at 82. 
448 Per Sandin, above n 245, at 889 at 891. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75 at 43. Julian Morris, above n 447, at 
14. James Cameron above n 247, at 36. Andre Nollkaemper, above n 447, at 82. 
449 Andre Nollkaemper, above n 447, at 83. 
450 At 83. 
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of the formulation),451  that require the presence of “threats of serious or irreversible 
damage”;452 “damage to the marine environment [that] can be irreversible or 
remediable only at considerable expense and over long periods”;453 and 
(2) comparatively lower gravity harm thresholds (which conversely strengthen the 
protective nature of the formulation),454 which merely require the presence of a threat, 
such as: “threat of a significant reduction or loss of biological diversity”;455 and 
“significant risks to nature or other adverse effects”.456  
 
These thresholds can be compared to those that feature in various New Zealand 
precautionary principle formulations identified above: 
 
(1) “adverse environmental effects or the risks of serious or irreversible environmental 
damage” (Environment 2010 Strategy); 
(2)  “Effects on the coastal environment [that] are potentially significantly adverse” 
(NZCPS); 
(3) “adverse effects” (HSNO); and 
(4) “significant adverse effects” (sections 31 and 61 of the  EEZ Act).  
  
451 “‘Significant’ threats encompass both ‘serious’ and ‘irreversible’ threats, but provide a lower threshold 
than those terms” in Richard Hildreth, Casey Jarman and Maggie Langlas “Roles for a Precautionary 
Approach in U.S. Marine Resources Management” (2004) 19 Natural Resources & Environment No. 1 at 64 
to 67. See also Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 63, Figure 2, which lists the terms in ascending order of 
gravity, and 64, which states that Figure 2 “accurately reflects the reality of positive international law in that 
the various thresholds with their consequences have been placed in the correct order”.  
452 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1 (1992) Reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992). Bergen Ministerial Declaration on 
Sustainable Development in the European Commission for Europe (ECE) Region, UN Doc 
A/CONF.151/PC/10 (1990). Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, arts 
10 and 11, 39 ILM 1027 (opened for signature 29 January 2000, entered into force 11 September 2003). 
453 Ministerial Declaration of the First International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, 31 
October – 1 November 1984. 
454 “‘Significant’ threats encompass both ‘serious’ and ‘irreversible’ threats, but provide a lower threshold 
than those terms” Richard Hildreth, Casey Jarman and Maggie Langlas above n 451, at 64 to 67. See also 
Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 63.  
455 Convention on Biological Diversity 1760 UNTS 79, 142 (opened for signature 5 June 1992, entered into 
force 29 December 1993), preamble. 
456 World Charter for Nature, Art 11, GA A/RES/37/7 48th plenary meeting28 October 1982. 
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But for the non-legally binding Environment 2010 Strategy harm threshold, each of the 
New Zealand formulations either expressly stipulate that ‘significant’ harm required to 
trigger application of their respective precautionary response, or are silent on the level of 
harm required to do so. In any case, where a harm threshold has been specified, it is clear 
that Parliament, or, in the case of the NZCPS, the Minister, have set the threshold low. On 
this basis, this paper goes on to consider what “significant effects” means.  
2 Significant effects  
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines significant as “not insignificant or negligible”. 
In the international setting, commentators assert that the threshold of ‘significant’ harm is 
met when the harm an activity may inflict is more than minor, insignificant, or trivial, but 
something less than ‘serious’ or ‘substantial’.457 Thus, under such a threshold, all harm that 
is considered to be more than negligible ought to be capable of triggering a precautionary 
response (i.e. assuming that the uncertainty threshold is also met).  
 
The lower cut-off point makes sense. The principle arose to counter the mischief of 
longer-term harm that has implications for sustainability and intergenerational equity. 
Furthermore, given the principle’s primary objective is to facilitate sustainable 
development;458 it would be incongruent with the principle’s purpose if it were to apply to 
lesser forms of harm that do not threaten the health and integrity of ecosystem structure 
and function. This is because doing so would: result in excessive limits being placed on 
activities; and, in turn, prevent sustainable management objectives being achieved, as the 
incorrect balance between use and protection will have been struck. Employing this 
  
457 Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, above n 43, at 269. R Lefeber "Transboundary environmental 
interference and the Origin of State Liability" (1996). See also ILC Draft Articles on International Liability, 
UN Doc A/CN 4/428 (1990) and on International Watercourses, IIYbLC (1984) Pt 1, 112. UNGA Report of 
the 6th Committee, UN Doc A/51/869 (1997) 5. ILC Report (2001) 388, [4] to [7] as cited in Patricia Birnie, 
Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgewell International Law and the Environment (3rd ed, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2008) at 186. 
458 See discussion above regarding the link between sustainable development and the operation of the 
precautionary principle under the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) 
Act 2012, the Resource Management Act 1991 and the Fisheries Act 1996.  
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reasoning, commentators have also asserted that, where a threat dimensions are silent as to 
the threshold of harm required to trigger its application, a threshold of significant harm is 
implicit and therefore must be read in.459  
 
This interpretation appears congruent with the New Zealand legislative regimes 
discussed above. For example, the Resource Management Act 1991 pitches the level of 
harm that it seeks to manage under its consenting regime (for the purpose of ensuring 
sustainability) at “more than minor”.460 The same threshold operates under the EEZ Act 
also.461 This is likely to be the reason why the New Zealand legislature has refused to 
incorporate the much higher harm threshold of “serious or irreversible damage” that 
features in the most widely endorsed international law formulations of the precautionary 
principle462 and has instead favoured the lower threshold of significant harm. This latter 
point is something that decision-makers and the courts must keep in mind when resorting 
to international law precautionary principle formulations to aid their interpretation of that 
found in s 61 of the EEZ Act.   
3 Irreversible effects 
Although the New Zealand threat dimension formulations do not expressly include the 
qualifier that threats must be irreversible, it is worth considering what this entails in 
practice because:  
  
459 Elizabeth Fisher, above n 359, at 15. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 44. European Environment Bureau, 
1999 at paragraph 3.2.  
460 Resource Management Act 1991, s 95A. 
461 Ministry for the Environment above n 421. EEZ Act, s 83. 
462 See for example Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, June 14, 1992, U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1 (1992) Reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992). Bergen Ministerial Declaration on 
Sustainable Development in the European Commission for Europe (ECE) Region, UN Doc 
A/CONF.151/PC/10 (1990). Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions UN Doc EB.AIR/R. 84 (opened for signature 14 June 1994, 
entered into force 5 August 1998). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 31 ILM 854 
(opened for signature 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994). Convention to Ban the importation 
into Forum Islands Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive wastes and to control the transboundary 
movement and management of wastes within the South Pacific Region (Opened for signature 16 September 
1995, entered into force 21 October 2001). 
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(1) significant effects can also be irreversible, something which informs how significant 
an effect in fact is;  
(2) given intergenerational equity is at the core of the precautionary principle, where such 
potential effects are in play, the purpose of the precautionary principle further directs 
decision-makers to take precautionary action; and 
(3) presence of such a threat has significant implications for determining the appropriate 
precautionary response.    
 
Irreversible effects are those that allow no practical opportunity to correct the 
environmental damage once it has occurred.463 The notion of irreversibility and what must 
be met before an effect is deemed to be irreversible has some difficulties. As Morris notes, 
in a scientific sense, all change is irreversible because the precise structure of the world 
that pertained before “cannot come into being”.464 On this basis he asserts this “ultimately 
negates the utility of including ‘irreversibility’ as a criterion as distinct from ‘serious’”.465 
Conversely, over long time-scales, many impacts can remediate naturally.466 Furthermore, 
harm may not be irreparable for physical reasons (that is, technically it may be possible to 
remediate); however, the cost of doing so may be so prohibitive that in all practically it is 
irreversible.467  In light of such difficulties, commentators argue that irreversibility means 
the that:468 
 
Long-term damage that is non in stricto senso irreversible, is nonetheless so 
enduring and/or unlikely to be undone that it is deemed “practically”, “virtually”, 
apparently”, “essentially” or “effectively” irreversible. Thus, the 1982 CCAMLR 
and 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
  
463 James E Hickey and Vern R Walker, above n 74, at 446 
464 Julian Morris, above n 447, at 14. 
465 At 14. 
466 European Environmental Agency Late Lessons from Early Warnings: The Precautionary Principle 1986 
to 2000, Environmental Law Issues Report No. 22 Copenhagen 2001 at 171. I M Goklany “Applying the 
Precautionary Principle in a Broader Context” in Julian Morris, above n 447. 
467 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 61. 
468 At 61 (citations omitted). 
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Resources, both of which are among the first international instruments to introduce 
the concept of irreversibility in to their operative terms, respectively require parties 
to prevent changes or minimise the risk of changes to ecosystems “which are not 
potentially reversible over two or three decades” and which are not reversible over 
a reasonable time.     
 
Given that securing inter-generational equity is at the core of the precautionary 
principle’s purpose, the adoption of such a workable approach makes sense, particularly as 
part of an operational definition. In any case, this gives a further indication of how 
irreversibility may be used to inform the severity of harm, and in turn, when and to what 
extent precautionary action is required in order to ensure sustainable management 
outcomes.469  
4 Objective criteria for decision-makers 
Commentators note that determining what constitutes “serious” can be subjective, 
value-laden exercise. However, in response to the call for objective criteria, commentators 
have come up with the following mostly objective indicia for ascertaining:470 
 
(1) “spatial scale of harm”; whereby the extent of a given harms geographical spread 
operates as an indication of severity (for example, local, regional, national or 
global);471  
(2) “temporal scale of harm”; whereby persistence of harm over time (namely, whether 
effects are immediate, short term, mid-term, long-term, intergenerational or 
irreversible) also operates as an indicator of severity;  
  
469 Adrian Deville and Rodney Harding, above n 444, at 25. Daniel Bodansky above n 245, at 387. Per Sandin 
above n 245, at 889 at 891 to 892. Nicholas de Saadler above n 75, at 16.  
470 Adrian Deville and Rodney Harding above n 444, at 25. Daniel Bodansky above n 245, at 387. Per Sandin 
above n 245, at 891 to 892. Andreas Klinke and Ortwin Renn “Prometheus Unbound: Challenges of Risk 
evaluation, risk classification and risk management” (Working Paper No 153, Akademie für 
Technikfolgenabschätzung in Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart, 1999) http://elib.uni-
stuttgart.de/opus/volltexte/2004/1712/pdf/ab153.pdf. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 57. Graeme Parkes 
“Precautionary fisheries management; the CCMLR approach” (2000) 24 Marine Policy 83 at 84. 
471 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 56 to 57 
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(3) the potential magnitude of an ecological impact on “genetic, species, or ecosystem 
abundance or diversity and processes such as atmospheric, water and nutrient cycles” 
and their subsequent impact on human health, wellbeing, enjoyment and economic 
interests;  
(4) the perceived value of threatened environment (i.e. that which will be subject to harm), 
whereby impacts on highly valued environments (for example, pristine environments, 
those valued for conservation, or critical human activities and so on) are more readably 
viewed severe in nature;   
(5) the connectivity of a receiving ecosystem (for example, via complex interactions, 
multiple feedbacks and other linkages) indicates a propensity for pervasive effects 
(note that this may also go to the spatial scale of harm); and 
(6) reversibility of the potential harm (i.e. whether it is permeant in nature), for example 
will it result in species loss, an ecosystem shift, or the release of persistent harmful 
substances.     
D Operationalising the certainty dimension   
As discussed in chapters IV and V, the main thrust of the principle is that it entitles 
regulatory action to be taken, despite “a lack of certainty about cause and effect 
relationships, or the nature and extent of environmental harm”.472 In legal terms, this 
(contrary to the traditional approach) entitles regulators to act without first having to prove 
causation (namely, that the activity they seek to regulate will cause harm in the absence of 
regulatory action). As noted in Chapter III, the standard of proof which regulators were 
required to meet in order to discharge this burden is proof on the balance of probabilities. 
1 General operation of the certainty threshold   
Subject to the limited number of formulations that operate from the starting point of 
reversing the burden of proof (i.e. where an activities proponent must to prove its safe 
before it can be undertaken), most precautionary principle formulations reduce the burden 
  
472 James Cameron above n 247, at 35. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 71. Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth 
Fisher above n 8, at 10. 
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placed on regulators by the need to prove causation. This is done by relaxing the standard 
of proof that a regulator must meet before they are entitled to implement protective 
measures.   
 
The certainty dimension built into each formulation of the precautionary principle 
prescribes the extent to which this standard of proof is relaxed for a regulator wishing to 
restrict an activity or member of the public wishing to oppose one during a consenting 
process on the basis of an asserted effect.473 In other words, this second component of the 
“precautionary trigger” stipulates a lesser level or threshold of knowledge as to the possible 
harm to the environment, which must be met before protective measures are taken, or in 
other words, before the precautionary response is triggered. As Bodansky notes, 
however:474 
 
this leaves open the question: Is any scientific evidence at all required of a potential 
threat before precautionary action is warranted, or justified, or required? And, if 
so, how much evidence? Or can mere speculation or fear trigger application of the 
precautionary principle? 
 
As the precautionary principle represents a shift away from needing to prove causation, 
the degree of certainty demanded by any given formulation must therefore reside 
somewhere between the following levels of scientific confidence:475  
 
(1) at the lowest end of the spectrum: “no rational basis in sound science data at all”, 
whereby concerns about environmental impacts are based on mere speculation and 
unfounded assertions;  and  
  
473 Judith Jones and Simon Bronitt above n 279, at 137 to 145. Jamie Benidickson et al above n 159, at D-43 
to D-44. The Royal Society of Canada Elements of Precaution: Recommendations for the Regulation of Food 
Biotechnology in Canada (Health Canada, Canadian Food Inspection Agency and Environment Canada, 
Expert Panel Report, January 2001) at 196 and 201 to 202. James Cameron and Will Wade-Gery, above n 
75, at 18. 
474 Daniel Bodansky above n 245, at 388.  
475 Adrian Deville and Rodney Harding above n 444, at 33. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 103. Alexander 
Gillespie, above n 15, at 372. Simon Marr, above n 11, at 25 to 26. 
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(2) at the highest possible end of the spectrum: proof on the balance of probabilities.476  
 
In an effort to identify an appropriate lesser alternative to balance of probabilities (i.e. an 
objective lesser standard of proof that sits at some point along the above continuum), 
commentators have attempted to elucidate what the substitute knowledge thresholds (i.e. 
certainty dimensions) of various existing precautionary principle formulations require. For 
example, in considering the thresholds of “reasonable scientific possibility” and 
“reasonable scientific probability” two lead authors note:477      
 
A reasonable scientific possibility could be said to exist whenever empirical 
scientific data (as opposed to mere hypotheses, speculation, or intuition) provide a 
rational basis that warrants drawing the conclusions from the data, even though 
reasonable scientific experts might disagree on whether that conclusion is the only 
valid, inference from the data. A reasonable scientific probability (or likelihood) 
exists whenever scientific experts generally agree that the available data and 
methods used to interpret the data are valid and reliable, and when there is also 
general acceptance by the relevant scientific community of the specific conclusions 
drawn from the data. "General acceptance" means something less than unanimity, 
but more than a minority opinion. 
 
Discussing the level at which the certainty threshold is likely pitched by any given 
formulation Sandin points out “the greater the uncertainty allowed, i.e., the less plausible 
the threat has to be, the stronger (in the sense of more cautious) is the principle”.478 In other 
words, the lower the level of certainty demanded, the more precautionary a formulation 
is.479 In this regard, Applegate notes that “[d]ifferent formulations of precaution envision 
different relationships between the existence or finding of uncertainty and the obligation to 
  
476 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 103. Alexander Gillespie, above n 15, at 372. 
477 James E Hickey and Vern R Walker above n 74, at 499 to 450. Adrian Deville and Rodney Harding above 
n 444, at 33. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 103. Alexander Gillespie, above n 15, at 372. Simon Marr, 
above n 11, at 25 to 26.  
478 Per Sandin above n 245, at 889 at 893. 
479 Per Sandin above n 245, at 892 to 893. 
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take regulatory action”.480  
 
At this point it is worth observing that, regardless of the specific point at which a 
revised lower threshold is set, relaxing the standard of proof that a regulator or opponent is 
subject to creates what is referred to as a “shifting” or “swinging” (as distinct from 
reversed) burden of proof, whereby:481  
 
(1) a regulatory or opponent is required to discharge their burden of proof to a lower 
standard by adducing some scientific evidence that meets the standard (i.e. but which 
itself, would not be sufficient to discharge proof on the balance of probabilities); and 
(2) once such evidence is adduced (i.e. to the satisfaction of the lower precautionary 
standard) the burden then shifts to the proponent of the activity to rebut the 
presumption in favour of declining or restricting the activity.   
2 Deriving an alternative threshold 
To an extent, the certainty dimensions of the various international law formulations at 
least give an initial steer as to where on the above continuum the particular revised 
threshold to be met has been set. Like the harm threshold, these can be disaggregated into 
strong and weak formulations. Common examples of weak formulations that impose a high 
threshold (i.e. those that reside further towards the “balance of probabilities” end of the 
spectrum) include “lack of full scientific certainty” (arguably the most widely endorsed 
internationally);482 and “scientific research has not fully proved a causal link”.483 
  
480 John S Applegate, above n 9, at 28. 
481 Judith Jones and Simon Bronitt above n 279, at 141. Nicholas Ashford “A conceptual framework for the 
use of the precautionary principle in law” in Carolyn Raffensperger and Joel Tickner (eds) above n 88, at 
204. Warwick Gullett “Environmental Protection and the ‘Precautionary Principle’: A response to scientific 
uncertainty in Environmental management” (1997) 14 EPLJ 52 at 59. 
482 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1 (1992) Reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992). United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, art 3, 31 ILM 854 (opened for signature 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) 
and Convention on Biological Diversity 1760 UNTS 79, 142 (opened for signature 5 June 1992, entered into 
force 29 December 1993), preamble.  
483 United Nations Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes, opened for signature 17 March 1992, 31 ILM 1316 (1992) (entered into force 6 October 1996); 1994 
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Stonger formulations that exist towards the mere assertion end of the spectrum 
however appear not to impose any thresholds at all.484 For example, the German Vorsorge 
(which gave rise to the international law iterations of the precautionary principle), provides 
that decision-makers may “[act] when conclusively ascertained understanding of science 
is not yet available”.485 As indicated above, such lower thresholds (which typically feature 
in formulations that arise in marine dumping, hazardous substances and modified 
organisms context) allow precautionary action to be taken:486 
 
(1) “when there is reason to believe that wastes or other matter introduced into the 
marine environment are likely to cause harm even when there is no conclusive 
evidence to prove a causal relation between inputs and their effects;  
(2) “without waiting for scientific proof”;  
(3) despite a “[l]ack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific 
information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects. 
While the above certainty dimension examples prima facie do not impose a minimum 
proof threshold, it is increasingly accepted that “the plain theoretical possibility of 
  
Agreement on the Protection of the River Scheldt, opened for signature 26 April 1994, 34 ILM 851 (1995); 
1994 Agreement on the Protection of the (River) Meuse, opened for signature 26 April 1994, 34 ILM 851 
(1995). 
484 Arie Trouwborst above n 75, at 103. 
485 1984 Report from the Government to the Federal Parliament on the Protection of Air Quality, BMI 1984 
as cited in Sonia Boehmer-Christiansen “The Precautionary Principle in Germany – Enabling Government” 
in T O’Riordan and J Cameron (eds) Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Cameron May, London, 1994) 
at 37. 
486 1996 Protocol to the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter, 1972 and 
Resolutions Adopted by Special Meeting 36 ILM 7 (opened for signature 7 November 1996, not yet in force). 
For examples of other marine dumping formulations also see the Convention on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, art 3(2), BNA 35:0401 (opened for signature 9 April 1992, entered into 
force 17 January 2000), which instructs decision-makers to act "when there is reason to assume” harm will 
result. Ministerial Declaration of the Third International Conference on Protection of the North Sea, 7-8 
March 1990, which allows action “even where there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between 
emissions and effects…”. the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East 
Atlantic, opened for signature September 22 1992, 32 ILM 1069, Art 2 (entered into force 25 March 1998) 
(‘OSPAR Convention’), which entitles action where “there are reasonable grounds for concern”.   
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environmental damage is not sufficient to trigger the application of the precautionary 
principle…”.487 This position was asserted and accepted during the “MOX” plant case 
where Ireland contested the lawfulness of the United Kingdoms’ new nuclear processing 
plant on a British coastline that was proximate to Ireland. In this case the United Kingdom 
asserted:488 
 
[T]he risk of harm occurring must in some measure be a real risk. It cannot be 
simply the merest suggestion that harm might occur. While this is not to suggest 
that the threshold is one of the probability of harm occurring, it must be more than 
the hypothetical or remote possibility of such harm.  
 
The above internationally certainty threshold examples can be compared with those 
that feature in the EEZ Act, the NZCPS, the Fisheries Act and HSNO, which respectively, 
are as follows: 
 
(1) “when information is uncertain, unreliable, or inadequate”;489 
(2) “effects [that] are uncertain, unknown, or little understood”;490 
(3) “information available is uncertain or inadequate”;491 and 
(4) “scientific and technical uncertainty about those effects”.492 
  
Based on this comparison, it is apparent that the New Zealand thresholds do not include the 
high threshold qualifiers such as ‘full scientific certainty’, which are found in the weaker 
international formulations. However, as noted above, some minimal threshold is likely 
implicit in each.  
  
487 Charles Weiss “Scientific Uncertainty and Science Based Precaution” (2003) 3 Politics Law and 
Economics 137. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 107. P.L. De Fur “Implementing the Precautionary 
Principle: Application to Policies Regarding Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals” in Carolyn Raffensperger and 
Joel Tickner (eds), above n 88, at 337.     
488 Written Response of the United Kingdom, dated 15 November 2001 at [184]. 
489 Fisheries Act 1996, s 10. 
490 NZCPS, principle 3. 
491 EEZ Act, s 61(2). 
492 HSNO, s 7. 
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The problem however, is that it is difficult to derive from the certainty threshold 
wording in the above domestic legislative formulations, an understanding as to where they 
reset the standard of proof. Bodansky notes that this is because they do not go beyond a 
purely negative formulation of defining the type of evidence or proof that is not required, 
and as such “do not define what positive evidence of an environmental risk is needed in 
order to trigger application of the precautionary principle”.493 As such, one must look 
beyond the specific wording in order to identify what alternative standard of proof is 
demanded.  
3 Deriving an alternative New Zealand threshold 
The above however does not take us very far. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
consider at length the Court’s approach to evidence, the process and criteria employed to 
ascertain admissibility of evidence, and what constitutes proof. However, suffice to say, this 
paper asserts that when applying the precautionary principle the Courts ought to:  
 
(1) carefully consider what in practice these rules require in order to prove harm on the 
balance of probabilities; and 
(2) work back from this point by reference to the specific mischiefs identified in Chapter 
IV, in order to identify what certainty threshold will actually be capable of acting in 
anticipation of harm.    
 
Regarding the latter, this exercise should be conducted by reference to how weak or strong 
the overall formulation is intended to be. As noted above, a given formulation is only as 
strong as its weakest dimension. Thus, by implication, a strong overall formulation demands 
a strong certainty dimension. Strength of a formulation can be discerned from the strength 
of the other dimensions as well as context it is to be applied in (e.g. if intended for 
application to dumping of waste, the overall formulation is typically intended to be strong). 
 
  
493 Daniel Bodansky, above n 245, at 388. 
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By way of example, when considering what revised threshold (i.e. standard of proof) a 
given certainty dimension requires in practice, one can look to the Daubert criteria,494 which 
the New Zealand courts have sometimes employed to determine admissibility of evidence. 
These factors include:495 
 
(a) The degree of testing to which the theory or technique has undergone;  
(b) The extent of peer review and the publication of the theory or technique;  
(c) The known or potential margin of error for a particular technique together with 
its methodological reliability 
(d) The level of general acceptance within the relevant scientific community.     
 
Without exploring each of these criteria in detail, it is worthwhile noting those occasions 
where the precautionary principle is asserted is likely to involve the offering of novel 
scientific evidence, otherwise there would not be uncertainty and in turn an need to invoke 
the principle. Considering this, the Courts should consider the extent to which the 
application of such criteria:  
 
(1) is likely to give rise to those mischiefs identified in Chapter IV which collectively gave 
rise to the need to act in advance of scientific proof; 
(2) takes them closer towards the balance of probabilities end of the spectrum and thus 
further away from actually acting in a precautionary manner in advance of science;  
(3) is likely to frustrate a regulators capacity to act in advance of harm.  
E    Command dimension  
As Sandin notes, the command dimension prescribes “what the status of the action is, 
for example, if the action is allowable, justified, recommended, or mandatory”.496 In other 
words this dimension establishes whether the applicable version of the precautionary 
  
494 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc (1993) 125 L Ed 2d 469 at 480 as cited in Joan Forret above 
n 15, at 52.  
495 Joan Forret, above n 15, at 53. 
496 Per Sandin, above n 245, at 895. 
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principle:497     
 
(1) imposes a positive legal duty on the decision-maker to implement precautionary or 
protective measures (i.e. to take positive steps); or  
(2) merely confers the decision-maker discretion to implement such measures if they so 
choose.  
 
Strong formulations adopt the former approach. In doing so they employ obligatory 
language like “shall…take preventative measures”, “preventive and abatement action must 
be taken”, “should be taken” and so on.498  
There are two tiers of weak command dimensions. The weakest tier does not create an 
affirmative duty to act but rather dispel the ability to rely on scientific uncertainty to justify 
inaction.499 These formulations typically employ ubiquitous triple-negative popularised by 
the Rio Declaration version of the precautionary principle, which provides: “lack of 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation”. The other tier simply emphasise the need to take 
action when the given precautionary trigger is met. However, in doing so they employ 
permissive wording that confers the decision-maker discretion to decide whether to do as 
such. Furthermore, as will be shown in the action dimension below, many weak 
formulations also often make the taking of precautionary action contingent on cost.500     
As illustrated in the table on page 111, when comparing such international command 
dimensions to those that that feature in New Zealand precautionary principle formulations, 
the following observations cam be made:  
(1) It is clear that the EEZ Act sits at the obligatory end of the spectrum by providing that 
  
497 At 895. Rosie Cooney, above n 361  
498 Sachs above n 259, at 1295. Daniel Bodansky, above n 245, at 386. Jonathan Wiener, above n 247, at 604 
to 605. Gary E Marchant, above n 7 
499 Jonathan Wiener, above n 247, at 604. Daniel Bodansky, above n 245, at 384. 
500 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 122. Jonathan Wiener, above n 247, at 605. Daniel Bodansky, above 
above n 245, at 385. 
  155 
where there is uncertainty (more specifically, where the precautionary trigger is met): 
“the EPA must favour caution and environmental protection”.  
(2) Similarly, NZCPS formulation, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the King 
Salmon decision likewise provides that a decision-maker “[must a]dopt a 
precautionary approach towards proposed activities whose effects on the coastal 
environment are [uncertain]”.501  
(3) The HSNO formulation appears to occupy a middle ground. While it is more 
‘directive’ in nature, the wording clearly retains an element of discretion on the part of 
the decision-maker by providing that they “shall take into account the need for caution 
in managing adverse effects”.502  
(4) Similarly, the Fisheries Act employs the discretionary directive at s 10(c), which 
provides “decision makers should be cautious when information is uncertain, 
unreliable, or inadequate”. This wording arguably creates a stronger command 
dimension to the HSNO formulation because it goes further than asking the decision-
maker to simply “take into account” a need for caution by stating that they “should be 
cautious”.  
Notwithstanding the prima facie retention of decision-maker discretion, the HSNO and 
Fisheries Act formulations still likely restrain a decision-maker’s legal ability to not take 
precautionary action when faced with uncertainty. These formulations apply to 
administrative decisions made by officials. The general administrative law principle that 
the exercise of such discretionary power must be reasonable may be used to set aside a 
decision where the decision-maker:503 
(1) in exercising that power, pursues an improper purpose, or fails to take into account 
relevant considerations, or takes into account irrelevant considerations; or 
(2) has made a decision that is so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it 
lay within its powers 
  
501 Department of Conservation New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement (2010), policy 3 at 12. Sustain Our 
Sounds Inc v the New Zealand King Salmon Company Ltd [2014] NZSC 40; (2014) 10 BRMB 137.  
502 HSNO, s 7. 
503 Philip A Joseph Administrative Law (7 May 2015) Lexis Nexis at [100].   
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Thus, when faced with scientific uncertainty and an activity that has the capability to cause 
significant harm, a decision-maker will need:  
(1) to take these factors together with the strong legislative direction to favour caution in 
the HSNO and Fisheries Act formulations into account; and  
(2) in order to justify not favouring caution, point to a rational basis as to why, in spite of 
the precautionary triggers being met, such action is not warranted or required.504  
Regarding the latter, the strength of Parliament’s direction (i.e. “should be cautious” vs 
“shall take into account the need for caution”) will likely influence how strong the requisite 
justification for not favouring caution must be.  
F     Action dimension  
As noted in Chapter V, the action dimension prescribes the protective measures that 
are to be taken in response to an identified threat that has triggered a precautionary 
response.505 As illustrated in the course of discussing the various versions of the 
precautionary principle considered so far, the particular ‘precautionary’ actions required 
by each formulation  (i.e. in terms of measures prescribed by a given action dimension) can 
vary in strength and specificity.  
 
Weak action dimensions essentially fall into two camps. One group states that 
uncertainty is not a basis for postponing action, but does not go as far as to direct that action 
be taken or specify what types of action are precautionary in nature. Those that fall into 
this group are in a sense silent as to the nature and extent of the response expected where 
the precautionary trigger is met.506 The second group simply states action should be taken, 
  
504 See Elizabeth Fisher, above n 75 at 83 to 98. Note that the New Zealand formulations are more directive 
than the formulations that Fisher examines in the context of judicial review on the basis of failure to apply 
the precautionary principle in Australia. As such, they arguably provide more robust grounds for judicial 
review. 
505 See Chapter V discussion on this point. Also refer to Daniel Bodansky above n 245, at 387 and discussion 
on this point in the New Zealand Context in Alexander Gillespie “Precautionary New Zealand” (2011) 24 
NZULR 3 364 at 371 to 373. 
506 Daniel Bodansky, above n 245, at 383 
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but qualifies this by stating that actions must also be cost effective before they may be 
imposed. This cost qualification is best represented by the widely endorsed Rio Declaration 
action dimension which directs decision-makers to take “cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation” in response to the precautionary trigger thresholds being met. 
Logically such provisions weaken the precautionary principle, as they provide that its 
application be linked to economic concerns, thereby subjecting the taking of precautionary 
measures to a cost-benefit analysis. In turn, this significantly weakens the protective nature 
of the principle by allowing economic considerations to be used as an excuse to avoid or 
stop regulatory action.507 In particular, this qualification gives rise to a similar cost/benefit 
analysis to that conducted under the traditional approach, which as noted above, pitches 
more immediate readily identifiable and readily proven economic loss against often less 
immediate readily identifiable and readily proven long-term environmental loss.   
  
In most formulations however, the phrases used are not very specific and are expressed 
in terms such as “precautionary measures”, “preventative measures” or like general 
phrases.508 This arguably accords with the idea that what is ultimately required will always 
  
507 Per Sandin, above n 245, at 894. Catherine J Iorns Magallanes, above n 8, at 6. Michelle Campbell & 
Vernon G. Thomas “Implementing the Precautionary Approach:  Towards Enabling Legislation for Marine 
Mammal Conservation In Canada” in DM Lavigne (ed) Gaining Ground: In Pursuit of Ecological 
Sustainability (Guelph, Ontario, 2006) 321 at 323.  
508 Agenda 21: A Programme for Action for Sustainable Development: Report of the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development, Chapter 22.5,[(c)], UN Doc A./Conf. 151/26 (13 June 1992). Vienna 
Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 22 March 1985, 1513 UNTS 293 
(entered into force 22 September 1988). Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
opened for signature 16 September 1987, 1522 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1989) (as amended 29 
June 1990, 25 November 1992, 17 September 1997, and 3 December 1999). United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 31 ILM 854 (1992) (entered into force 21 
March 1994). International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Co-operation, opened 
for signature 30 November 1990, 1891 UNTS 51 (entered into force 13 May 1995). The 1984 Ministerial 
Declaration of the International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea (1 November 1984). 
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, opened for signature 9 April 
1992, BNA 35:0401 (entered into force 17 January 2000). Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North East Atlantic, opened for signature 22 September 1992, 32 ILM 1069 (entered into 
force 25 March 1998). 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping 
of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 and Resolutions Adopted by the Special Meeting, opened for signature 7 
November 1996, 36 ILM 7 (not yet in force). 
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depend on the circumstances and often cannot be readily ascertained in advance due to 
scientific uncertainty. It also accords with Fisher’s view that the question as to what steps 
ought to be taken is a value laden one and thus, it is more appropriate that it is answered 
by each state. Thus, more prescriptive action dimension is not useful or may be limiting.509 
However, as such formulations do not specify what steps are to be taken they are difficult 
to class as being strong or weak.510  
 
The action dimensions in the various New Zealand precautionary principle 
formulations largely resemble those vague international law action dimensions described 
above that are equivocal in terms of precautionary strength. For example, upon triggering 
a precautionary response the: 
 
(1) HSNO version prescribes “the need for caution in managing adverse effects”;511  
(2) NZCPS version prescribes the adoption of “a precautionary approach towards 
proposed activities”; and 
(3) EEZ Act stipulates that decision-makers must: “favour caution and environmental 
protection”.  
 
Significantly, unlike the most popular precautionary principle formulations found in 
widely adopted international law instruments such as the Rio Declaration and Convention 
on Biological Diversity, New Zealand’s formulations do not include a cost-effective 
qualification.512 On this basis, the New Zealand courts ought to be careful when looking to 
such international formulations for guidance when determining what precautionary action 
should be taken when applying New Zealand formulations. The exclusion of cost 
considerations aligns with the German Vorsorgeprinzip, which provides (in the context of 
irreversible harm caused by acid rain) that cost-benefit analysis ought to be excluded from 
decision-making on the basis such harm ought to be avoided regardless of cost. This view 
  
509 Per Sandin, above n 245, at 894. Elizabeth Fisher and Ronnie Harding above n 391, at 113 and 116. 
510 Per Sandin, above n 245, at 894. 
511 HSNO Act, section 7, above n 415.  
512 See page 85 discussion on cost-effectiveness.  
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accords with the inter-generational equity notion that underpins the precautionary principle 
(i.e. that the actions of humans today should not compromise the interests of future 
generations), and the view that ecosystems should be protected from being compromised 
permanently because of their intrinsic value. On this basis, a strong argument can be made 
that the New Zealand legislative precautionary principle formulations, like the 
Vorsorgeprinzip, contemplate decision-makers and the courts making decisions that:  
 
(1) entail investment in the future, whereby it is appropriate to impose conditions that may 
involve a significant cost to implement but which are necessary to adequately guard 
against long-term harm arising; or 
(2) involve significant opportunity costs resulting from refusal of consent because the 
potential harm may impact future generations.  
 
In terms of specific differences, the EEZ Act’s emphasis on favouring “environmental 
protection” in addition to caution likely further strengthens the protective nature of this 
versions action dimension. A good argument can be made that this additional wording 
suggests Parliament intended to place considerable emphasis on the need to act early in the 
marine environment in the face of uncertainty, and as such demands more in terms of 
action. Such an approach would accord with the sectorial approach described in Chapter 
V, whereby the strength of the given precautionary formulation is tailored to the specific 
risk (i.e. harm and uncertainty) that a given sector of environmental management must 
grapple with.513 This view appears to have been accepted in the Trans-Tasman Resources 
marine consent application because, in discussing the requirement to favour caution under 
s 61, the decision-making committee states:514 “this provision is an explicit statement that, 
within the context of the EEZ Act, the promotion of sustainable development requires a 
cautious approach”. Furthermore, they go on to note:515   
 
  
513 See discussion in Chapter V under “Status of the precautionary principle in international law”. 
514 Environmental Protection Authority, Trans-Tasman Resources Ltd Marine Consent Decision, June 2014 
at [139]. 
515 Above at [774]. 
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Section 61(2) is an important section of the EEZ Act and a significant difference 
from the RMA. Caution and environmental protection are specifically stated and is 
a ‘lens’ through which we must view the proposal to determine if it meets the 
purpose of the Act (section 10).  
 
In Chatham Rock Phosphate, the decision-making committee also appears to adopt the 
same view.516  
 
The Fisheries Act is similar in that at s 10(c) it states that decision-makers “should be 
cautious” when confronted with uncertainty thereby employing an action dimension that is 
neutral in terms of strength. However, at s 10(d) it goes on to state that uncertainty “should 
not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take any measure to achieve the purpose 
of this Act”. Thus, (in contrast to the EEZ Act version) it is more akin to weaker 
formulations that merely permit precautionary action, rather than requiring it. Arguably the 
prima facie weaker s 10(d) action component does not weaken the overall action dimension 
established in s 10(c), but rather simply re-enforces the precautionary imperative imposed 
on the decision-maker. To date, case law discussing s 10 has not examined it in this level 
of detail.517   
 
1     Precautionary measures  
The range of measures that can be undertaken in order to implement the precautionary 
principle are not novel and do not fall within the exclusive domain of the principle.518 
Whether a given environmental measure is, if implemented, truely precautionary in nature, 
depends on whether in the circumstances it is effective at giving effect to the precautionary 
principle’s purpose (i.e. operates to address the mischief the precautionary principle seeks 
  
516 Environmental Protection Authority, Chatham Rock Phosphate Limited Decision, February 2015, at [827]. 
517 See for example Squid Fishery Management Company Ltd v Minister of Fisheries CA 39/04 13 July 2004 
and Roaring Forties Seafood Limited v Minister of Fisheries HC Wellington CIV-2003-485-2706, 11 – 12 
February 2004. 
518 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 179. Freestone above n 12, at 141. Nollkaemper above n 447, at 80.  
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to avoid).519 As Freestone notes:520 
the distinctive feature of the precautionary principle/approach is not that it dictates 
specific regulatory measures: many different types of measures can be used to 
implement it. The distinctive characteristic is the way in which, and the time at 
which, the measures are to be adopted.  
On the above basis this paper does not explore various measures at length but rather focuses 
on the substantive characteristics that a given measure should possess.  
2     Effectiveness as a general consideration   
As Trouwborst notes, in determining “how should we go about taking precautionary 
action, “effectiveness” the fundamental determining factor; the condition of effectiveness 
is so logically apparent that it arguably exists within the precautionary principle tacitly by 
necessary implication.521  
 
A measure is effective if it is likely to produce the desired outcome.522 Whether “the 
measures envisaged…make it possible to achieve the appropriate level of protection”, 
depends on their ability to anticipate (i.e. intervene in advance of) the given harm and 
prevent it before it occurs, rather than react to harm ex post facto.523 On this basis, an action 
is only truly precautionary in nature if it operates as an effective remedy to the harm and 
uncertainty mischiefs identified in Chapter IV that the precautionary principle ultimately 
exists to prevent.524  
 
  
519 Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle International Law and the Environment (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2002) at 676.   
520 Freestone above n 12, at 141.  
521 Arie Trouwborst above n 75, at 147 to 148. 
522 European Commission Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, 
COM(2000) 1 final: 2000 Brussels at 18. Rene Lefeber Transboundary Environmental Interference and the 
Origin of State Liability (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1996) at 61. Arie Trouwborst above n 75, 
at 147 to 148. 
523 De Saadler above n 75, see introduction section.  
524 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 147 to 148.  
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As Kaiser states it must be: “designed to effectively reduce the likelihood of the 
perceived harm occurring”.525 Thus given the above, what constitutes an effective 
precautionary measure will depend on the circumstances, and in particular:  
 
(1) the specific characteristics and idiosyncrasies of the receiving ecosystem;  
(2) the kind of harm that is to be prevented or abated (e.g. the gravity and nature of the 
harm); the extent of the uncertainty that the decision maker is faced with; and  
(3) the relevant limitations of science (e.g. if one must rely on modelling to determine 
ecological impacts then the limitations must be kept in mind).  
 
On the above basis, it can be argued that in order for a decision-maker to be able to 
effectively determine what action constitutes an appropriate “precautionary measure” or 
amounts to “favouring caution” they must:  
 
(1) have a detailed understanding of those matters outlined in Chapter IV, which the 
precautionary principle seeks to overcome; and 
(2) proposed actions ought to be sense checked against these factors in order to ascertain 
whether a proposed precautionary action is in fact capable of overcoming such matters 
or mischief.  
 
3     Other general considerations  
In terms of further general substantive points, it is clear, particularly in stronger 
formulations of the precautionary principle, that precautionary measures entail not only 
caution but also an almost perpetual effort to actively take positive steps to avert harm.526 
This is demonstrated in the Vorsorgeprinzip, which demands that decision-makers take 
“active measures”.527 Specifically, as outlined in Chapter V, in terms of intervention, the 
German formulation requires regulators to:  
  
525 Matthias Kaiser “Fish-Farming and the Precautionary Principle: Context and Values in Environmental 
Science for Policy” (1997) 2FS Environmental Science for Policy 307 at 328. 
526 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 148 to 149. Adrian Deville and Rodney Harding above n 444, at 37 to 78. 
527 See Chapter V discussion on the German formulation of the precautionary principle. 
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(1) be actively looking to the future;  
(2) engaging in long-term planning that looks ahead to address harm as early as is possible;  
(3) actively attempt to detect dangers through ongoing research; and  
(4) require ongoing investment in measures designed to avoid and abate harm.  
 
As noted in Chapter V, the Vorsorgeprinzip is closely related to the concept of 
Gefahrenabwehr, which translates into ‘defence against dangers and threats’, a concept, 
which inherently contemplates active and vigilant regulatory behaviour.528 Chapter V 
tracks migration of the majority of the Vorsorgeprinzip’s substantive content from German 
law into the international law formulations. Thus, on this basis, it may be argued that this 
informs the action dimension of any given international precautionary principle 
formulation. In terms of the active element of the required precautionary action, this is 
arguably demonstrated through the widely adopted Bergen Declaration, which as 
Trouwborst notes: “[stipulates] that precautionary measures “must anticipate, prevent, and 
attack the causes of environmental degradation””.529 Given that New Zealand’s has 
essentially cut and pasted those international precautionary principle versions that were 
inspired by the Vorsorgeprinzip into its environmental legislation, a good argument can be 
made that this active steps notion was also carried over into the action component of New 
Zealand’s domestic formulations as well.    
 
That precautionary actions must be proportional is also implicit in the action 
dimension.530 This concept, which is of considerable importance to the principle’s function 
essentially operates as a counter-balance to the effectiveness requirement.531 As 
Trouwborst summarises (emphasis added):532  
  
528 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 148 to 149. 
529 At 149. 
530 Timothy O’Riordan and James Cameron “The Precautionary Principle in Contemporary Environmental 
Law and Politics” in Raffensberger and Tickner, above n 88. David Vanderzwaag, above n 2, at 167. Fisher 
above n 35, at 320.   
531 Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 149.  
532 At 150.  
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Effectiveness ensures that the relevant purpose is served; proportionality ensures 
that this is all that happens and no more than that, by adjusting the means to the 
objective…From the start, proportionality has been a critical feature in the 
application of the precautionary principle…the notion is firmly anchored in 
pertinent state practice…The more significant or the more serious the expected 
environmental impact, the more rigorous the abatement measures may, 
respectively be.   
 
In addition, Deville and Harding assert that the more uncertain the threat is the more 
cautious we must be.533 This feature of the principle accords with the precautionary 
principle’s core task of ensuring that the necessary steps are taken in order to avoid harm 
before it occurs. Logically, one can only achieve this if the precautionary measures taken 
are commensurate with the uncertainty faced, otherwise one is effectively back to operating 
on a traditional approach basis, whereby the requisite steps are only taken after one has 
proof that they are necessary to avoid harm. Furthermore, this also accords with sustainable 
management purpose that the precautionary principle ultimately seeks to serve, which itself 
entails finding the appropriate balance between protective measures and use.  
 
Implicit in the requirement of effectiveness is the need to ensure that measures are 
comprehensive, integrated and account for the connected nature of ecosystems and 
temporal issues such as the time-delayed and non-linear nature of ecosystem changes.534 In 
this regard the precautionary principle is closely linked to the ecosystem approach.535 As 
such, for an action to be truly precautionary, it must for example, take into account whether 
the chosen precautionary measure is in fact capable of: 
 
(1) guarding against time delayed and non-linear harm – e.g. will imposing monitoring 
requirements as a precautionary measure successfully enable detection of such harm 
  
533 Deville and Harding above n 444 at 37. 
534 Hey above n 79, at 308. Arie Trouwborst, above n 75, at 183. 
535 Tickner above n 76, at 6. N.A. Robinson “Legal Proceedures for Ecosystem Management: Environmental 
Law’s First Challenge of the New Millennium” (2000) 5 APJEL 203. Trouwborst above n 379. 
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and thus, operate as an effective means of bridging the knowledge gap that is 
responsible for uncertainty;  
(2) taking into account the innumerable ecological connections than may be affected by a 
given impact; and  
(3) adequately protecting such ecological connections from an ultimate harm that may 
manifest as a product of a culmination of of knock on impacts being communicated 
through such connections.     
 
Finally, critical to aiding the selection of the appropriate and effective response is the 
need to impose measures that are bias towards environmental protection. Drawing on 
factors such as scientific biased against finding causal relationships (i.e. between an activity 
and resulting harm) that is inherent in statistical analysis,536 and the need to safeguard 
ecological space,537 measures should play it safe by favouring environmental protection.538  
4 Adaptive management  
In the consenting context in New Zealand, particularly in the marine space, decision-
makers and the courts have often asserted that allowing an activity for which consent is 
sought to occur under an adaptive management approach amounts to a precautionary 
response (i.e. proper application of the precautionary principle).539 In addition, the EEZ 
Act closely pairs the precautionary principle and adaptive management in s 61(3) which as 
noted above provides:540 
 
If favouring caution and environmental protection means that an activity is likely 
  
536 See discussion at pages 51 to 54 above.  
537 See discussion at pages 68 to 69. 
538 Van Dyke above n 322, at 330. E.J. Molenaar “Addressing Regulatory Gaps in High Seas Fisheries” 
(2005) 20 IJMCL 533 at 537. David Vanderzwagg “The Implications for the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act (CEPA)” (1994) 
539 See for example Kuku Mara Partnership (Beatrix Bay) v Marlborough District Council (No 2) EnvC W 
39/2004 at [35(g)], [221], [229] and [717], which when read together demonstrate the Court considers 
requiring adaptive management equals proper application of the precautionary principle. Golden Bay Marine 
Farmers v Tasman District Council (No 2) W19/2003 at Chapter 5.   
540 EEZ Act, s 61.  
  166 
to be refused, the EPA must first consider whether taking an adaptive management 
approach would allow the activity to be undertaken. 
 
In other words, s 61(3) states that if, in light of the uncertainty and harm associated 
with an activity for which consent is sought (i.e. which has triggered application of the 
precautionary principle), decision-makers think the appropriate precautionary 
response is to refuse the activity, the EPA must first consider whether taking an 
adaptive management approach would allow the activity to occur.    
 
Given the above, it is worthwhile examining the adaptive management measure 
and considering the application of the “effectiveness” and other criteria above, in order 
to see whether employing adaptive management in response to the Act’s precautionary 
triggers being met truly amounts to proper application of the precautionary principle.  
 
While a universal definition of adaptive management does not exist, the definition 
cited by the Environment Court in Clifford Bay Marine Farms Limited is 
representative:541 
 
Adaptive Management: An experimental approach to management, or "structural 
learning by doing". It is based on developing dynamic models that attempt to make 
predictions or hypotheses about the impacts of alternative management policies. 
Management learning then proceeds by systematic testing of these models, rather 
than by random trial and error. Adaptive management is most useful when large 
complex ecological systems are being managed and management decisions cannot 
wait for [mal research results. 
In practice, adaptive management entails allowing an activity that has uncertain ecological 
effects to start on a smaller scale than is ultimately sought under an application for consent 
  
541 Clifford Bay Marine Farms Limited v Marlborough District Council EnvC C 131/2003 at [151].  
Golden Bay Marine Farmers v Tasman District Council NZEnvC Wellington W 19/03, 27 March 2003 
at [78] to [79]. See also Anne-Marie Smit “Adaptive monitoring: an overview” (DOC Science Internal Series 
138, October 2003). Benidickson et al above n 159, at A-2. R.E. Grumbine “What is Ecosystem 
Management?” (1994) 8:1 Conservation Biology 27 at 31. 
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subject to the following:542  
 
(1) the collection of baseline information about the receiving ecosystem upon which 
subsequent adaptive monitoring is based (e.g. information about the health and 
population of species that are believed to indicate an ecosystems health or natural state 
prior to the proposed activity taking place); 
(2) scientific monitoring of the smaller scale version of the proposed activity’s impact on 
the receiving environment overtime in order to detect, for example: (a) changes or 
deviations from the baseline ecological starting point; and (b) if relevant, levels of 
specified chemicals or substances introduced or generated in the receiving 
environment as a result of the activity;  
(3) thresholds (in terms of deviation from an identified ecological indicator baseline), at 
which remedial action is triggered, which are set on the basis that taking action at this 
point allows sufficient time to react before the impact becomes overly damaging or 
irreversible harm; and 
(4) the activity being allowed to expand in timed stages, typically over the course of 
several years, towards the full activity for which consent was sought, provided that the 
relevant thresholds are not triggered; and  
(5) if triggered, a prescribed management response is initiated, which may entail 
reassessment of the activity, implementation of prescribed mitigation measures or the 
requirement that the activity be ceased.  
   
This paper asserts that while adaptive management may form part of a precautionary 
response, this tool in and of itself is not inherently precautionary in nature for the following 
reasons. First, adaptive management emerged as the primary means of implementing the 
ecosystem approach, which recognises that as a result of the multitude of ecosystem links 
and processes explored in chapter IV:  
  
542 Board of Inquiry's decision in New Zealand King Salmon Requests for Plan Changes and Applications for 
Resource Consent Blenheim, 22 February 2013 at [181]–[182]. Crest Energy Kaipara Ltd v Northland 
Regional Council [2011] NZEnvC 26 at [8]. Golden Bay Marine Farmers above n 541. Derek Nolan & Claire 
Kirman, above n 31, at 384 to 386. Grumbine above n 541. Benidickson et al above n 159, at A-2.   
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(1) activities undertaken in one location may have unforeseen consequences elsewhere, 
often far away and many years later;543 and 
(2) fragmented sectoral and species-specific approaches to environmental management 
fail to adequately protect the environment (i.e. as they are blind, and thus fail to 
account for, the wider ecosystem impact of an activity and the cumulative effects of 
multiple activities on the receiving environment).544 
 
 As explained in chapter V, the ecosystem approach responds to the above by taking an 
integrated and holistic approach, whereby decision-makers are required to take into account 
“all of the components of an ecosystem, both physical and biological, of their interaction 
and of all activities that could affect them”.545 Thus, while the ecosystem approach has 
some functional overlap with the precautionary principle,546 it serves an entirely different 
primary functional purpose to the precautionary principle. In particular,  the ecosystem 
approach is designed to facilitate a shift from fragmented to holistic environmental 
management practices, whereas the precautionary principle is intended to facilitate a shift 
from reactive to anticipatory practices.547  
 
 Within the above context, the ecosystem approach acknowledges there will often be 
uncertainty as to how the impacts of a given activity will communicate throughout the 
receiving ecosystems.548 As such, it employs an adaptive management method of “learning 
by doing” to assist with discerning an activities wider impacts so that holistic management 
  
543 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity above n 134, at 1. Trouwborst above n 379, at 28.  
544 Wang above n 34, at 46. 
545 Owen McIntyre “The Emergence of an ‘Ecosystem Approach’ to the Protection of International 
Watercourses under International Law” (2004) 13 (1) RECIEL 1 at 1. Maltby above n 386, at 17. Report of 
the Secretary General above n 49, at [137]. DA Laffoley and others above n 386, at 7. Wang above n 34, at 
46. 
546 For example, as discussed in chapter V, at a meta level application of the precautionary principle entails 
ongoing research to continue to develop our understanding of the impact activities have on the ecosystem.  
547 Trouwborst above n 379. 
548 McIntyre above n 545. Maltby above n 386. Report of the Secretary General above n 49. Wang above n 
34. Sustain Our Sounds Inc v the New Zealand King Salmon Company Ltd [2014] NZSC 40; (2014) 
10 BRMB 137. Environmental Protection Authority, Trans-Tasman Resources Ltd Marine Consent Decision, 
June 2014.  
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practices can follow. On this basis it can be said, the purpose that adaptive management is 
also designed to achieve is holistic, as opposed to anticipatory, environmental decision-
making.549 In turn, the tools used to implement it, principally adaptive management, are 
geared towards effecting a functional shift to holistic, not anticipatory environmental 
management practices.     
 
In addition, based on the following, a strong argument can be made that adaptive 
management possesses all the hallmarks of the traditional approach. As noted in chapter 
V, adaptive management is an entirely science based approach (i.e. all decisions as to 
whether or not an activity is allowed are based entirely on scientific findings). In this regard 
adaptive management:550  
 
(1) relies on science to measure the ‘baseline’ conditions of the receiving ecosystem (i.e. 
typically by measuring the presence and condition of indicator species), and over time, 
monitors impact of the activity by measuring deviations from the baseline ecological 
state (i.e. the pre-activity ecological status quo);551  
(2) sets impact thresholds (i.e. levels of insult that science believes the receiving 
ecosystem can tolerate) and assumes that there will be sufficient time to react and avoid 
significant harm if action is taken when these thresholds are breached; and  
(3) allows the activity to proceed, be it in a staged manner over several years, unless there 
is scientific proof that it is causing harm.   
 
Based on the above, it may be said that adaptive management is subject to the full 
battery of limitations explored in chapter IV that render science often incapable of 
anticipating harm. While extensive analysis of the scientific limitations associated with 
adaptive management is beyond this paper, the following factors count against its capacity 
  
549 Ibid.  
550 J Brunée and S Toope, above n 384, at 41 onwards, as cited in DEJ Currie above n 384. Owen McIntyre 
above n 384. http://www.msfd.eu/knowseas/library/PB2.pdf at 4. Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of 
the Secretary General, above n 49. Randall Peterman and Michael M’Gonigle “Statistical Power Analysis 
and the Precautionary Principle (1992) 24, No 5 Marine Pollution Bulletin 231. M’Gonigle above n 79   
551 Ibid.  
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to anticipate harm:  
 
(1) By monitoring deviations from baseline measurements of ecological indicators, 
adaptive management employs the standard scientific process of disproving a null 
hypothesis.552  
(2) Despite being an exercise of ascertaining wider ecosystem effects, it focuses on the 
relatively discrete analysis of indicator species, and in doing so it: assumes such 
species operate as a representative indication of all potential impacts the activity in 
question has on the receiving ecosystem’s components; may overlook synergistic and 
cumulative effects; and, may also ignore impacts on related ecosystems and so on.553 
(3) It relies on statistical analysis to prove or disprove the null hypothesis, and in doing so 
becomes subject to the bias in favour of type II errors.  
(4) Despite being conducted over a period of several years, is likely unable to overcome 
the impediment to predicting and proving causal relationships brought about by factors 
such as temporal delays between impacts and the manifestation of harm, oscillating 
ecosystem processes, and other non-linear effects.       
 
Based on the above a strong argument can be made that in essence, adaptive management 
is simply a staged version of the traditional approach. The fundamental difference being 
that it eliminates some scientific uncertainty as it affords the proponent of an activity more 
time to gathering information regarding ecological impacts, and allows them to use 
monitoring of real effects rather than scientific modelling alone, which as noted in chapter 
IV is fraught with uncertainty.    
 
To conclude, this paper asserts that such an approach to vetting the precautionary 
pedigree of a potential measure ought to be taken when applying the action dimension of 
the precautionary principle. In doing so the effectiveness of the measure ought to be 
considered in light of the circumstances (e.g. the nature of the activity and uncertainties 
that are being contended with.  
  
552 Ibid.  
553 See Chapter IV which explains this in detail.  
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VI  Conclusion 
 
As this paper has demonstrated, the precautionary principle has clearly evolved far 
beyond the common sense notion that the legal principle was originally derived from. In 
doing so it has:  
 
(1) grown into a rich territory meaning;  
(2) developed from an aspirational notion into either, depending on the given formulation, 
a legal principle or binding legal rule; and  
(3) become inextricably entangled with other fundamental environmental law norms that 
are at the core of most environmental management legislative regimes.  
 
Although the principle has developed considerably in both international law and 
domestic legal systems (particularly in terms of its application with respect to domestic 
systems) it still has a long way to go before it may be properly regarded as a fully developed 
legal norm. This development deficit is problematic as it creates pressing issues for 
decision makers and the courts when the precautionary principle is incorporated into 
legislation in a rule like manner without first addressing this development, or rather 
operationalising issue.  
 
In spite of this issue and notwithstanding its active role in the precautionary principle’s 
development at international law, New Zealand’s approach to implementing the principle 
domestically has from the start been fundamentally flawed. As outlined above, this is the 
result of what appears to be a demonstrable failure to properly engage with, understand, 
and operationalise the principle (i.e. unpack the international law ‘summary’ definitions 
when incorporating them into legislation) before applying it domestically.  
 
As examined in chapter VI, failure to operationalize the precautionary principle and 
establish a structured uniform approach to applying it, can lead to its misapplication. In the 
consenting context, this can in turn result in the approval of activities that cause significant 
and irreversible harm. Such an outcome operates to undermine the ability of the legislative 
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environmental management regime that it is applied under, to serve its overall purpose of 
sustainable management and associated objectives (e.g. intergenerational equity and 
maintenance of the life supporting capacity of ecosystems).  
 
In light of the above, it is imperative that New Zealand operationalises the domestic 
formulations of the precautionary principle, which are applied under the various legislative 
regimes that it features in and establishes a robust and uniform approach to its application. 
As noted in chapters I and VI, this is particularly important in the marine setting due to: 
the mass prevalence of scientific uncertainty associated with marine ecosystems and the 
impact that human activities inflict when conducted in this space; and, the elevated 
potential for such activities to cause widespread significant and irreversible harm. In 
considering how this is achieved it is worth noting the:  
 
(1) the disparity between the approaches taken to applying the precautionary principle in 
New Zealand in various cases that have applied it to date; and  
(2) considerable disagreement both internationally and nationally as to what the wider 
substantive content of the precautionary principle entails; and 
(3) fact that operationalising the precautionary principle entails making various value 
judgements in respect of the levels of risk that New Zealand is willing to assume (i.e. 
as a result of electing to incorporate into a given formulation, operational detail that 
strengthens or weakens the given formulation).     
 
Given the above factors, it is unlikely that the monumental task of “opeationalising” 
the precautionary principle can or should be achieved through the courts’ efforts of 
interpreting the existing high-level definitions and elucidating their substantive content. 
Arguably, such disparity demonstrates that a strong legislative steer is required to establish 
a standardised approach to applying the precautionary principle. Furthermore, while the 
courts may be well placed to elucidate the burden and standard of proof issues, resolving 
many of the other definitional ambiguities imbedded within the principle will likely entail 
value judgements that should only be made by elected officials. Furthermore, the task of 
clarifying, operationalizing, and properly embedding the precautionary principle into 
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existing risk management regimes will require considerable coordination. On this basis the 
only viable way to resolve the fundamental issues identified by this paper will be though 
the development of policy by central government and the implementation of it through 
legal instruments such as legislation, regulations and policy documents like the NZCPS.    
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